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ABSTRACT 
The organisation of work is seen here as concerning the 
ways in which various elements in work such as skills, 
tasks and structures of relationship are planned and 
managed. The technological artefact used in work is 
recognized as a relevant resource in the work organisation 
phenomenon. This is particularly so in a developing 
country like Nigeria where technology is looked upon as a 
harbinger of modernization along western lines. Hence, 
the study rejects the relegation of technology and the 
corresponding elevation of social factors to a determinist 
height by Gallie, Bijker and Pinch, and others. It agrees 
that technology is a social construct but argues that when 
a technological artefact becomes existent, it is capable 
of influencing its environment. Its construction or 
design would have been unnecessary if this was not the 
case. On the other hand, deviating from Ellul and post - 
industrial society theorists generally, the study argues 
that technological relevance does not mean its 
determinacy. It recognizes that it would be wrong to 
discount the social origins of technology as well as the 
import of social choice. Therefore, the study draws on 
the interactive model posited by Hughes, Law, Latour and 
others which rejects any form of determinism, whether 
%social' or %technological'. However, unlike some 
proponents of the model (for example, Latour) the study 
presumes the possibility of assessing the influence of 
these 'actants'. Hence, it sees a crude oil refining 
plant as distinctly able to turn out refined petroleum 
products, not textiles; and able to influence certain 
aspects of work organisation. Overall, the study is 
congruent with the interactive model in arguing that the 
social and the technological are in %alliance', neither 
being the sole determinant of the way work is organised. 
This remains the order of things even in *developing' 
Nigeria where imported technology is yearned for and revered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE THEORETICAL FRAME 
Interest in technology at work is not new and it has been 
sustained, particularly with the advent of microelectronic 
technologies. Many take the view that these technologies 
are capable of transforming the social order (Large, 1984; 
Zuboff, 1988; Kling, 1990). As Kling explains, they play key 
roles in restructuring social relationships by "altering 
the kinds of information readily available, reorganizing 
patterns of access to information, altering the cost and 
work for organizing information, and shifting patterns of 
social dependencies... " (1990: 3). For many in the 
underdeveloped world, technology, particularly the 
imported variety, is reckoned to be the cornerstone of the 
much-craved-for modernisation (Osifo, 1982, Udo-aka, 1982; 
NOIP, 1989; Anya, 1985). In the developed world, where 
modernisation has long taken place, Large (1984) and 
Francis (1986) point to a shift in employment from 
manufacturing to services, a reduction in the amount of 
labour needed on the shop floor and, in fact, the complete 
displacement of labour in certain areas. Another area of 
intense debate is the presumed changes in the skill 
levels. In this regard, whilst Braverman (1974) and his 
supporters are convinced about the fragmentation and 
deskilling of jobs, others like Gershuny (1978) and Fuchs 
(1968, cited in Penn R and Scattergood H: 1985) take the 
view that advanced technologies require an educated and 
skilled workforce. 
In apparent agreement with these assertions, some analysts 
go on to make prescriptions regarding the best ways to 
introduce and make effective use of new technology at 
work. For instance, concentrating on ergonomic concerns, 
Armbruster(1983) refers to the importance of ensuring 
systems accessibility in terms of physical proximity to 
machines and possession of the skills for operating the 
machines; provision of adequate space and layout for 
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equipment; as well as ensuring the safety of workers and 
the security of equipment. Similarly, Mumford (1983) 
suggests 'consultative participation' of both management 
and workers in decisions concerning technological change. 
For developing countries, emphasis is on choosing foreign 
technologies which are appropriate to the needs of a given 
country. Essentially, this often means a choice between 
capital-intensive and labour-intensive technologies. 
In any event, although all analysts seem to accept the 
plausibility of social transformation, they could still be 
categorised according to their conception of the 
'effects', 'impacts' or 'implications' of technological 
change. First, there are those who regard technology as 
the primary determinant of all that goes on in the 
workplace. Some organisation theorists and industrial 
sociologists of the 1950s and 60s fall in this category. 
These include Walker and Guest (1952) who, from their 
assembly-line studies, contend that: 
[the] technology in any given operational unit may be 
the crucial factor in determining the character of 
the social relationships for any individual or for a 
group of individuals (quoted in Rose, 1975: 185). 
Similarly for Sayles (1958), the technology in the 
workplace "shapes the relationships within the work-group 
and thus the structure of the group itself" (quoted in 
Rose, 1975: 197). Explaining this technological determinist 
view, Rose notes that the "technical arrangement may 
create 'islands' of workers whose highly interlocking 
task-structure encourages separation and cliques" 
(1975: 197). In any case, Sayles accords even more powers 
to technology. He takes the view that in the plant he 
studied, the "social system [itself was] erected by the 
technological process ... " (In Rose, 1975: 198, emphasis in 
original). In this scheme, technology easily becomes the 
main explanatory variable in workplace relations. 
3 
In a similar vein, Ellul espouses identical technological 
determinist views. In Ellul's 'technological phenomenon', 
"workers are ... scarcely in a position to act in a 
distinctly human way ... [and] the integration of the 
individual into the technical complex is more complete 
than ever before" (1981: 389). For Ellul, human choice in 
technological outcomes is out of the question. In his own 
words: 
It is no longer possible to reflect that on the one 
hand there are techniques which may or may not have 
an effect on the human being; and, on the other, 
there is the human being himself who is to attempt to 
invent means to master his techniques and subordinate 
them to his own ends by making a choice among them. 
Choices and ends are both based on beliefs, 
sociological presuppositions, and myths which are 
[already] a function of the technological society ... Modern manin choosing is already incorporated within 
the technical process and modified in his nature by 
it (1981: 206). 
In effect, under this technological determinist view, 
divergent group interests seems irrelevant. As it 
appears, all organisation participants would have common 
goals and the idiosyncrasies of individual workers are of 
no effect. But this hardly corresponds with what obtains 
in real life. When applied to the workplace, Ellul's 
technology-determinist model seems to recognize 
cooperation but, at the same time, apparently ignores 
possible conflicts that occur both between individuals and 
between groups of individuals in organisations. This runs 
counter to Edwards' observation of "a deeper antagonism" 
in the labour process and that "Conflict and Co-operation 
are created simultaneously in the organisation of 
production ... 
" (1986: 72). 
It is notable that conflict and cooperation themselves 
could be explained in terms of the idiosyncratic nature of 
individuals in social relationships as well as differences 
in goals. For one thing, McGregor's (1960) theory Y 
suggests differences between employee and organisational 
goals. But, very importantly, exponents of technological 
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determinism are unable to demonstrate that technology 
accounts for these differences, or even determines unique 
organisation or individual goals. For example, it is 
difficult to demonstrate that technology determines 
absence/turnover rates, strike activity, or indeed, an 
individual's choice of type and place of work etc. As 
Sayles himself also recognises: 
technological factors ... do not explain what sets 
off a spate of aggressive activity, what brings it to 
a halt, and what are the personal motivations 
involved (quoted in Rose, 1975: 198). 
These and similar arguments probably lead some analysts to 
dismiss any relevance of technology in workplace 
relations. 
Whilst relegating technology as an irrelevancy, this 
second group of analysts emphasize the dominance of social 
factors. One such vehement dismissal of technology comes 
from Haug who is categorical that even "to ask whether 
technology acts as a force for emancipation or for 
derogation with regard to human labour is to give 
technology a sort of self-determined place which it does 
not deserve. Technology is not a subject" (1985: 83). 
According to Haug, technology is merely a means at the 
disposal of humans. In a similar vein, Gallie's 
"principal conclusion" from his refinery studies is that 
"the nature of the technology ... has at most, very little 
importance ... Instead [of] ... critical importance ... 
[are] wider cultural and social structural patterns of 
specific societies ... 
" (1978: 295). For their part, 
Noble, (1979), Child (1984), and Wilkinson (1983) point to 
the importance of 'social choice' in technological 
outcomes. Similarly, Ahiauzu (1984) stresses the 
influence of culture in shaping attitudinal 
characteristics and hence behaviour in the work place. In 
addition, Goldthorpe and his colleagues (1968) are 
convinced that attitude and behaviour are not contaminated 
by technology. 
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There can be little doubt that socio-cultural factors are 
important. However, the view that technology is 
essentially irrelevant, as Gallie and others are wont to 
suggest, is more difficult to accept. For instance, from 
Blauner's point of view, the relegation of technology 
would be unthinkable since the "most important single 
factor that gives an industry a distinctive character is 
its technology" (1964: 6, emphasis in the original). That 
is, for example, it is possible to distinguish between a 
refinery and a textile mill by means of their technologies 
of production. 
When technology is seen as irrelevant, one question which 
arises concerns why technology is employed in production 
activities in the first place. Infact, it could be 
suggested that such a dismissal of technology is 
equivalent to questioning the usefulness of the industrial 
revolution in Europe and the subsequent developments in 
technology ever since. Relatedly, if technology is 
considered as irrevelant, the craving for alien 
technology, as occurs in developing countries like 
Nigeria, becomes rather difficult to explain. It is 
unlikely that these countries would borrow heavily just to 
invest in irrelevancy. Thus, what seems more probable is 
that the technological is important, just as the socio- 
cultural is. 
Hence, a final group of analysts rejects any form of 
determinism, whether technological or social. However, two 
variants are distinguishable in this group. Firstly are 
those who, whilst avoiding determinist assertions, 
emphasize some independent influence of technology but, at 
the same time, recognize the importance of choice and/or 
negotiation between social actors. Thus, in their 
research, Clark and his colleagues see "technology ... as 
an independent variable influencing the way the outcomes 
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of technological change in the workplace are socially 
chosen and negotiated" (1988: 12). Also, advising against 
throwing away "the technology 'baby' with the determinist 
'bathwater'", Mcloughlin and Clark argue that "even where 
... social and political influences are found to be 
evident, it would be wrong to conceive the innovation 
process as shaped entirely by non-technical factors, since 
design choices also arise from, and are constrained and 
extended by, existing technology" (1988: 100,101). 
As it appears, Clark and his colleagues tend to draw 
particular attention to the independence of the technical. 
Nevertheless, another analyst who could be placed in this 
sub-category but who tends to place equal emphasis on both 
the independence and interdependence of variables is Rose. 
As he writes: 
the productive system has three key dimensions which 
are all interdependent: the technological, the social 
and the economic. Yet each of these possesses its 
own scale of independent values. To pursue one set 
of these and ignore the others is to invite trouble, 
if not disaster... (1975: 215). 
On the other hand, the second sub category of analysts 
accepts the importance of both the social and the 
technical but emphasizes the interdependence of factors 
and also stresses the difficulty of distinguishing between 
entirely social and technological effects. Analysts here 
belong to the interactive or Actor-Network school'. From 
this interactive framework, Hughes (1987) advises against 
any distinction between the technical, social, economic, 
political or the cultural which, according to him, impedes 
understanding of the processes and outcomes of 
technological change. Similarly, Callon declares: 
right from the start, technical, scientific, social, 
economic, or political considerations [are] 
inextricably bound up into an organic whole 
(1987: 84). 
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That is, it has to be recognised that diverse variables 
are linked together in complex relationships to which each 
contributes. In essence, no single factor would be wholly 
independent in its effects. A study of one variable has 
to be set in the context of the others. 
However, it is noteworthy that the two variants of 
opponents of determinism together espouse the relevance of 
both the technological and the social and seem to 
recognize the interaction between them, albeit to varying 
degrees. In the event, this study is informed by these 
two sub categories which, for convenience, are together 
subsumed under the interactive framework. 
Taking a definition of technologies as physical production 
artefacts which are configured in a particular way, it is 
presumed that a given technology has in-built 'technical 
rigidities' which imposes constraints on how work is 
organized. However, technical rigidity does not 
necessarily imply a subordination to the technology. 
Following Clark et al, the study regards "technology ... 
as a significant explanatory variable ... 
" (1988: 10). 
Also, with them, the study recognizes the potential 
influence of social actors. Hence, for instance, it 
becomes possible to argue that whilst the skill 
requirements of jobs may be dependent on the technology, 
the content of jobs, in the final analysis, is a function 
not only of the skill requirements but also that of 
negotiated and/or chosen work design. 
These congruencies with Clark et al., notwithstanding, 
the study deviates somewhat from their views. The study's 
point of departure from these analysts lies in its denial 
of any independent influence of technology. This denial 
is on the basis that to be independent implies not needing 
help. In so far as a given technology would not just 
function on its own accord in a vacuum but would need to 
1. *] 
be 'activated' by social actors, it cannot safely be 
regarded as influencing independently. Hence, whilst 
accepting the ability of technology to exert influence, 
the study also joins interactive theorists like Hughes 
(1987) and Callon (1987) in suggesting the interdependence 
of the technological and the social. 
Overall, the aim of the research is not merely to identify 
factors which influence work organisation. Rather, a more 
fundamental concern is to examine the extent to which 
technology influences the design and allocation of work 
tasks. That is, the extent to which, for instance, the 
technical rigidities of the technology influence 
managerial choice or are taken into consideration by both 
management and employee representatives in negotiations 
concerning the organisation of work. 
In any event, it has to be noted that the complexity of 
the relationships constrain any attempt to explore the 
processes of interactions amongst variables. Such an 
attempt is fraught with difficulty. For instance, one 
cannot easily demonstrate that a given 'process' could be 
associated with particular participating elements to the 
exclusion of certain others. Therefore, to avoid these 
muddy waters, the study does not attempt to chart all the 
various processes or mechanisms of interactions between 
variables. Rather, attention is directed towards 
ascertaining that the technology is able to exert 
influence but within an interdependent relationship 
between it and the social. In other words, the study 
focuses on the tenet that all interacting variables 
contribute to the outcomes of a given phenomenon, in this 
instance, technological change. Neither the technological 
nor the social is irrelevant. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
This thesis was originally intended as a comparative study 
of a refinery in Nigeria with another in Britain. The 
preference for a comparative approach, and the choice of 
refinery for study, were for two main reasons. First, a 
comparative approach was expected to enable understanding, 
explanation and interpretation of macrosocial similarities 
and variations (Ragin, 1987). In the context of the 
intended approach a refinery was considered for the study 
because refineries in Nigeria are amongst the few 
workplaces in the country with modern technology which 
approximates that available in similar workplaces in the 
developed world. The second reason laid in the desire to 
find out whether the craving for technological development 
as well as the 'foreignness' of the technological system 
in a Nigerian workplace would considerably affect the 
level of relevance of technology in work organisation. 
For instance, did 'foreignness' make technology more 
determinate and significantly influence negotiation and/or 
choice in the organisation of work? That is, set against 
the outcomes in Britain where the technology could be 
regarded as 'local'. 
Furthermore, a comparative approach would probably provide 
useful insight into technological change in Britain which 
is long-matured in technology use. That is, it may be 
possible for *developing' Nigeria to benefit by tapping 
from the experiences of the more developed nations and 
also learn from their mistakes. In any case, it could be 
argued that socio-cultural and economic differences make 
such comparisons difficult and perhaps doubtful. However, 
from the presumption that refining technology is similar 
the world over, a determinist technology, for instance, 
would be expected to have similar effects at workplaces in 
both the 'importing' and the %exporting' countries, 
irrespective of socio-cultural differences. On the other 
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hand, socio-cultural and economic differences could be 
employed in explanation for any differences in 
technological change effects. 
In any event, the original intention to undertake a cross- 
national study was not realized because my sustained 
attempts to gain access to a British refinery were all 
unsuccessful. Reasons given by some of the British 
refineries, for refusal of research access, included their 
concern not to: 
i) add to the pressures already created by their 
involvement in preparations for major overhaul or in 
on-going capital projects (This would have been an 
interesting opportunity had access been possible); 
ii) accomodate another research person in view of access 
earlier granted to another research student. 
In the circumstance, the research inevitably became a 
single case study. However, some cross-national 
comparisons did occur, but these were only with 
information on Britain already available in the 
literature. Undoubtedly, using first-hand information 
would have been preferred, but the point that workplaces 
in Britain are, by all standards, better researched than 
those in Nigeria made the accessible second-hand 
information still very useful indeed. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be mentioned here that 
comparison between two Nigerian refineries could be seen 
as a useful alternative. Such a comparison would enable 
the exploration of social explanations for technological 
change outcomes as well as the investigation of technology 
-oriented issues like technical rigidities and the 
deskilling concepts. However, internal comparison of two 
separate Nigerian refineries was not embarked upon because 
it was not considered an overarching concern in the study. 
Of more central concern was the 'performance' of the 
imported technology in an %alien' environment. In any 
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event, it is noteworthy that the chosen research site had 
the advantage of possessing both old and new refining 
plants, and hence was better suited for answering the 
research questions (discussed below). 
Another issue that requires attention here is the 
suitability of a case study research. A common criticism 
of this approach borders on the limitations of its 
typicality or general izabi1ity. Epistemologically, a case 
study would be seen as "a descriptive material an observer 
has assembled ... about some particular phenomenon or set 
of events", or refers to "a descriptive material ... from 
which some theoretical principles are to be inferred" 
(Mitchell, 1983: 191). By the former definition, a case 
study could be seen as an inductively-oriented 
investigation, whilst the latter evidently suggests a 
deductive approach. However, an important commonality in 
the definitions is the specificity of the materials of a 
given case study. It is this specificity that enables 
critiques to charge case studies with atypicality or non- 
generalizability. Often, a study is adjudged as typical 
only if "the particular set of events selected for report 
is similar in relevant characteristics to other cases of 
the same type" (Mitchell, 1983: 189; emphasis in the 
original). In other words, case study results are seen as 
ungeneralizable. In relation to our particular concerns, 
critics of the case study approach would argue that 
nothing guarantees that events in the refinery chosen for 
study would be similar to those in the other Nigerian 
refineries; and hence, it is not safe to use materials 
from there as a basis for making generalizations about 
technological change outcomes, not even in relation to the 
relatively narrow confines of Nigerian refineries, not to 
mention the Nigerian society generally. 
This notwithstanding, many would see nothing to be 
diffident about adopting a case study approach. To begin 
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with, Ragin apparently questions the presumed typicality 
of the survey method when he makes the following point: 
A seemingly large set of more than one hundred 
nation- states can be reduced by half if there are 
problems with missing data. Often, the remaining 
cases are not representative of the original [number] 
.. * much less of all societies (or all macrosocial 
systems) (1987: 10). 
Ragin also draws attention to the fact that: 
theoretical strictures may reduce the number of 
relevant cases [and hence] ... the greater the likelihood that the investigator will find it 
difficult to evaluate an explanatory statement in a 
way that conforms to the standards of mainstream 
social science, especially its quantitative branch 
(1987: 10). 
Similarly for Freeman(1986), 
Researchers sample organisations ... in opportunistic 
ways. When they do achieve a modicum of 
generalizability, the populations from which samples 
are selected often are themselves defined 
arbitrarily... (quoted in Bryman, 1988: 17). 
In essence, survey data is not exactly as overly 
generalizable as is often presumed. 
Further, by distinguishing between statistical and 
analytical/logical generalization or inference, some 
analysts are able to accord some order of generality to 
case studies. Whilst statistical inference relates to 
"the confidence we may have that the surface relationships 
observed in our sample will in fact occur in the parent 
population", analytic inference "makes a statement about 
the confidence we may have that the theoretically 
necessary connection among the features observed in the 
sample pertain also to the parent population" 
(Mitchell, 1983: 207). Mitchell is certain that case 
studies make no recourse to statistical inferences. In a 
similar vein, Yin (1984) argues that "survey research 
relies on statistical generalization whereas case studies 
... rely on analytic generalization" (quoted in 
Bryman, 1988: 18; emphasis in the original). For Mitchell, 
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the essential point about making inferences from case 
study material is that "the extrapolation is ... based on 
the validity of the analysis rather than the 
representativeness of the events" (1983: 190). 
That is, inferences made from case studies are not based 
upon the representativeness, and hence the typicality, of 
the sample. Rather, here, feasible inferences could be 
made on the basis of linkages between events and the 
guiding theoretical propositions (Mitchell, 1983; 
Ragin, 1987; Bryman, 1988). Hence Mitchell characterises a 
case study as: 
a detailed examination of an event (or series of 
related events) which the analysts believes exhibits 
(or exhibit) the operation of some identified general 
theoretical principle (1983: 192). 
Indeed for Mitchell, "what is important is not the content 
of the case study but the use to which the data are put to 
support theoretical conclusions" (1983: 191). Put 
differently, whatever, the content of the case study, what 
is relevant, and in fact imbues the study validity, is the 
ability to relate content to theory. This, therefore, 
means that for our concern premium should (and would) be 
placed on the use of the case study data to demonstrate 
the interactive model, as employed in this work viz: 
neither technology nor social factors would exclusively 
account for the outcomes of technological change; the 
%technological' and the 'social' are both relevant. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS 
The problem of investigating the relevance of technology 
in the workplace lies in teasing out its influence against 
the background of interacting, interdependent variables. 
Many studies which reject the technological determinist 
perspective often tend to concentrate on the processual 
dimension of technological change and in so doing succeed 
in bringing the social shaping perspective into 
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prominence. For instance, Wilkinson's interest was to 
show the political nature of technical change and he 
therefore explored the roles of managers, engineers and 
workers in "the process of bargaining, negotiation, 
accommodation, and so on ... 
" (1983: 22). This way, he 
found in his case studies that "technology has no uniform 
impact, but [its impact] depends on the social and 
political intentions of managers and engineers, and also 
on the way workers respond, adapt and try to influence the 
outcome" (1983: 21). 
Similarly, Batstone et al., (1987) not only looked at the 
organisation of work before and after the introduction of 
new technology but also looked at "the processes by which 
work organisation is shaped with the introduction of new 
technology, and ... highlighting particular 
characteristics of union organisation which shape these 
processes" (1987: 7). From their studies, they were able 
to conclude that "while technology plays some roles, other 
factors are of greater significance in explaining changes 
in work organisation and labour regulation associated with 
technological innovation" (1987: 210). 
Undoubtedly, a processual approach could provide a 'feel' 
about the change. it is quite probable that how 
organisational actors interpret technology and work 
relationships could be made clearer by adopting a 
processual approach. Also, it is conceivable that by this 
approach, the interdependence of the social and the 
technological which the research acknowlegdes could be 
further highlighted. Nevertheless, interactions between 
organisation variables are themselves processual and hence 
are rather tentative by nature. Thus, on one hand, what 
the researcher attempts to study is very fluid and, most 
probably, would be very different if reinvestigated in 
another time period. On the other hand, where to start or 
even end an investigation becomes contestable. In the 
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circumstance, it would probably be more worthwhile to 
study phenomena as they exist, or existed. Besides, in 
relation to a developing country like Nigeria, most extant 
workplace technologies are essentially fully designed and 
developed exogenously. In effect, Nigeria could be seen 
as basically a consumption site of these technologies. 
Therefore, it seems plausible to adopt a simple 'before 
and after' model in our investigation of the imported 
refining technological system. 
Hence, I prefer an approach for analyzing technology 
%influence' which avoids the processual aspects of 
technological change and focuses mainly on salient aspects 
of work organisation before and after such a change. I am 
also convinced that an exploration of why a given 
technology is adopted in the first place may also throw 
some light on its relevance in the organisation of work. 
For instance, if a technological artefact is acquired 
mainly for image-making (Kling, 1990), then its level of 
relevance in work organisation is likely to be low. On 
the other hand, the reverse is likely to hold if 
technology is adopted for the purpose of boosting 
productivity. This is expected to be even more so in a 
developing country like Nigeria where technology is seen 
as a key instrument for the much sought modernization and 
industrialisation. 
Therefore, the study is confined mainly to investigating 
certain aspects of work organisation before and after 
technical change. It is within this framework that 
certain research questions are generated. In any event, 
the generation of these questions is informed by a 
discernable thread of commonality in divergent views 
concerning technological change. This is that 
technological 'influence' could be located in its effect 
on jobs tasks and skills (Bright 1958; Hill, 1981; 
Cockburn 1983; Boddy and Buchanan, 1982) and in its use as 
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a tool for control (Braverman, 1974). While avoiding the 
muddy waters of complex analysis of jobs, skills and forms 
of control, these research questions include: 
1. What was/were the reason(s) for acquiring the 
technological system? 
2. Has the content of jobs changed? If it has, when and 
in what ways has the change occurred? 
3. Were there changes in: 
a) Organisation structure and division of labour 
b) pay systems 
c) Industrial relations patterns? 
4. Where changes(s) occurred in the production system, 
What is/are responsible for what change? 
It was hoped that the exploration of these questions would 
help in the assessment of the relevance of technology in 
work organisation. 
The research data was collected via the use of 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with 
sections of workers including operators, lower, middle, 
and top-level management as well as with employee 
representatives. In addition, short non-participant 
observation sessions were undertaken. Unfortunately, the 
anticipated access to relevant written materials did not 
come to fruition essentially because of my 'outsider' 
status. Nevertheless, analysis of the collected data 
enables the assertion that technology exudes relevance. 
However, even in technology-yearning Nigeria, no single 
factor, not even the revered technology, could exclusively 
account for all technologically related change outcomes. 
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The research study examines the relevance of technology in 
the organisation of work at the Port Harcourt Refinery, 
Nigeria. The investigation is foreshadowed mainly by 
experiences in the developed world. 
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Chapter 2 looks at the different conceptualisations of 
work and the organisation of work. This is primarily in 
order to identify the dimensions of work organisation 
which the research addresses. The different reasons for 
organizing work are also discussed. It is argued that 
organisations organize work for a mixture of reasons, 
making use of both human and material resources, including 
technology. 
Chapter 3 explores the various theoretical perspectives 
namely: technological determinism, social determinism or 
the social shaping approach, and the interactive model, 
which are presumed to underpin assertions on technology 
influence in the workplace. The intention is not so much 
to show that these perspectives are mutually exclusive. 
Rather, the aim is to attempt a critical examination of 
their persuasiveness. Beyond this, the implicit ambiguity 
in the tenets of the most persuasive perspective, the 
interactive model, provides the backcloth of the research 
problem. 
The significance of technology in Nigeria's development 
efforts is the subject of Chapter 4. It shows that 
technology is given a pride of place in the scheme of 
things. Further, the extent to which this apparent 
reverence for technology makes it determinate is examined. 
It is argued that the reverence notwithstanding, 
technology can only claim importance not dominance. 
Chapter 5 discusses methodological issues. It attempts to 
justify the chosen research strategy. By examining the 
presumed characteristics of both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods as well as their merits and 
demerits, it concludes that the distinctiveness between 
them is only one of degrees and agrees that the 
inclination to one or the other research method depends on 
the research problem. It justifies the study's 
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combination of methods by arguing that interacting 
variables do not all lend themselves easily to 
observation, and that the research problem does not 
necessarily demand behavioural information. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to discussing the background for the 
case study. It presents a brief history of Nigeria's oil 
industry generally and the Port Harcourt Refinery in 
particular. A review of the refinery's organisational and 
industrial relations structures are also presented. 
Finally , experiences during the fieldwork and the actual 
research methods that were employed are presented. 
Chapters 7,8,9 and 10 are devoted to the analysis of the 
research data in the context of the three theoretical 
perspectives. Chapter 7 addresses the issue concerning 
managerial choice and strategies for technological change. 
It highlights the influence of the state and portrays the 
efficacy of managerial prerogative by showing that 
decisions relating to the choice and strategies for 
implementing the technological change were essentially 
managerial. It also uncovers the point that the control 
of labour is not the primary concern of management. 
Chapter 8 explores the implications of new technology on 
the content and character of jobs. It reveals some 
changes, thus recognising the importance of the 
-1 technical'. Nontheless, the chapter also seeks to deny 
any unilateral control by technology. Chapter 9 considers 
the control and supervision implications of the change. 
It suggests that the effects of the new sophisticated 
monitoring and control devices are evident but some 
aspects of control have witnessed little change, if any. 
Chapter 10 evaluates the relevance of the new technology 
in industrial relations. Again, both the influence of the 
state and the passivity of employees and their 
representatives are brought into focus. It also suggests 
that the adoption of a new technology has very little, if 
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any, influence on the system of industrial relations in 
the refinery studied. Chapter 11, which is the concluding 
chapter, re-echoes the interactive model by drawing on the 
arguments and findings discussed in the preceding 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WORK AND ITS ORGANISATION 
Work is a very broad concept whose meaning is a function 
of individual or group ideologies as well as a function of 
time and place (Eyerman, 1985). This chapter begins by 
briefly considering the different conceptualisations of 
work. This is not so much to provide an in-depth analysis 
of the concept as it is to choose a definition most 
closely identified with our concerns. Thus, a definition 
of work as an activity is chosen essentially for its 
empirical orientation and hence analytic value. 
Subsequently, some notions concerning the organisation of 
work are outlined, followed by a consideration of the 
different rationales for organising work. It is argued 
that no one rationale explains what happens in real work 
situations. What is more likely is a mixture of 
rationales in pursuit of which organisations employ 
resources including technology. 
2.1 WORK: A DEFINITION 
The concept work is so amorphous that no single definition 
captures its varied dimensions. Hence, Eyerman sees works 
as: 
a %contested' concept whose meaning and interpretation 
emerges in the interplay between theoretical and 
practical, commonsensical discourse (1985: 30). 
In any case, Anthony concedes that "work is a thing of 
such richness and complexity that it defies [simple] 
analysis" (1977: 312). 
A normative view conceptualizes work as synonymous with 
any or all of the following: application of physical or 
mental effort; the result of such effort or specifically, 
the result of a particular task, job or undertaking. 
Within this framework, work has to do with activity. As 
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Eyerman reports, work is seen as an "economic activity, 
productive of use and exchange value, and of commodities" 
(1985: 27). In other words, an activity has to be 
purposive and/or productive' for it to qualify as "work". 
According to Cornell and his colleagues, the purposiveness 
of work is highlighted in the argument that "work is telos 
realization, i. e., to reach a goal formulated in advance 
of the action" (1985: 16). Reaching a goal suggests the 
existence of some need(s) which require(s) to be 
satisfied. Hence, work may be conceived of as a purposive 
activity undertaken for the satisfaction of some need. 
This conceptualization stirs up questions like whose and 
what needs?, what and whose purpose or goal? It is 
presumable that these and similar questions underpin 
alternate definitions of work as firmly within the context 
of social relations. One such conceptualization sees work 
as having to do with coercion, exploitation and control of 
a factor of production - the worker - who sells his effort 
for pay to the employer who buys this effort for profit 
(Rose, N.; 1990). The difference here lies in the point 
that whilst recognising work as a productive activity with 
exchange value, this view emphasizes social dimensions of 
work2 . 
More philosophical conceptualisations of work are also 
evident in the literature. For example, following 
Marcuse, Cornell, et al., (1985) enunciate this view of 
work. For them, 
Work cannot be regarded as a specific activity. It 
is not just an activity among others; it is a 
'doing',... something that permeates the life of man 
and his history. Work is, on this level, not defined 
by its object, goal, result, content, etc, but by 
human existence as such. " (1985: 20). 
Here the instrumentality of work is de-emphasized. Work 
is of value mainly because it is a natural necessity. In 
this framework, work becomes a source of meaning, 
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structure and identity for both the individual and the 
society at large. 
Nonetheless, whilst not disputing this ontological view of 
work, the study is content with the more empirically- 
oriented conceptualisations of work which seem more easily 
comprehensible and more amenable to analysis. That is, 
work in this perspective is regarded as a need-bounded3 
activity undertaken within the context of social 
relations. Presumably, the 'needs' and 'goalsi4 elements 
in "work" underlie the need for its organisation. This 
presumption applies in both developed and underdeveloped 
economies. 
2.2 WHAT IS WORK ORGANISATION? 
Perhaps it is not surprising that the organisation of 
work, like work itself, is also conceptualized in 
different ways. Often the concepts 'work organisation' or 
organisation of work' and 'job design/redesign' are used 
interchangeable or in combination. Thus, Davis (1966) 
defines job design as: 
the specification of the content, methods and 
relationship of jobs in order to satisfy 
technological and organisational requirements as 
well as the social and personal requirements of the 
job holder (quoted in Willcocks and Mason, 
1987: 93). 
On the other hand, Wild apparently distinguishes between 
work organisation and job design, the former being a 
prerequisite for the latter. For him, work organisation 
refers to the "manner in which work is planned and 
controlled" (1975: 48). Implicit here is work 
organisation's concern with both the content of individual 
jobs as well as the broader social context in which work 
is performed. 
23 
Similarly, with Francis' suggestion that work "requires 
the application of effort ... the exercise of skill and 
knowledge [and] also demands some level of participation 
in relationships with other [organisation participants] 
and ... yields a wage or salary" (1986: 40), work 
organisation could be seen as concerning the ways in which 
various aspects of work like skills, tasks, pay systems 
and structures of relationships are planned and managed. 
In his own work, Thompson (1983) further highlights the 
multi-dimensional nature of work organisation when he 
distinguishes between "technical" and "human" organisation 
of work. According to him, the technical organisation of 
work has to do with the technological hardware or, more 
precisely, the equipment and process layout. On the other 
hand, the human aspect comprises a division of labour as 
well as a social organisation of work. The social 
organisation of work, in turn, consists of formal and 
informal components. Its "formal components deal with the 
structure of command and cooperation while informal 
aspects refer to the work groups and their behaviour 
patterns" (1983: 19). Thus, like Wild and Davis, Thompson 
ties together the design of jobs at individual and group 
levels as well as the establishment and management of the 
network of relationships in the workplace. 
In effect, analysts adopting a multi-dimensional approach 
see work organisation as concerning a conscious effort at 
the distribution of tasks among organisation participants; 
organisational accomplishment of these tasks; as well as 
the often unplanned but obvious informal relations. Of 
these concerns, the first two respectively relate to the 
content of jobs and labour regulation - an aspect which 
for Batstone et al., includes "the totality of forms of 
control, reward, and sanctions which exist in the 
workplace" (1987: 8). That is, the dimensions of work 
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organisation may be located in the content of jobs, and 
the control and reward systems in the workplace. 
Implicit in the construct "organizing" is the structuring 
of activity. "Structure" itself suggests order' and as 
Silverman observes, it seems "a certain order in any 
social relationship is necessary so that the participants 
themselves may make sense of each other's action" 
(1970: 8). The question, then, is: is the organization of 
work mainly about achieving order? Or, put differently, 
why organize work? 
2.3 SOME RATIONALES FOR ORGANIZING WORK 
Debates on the organisation of work have often focussed on 
its 'human' components even though the 'technical' 
components also get some mention (Thompson, 1983). The 
rationale for organizing the 'technical' aspect is 
typically for system efficiency but also for health and 
safety which are the main concern of ergonomists. On the 
other hand, the suggested or implied rationales for 
organizing the human' components include control, 
humanisation' and profit optimization. These are 
explored in some detail below. 
Work Organisation for Control : 
According to Edwards, "work relations are concerned with 
the control of the process wherein workers' capacity to 
labour is translated into actual work" (1986: 1). And for 
Hill (1981), the control of work processes and the people 
involved is two-dimensional - the structural and normative 
control forms. Whilst the normative aspect has to do with 
organisational values which regulate the conduct and 
performance of organisation members, the structural 
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dimension concerns the "coordination of activities and 
direction of employees" (1981: 16). Apparently, the 
structural aspect relates to the achievement of order' 
and this probably explains why it underlies much of the 
debate on the issue. 
The structural dimension of control may be located in the 
bureaucracy and the systems of discipline and reward as 
occur in the workplace. Thus, Storey notes that "the key 
dimensions of bureaucracy - hierarchy, specialisation and 
division of labour, impersonality and formalised rules - 
are expressive of its essential control function" 
(1983: 134). These "techniques of control"5 according to 
Zuboff, "are used for monitoring, surveillance, detection, 
or record-keeping" (1988: 313). Bureaucracy seems to 
epitomize the pursuit of 'structure' or more simply, 
order' in the workplace. Under bureaucracy, 
the direction of work, the procedures for evaluating 
workers' performance, and the exercise of the firm's 
sanctions and rewards ... become subject to the dictates of "company policy". Work becomes highly 
stratified; each job is given its distinct title and 
description; and impersonal rules govern promotion 
(Edwards, R. 1979: 21). 
Similarly, the disciplinary system itself takes care of 
"acts of challenge, recalcitrance, and resistance... " 
(Storey, 1983: 129) which inherently threaten 'order' 
whilst the pay system is a "subtle control device" 
(Storey, 1983: 137) which rewards compliance. Implied here 
is the purposiveness of 'control' and since %purposes' 
could differ, it follows that the differences in 
rationalisations concerning the control of work becomes 
readily explicable. Thus, %control', seen as a reason for 
organising work may itself be interpreted either as an 
attempt to find the most efficient mode of operation or as 
indicative of struggle and/or domination. 
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Under a Marxian and, its offshoot, the labour process 
framework, the rationale for organizing work is located in 
capital's effort to retain control of the workplace 
inorder to ensure a continued realisation of surplus 
value. This view is aptly expressed by Storey thus: 
It is the essential function of management ... to 
control; that is to translate labour's power into 
labour and thereby to realise surplus-value 
(1983: 123). 
Similarly, Marglin (1982) and Landes (1986)6 explain the 
shift away from the 'putting-out' system to the factory in 
terms of the early industrialists' desire for control of 
the factors of production. For Marglin, the factory 
system "guaranteed to the entrepreneur an essential role 
in the production process as integrator of the separate 
efforts of his workers into a marketable product" 
(1982: 287). The factory system made it easier for 
employers to co-ordinate and direct the activities of 
their workers and hence greater certainty of increased 
production. Besides, Marglin is sure that "the factory 
system afforded ... a system of discipline and supervision 
that was impossible, under the putting-out system" 
(1982: 294). Support for this view is also provided in 
Fox's argument that "the emergence of the factory system 
owed ... much to the desire for closer co-ordination, 
discipline and control of the labour force... " (1974: 180). 
Furthermore, the control of labour is claimed to be the 
outcome of a struggle between labour and capital over the 
effort bargain. Storey (1983) seems to be an ardent 
suporter of this view. As he elaborates: 
Labour power comes in a form ineluctably attached to 
the worker. Hence, unlike other 'commodities', 
labour is an uncertain factor intrinsically 
possessing all the vagaries of the subjective 
individual. Management must render the potential of 
labour power actual in a form which is malleable 
(1983: 82-83). [Further] steering the labour process 
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along the straight and narrow of valorisation demands 
real control to ensure that other substantive 
objectives do not confound its realisation 
(1983: 124). 
That is, to be sure of surplus value, capital has to win 
the battle over the control of labour. Also, managerial 
control could be explained in terms of the low trust and 
conflictual relationship between management and employees 
(Fox, 1974). And, workplace strategies such as hierarchy, 
job design, redundancies etc, are all attempts by 
management to exert control over the labour process. 
The view that conflict is the basis of control in the 
workplace apparently permeates the labour process 
literature. Braverman (1974), who provides the main text 
for the labour process school, recognizes the conflictual 
workplace relations and sees the planning and coordination 
of work as having to do with the "habituation of the 
worker". He argues that capital's exploitation of labour 
power for the accumulation of surplus rather than for the 
satisfaction of human needs results in antagonism between 
the two parties. Therefore, for capital to be able to 
extract its needed maximum effort from antagonistic 
labour, adoption of labour control strategies becomes 
necessary. Management achieves control by means of 
Tayloristic principles which enables it to separate the 
conception of tasks from their execution. It is presumed 
that management retains the 'superior' conception aspects 
of tasks whilst labour is consigned to the rather 
%inferior' execution aspect. Hence Braverman contends 
that capital uses its "monopoly over knowledge to control 
each step of the labour process and its mode of execution" 
(1974: 119). Labour control is achieved by the 
fragmentation of tasks on one hand and their reintegration 
on the other hand by managerial planning and coordination. 
In other words, management is able to specify tasks and 
determine exactly how they should be carried out. 
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Braverman's analysis is riddled with a number of problems. 
Aside from his reliance on speculations rather than 
empirical evidence (Kusterer, 1978; Batstone et al., 1987) 
which casts doubts on his analysis, his apparent emphasis 
on conflict as the source of managerial control needs is 
problematic. There is no systematic evidence to suggest 
that the relationship between managers and workers is 
always and inevitably conflictual. It could, for 
instance, be argued that when the wage-effort bargain is 
complete and accepted by all sides, it is highly probably 
that relations between employers and employees become 
harmonious, at least for a while. In any event, 
management strategies like investments in training which 
may actually be in the interest of both management and 
workers are not indicative of perennial subjugation. 
Furthermore, a suggestion of a mutual dependence between 
capital and labour seems plausible. Arguing along this 
line, Latour (1988) points out that the 'Prince, 7 which for 
our present concerns refers to the contemporary employer, 
does not have only his worker as 'enemy. ' Also in the 
list of enemies are other Princes. Since the Prince thus 
has to struggle "on many fronts at once, he might from 
time to time need ... collaborators to resist, for 
instance, other Princes" (1988: 25). That is, competition 
has many fronts. It could be employers competing with 
each other8 or combined in competition with their 
employees. Just as it is conceivable that managements may 
combine against employees, individual employers may 
similarly cooperate with their employees for mutual 
advantage in the competitive marketplace. In essence, 
workplace relations are characterised by a duality - 
conflict and cooperation. The existence of one does not 
mean the preclusion of the other, as Braverman's thesis 
tends to suggest. 
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Further, Braverman's assumption that control of 
recalcitrant workers is the central concern of management 
is questionable. Also questionable is the implicit 
assumption that managerial control is unilateral. With 
regard to the former assumption, Littler and Salaman take 
the view that "surplus value has to be produced but also 
realized in the market" (1982: 257; emphasis in original). 
They are not convinced that control of labour for 'surplus 
value' is more important to management than their concern 
for the much higher returns available via healthy 
relations with the capital market, innovation, and finding 
a market for their product9. Hence, they conclude that 
"the first priority in capitalism is accumulation not 
control" (1982: 265). 
Similarly, Hill (1981) stresses that control is 
significant "in as much as it enhances accumulation and 
profitability, and it is this over-arching concern that 
accounts for capitalism's incessant transformations of the 
productive apparatus within industry" (1981: 112). In 
essence, it is not necessarily the presumed conflictual 
relations in the workplace that necessitates control, nor 
is it the case that control is directed only at 
recalcitrant labour. 
If one assumes unilateral control by management, one 
wonders how collective bargaining could be explained. The 
notion of collective bargaining as an exchange 
relationship" does not seem to be compatible with the 
unilateral control argument. It seems certain that Clegg 
was right in suggesting that "the mere existence of a 
collective bargaining relationship creates power resources 
for the negotiators (1979: 251 ) on either side. Even if 
collective bargaining is seen merely as a means of social 
or specifically managerial control (as many Marxists do), 
there is no reason to believe that control is always one- 
sided. Presumably, trade unions or other employee 
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representatives are able to pursue and advance the 
interests of their members mainly as a result of their 
ability to exercise some power and control. Even a threat 
of withdrawal from the bargaining relationship could in 
itself be seen as an effective weapon. Hence the process 
of work regulation is undertaken jointly by management and 
labour and "a structure of control should be seen as the 
result ... of past interactions between employers and 
workers... " (Edwards, 1986: 3). Perhaps it is also 
noteworthy that work rules arising from these interactions 
serve as an instrument of control for both management and 
labour. Following from these, it seems erroneous to 
assume unilateral control by management. If both 
management and labour are able to pursue their separate 
interest, the argument that one or the other assumes 
permanent control seems rather untenable. 
Further, to impute unilateral managerial control 
unfortunately suggests that management can now be seen "as 
omniscient, conspiratorial and able... to get its own way 
- that is, to solve successfully its problems of control" 
(Wood, 1982: 16). That is, Braverman ascribes 
unprecedented rationality and power to management and at 
the same time underrates the position of workers in 
workplace relations. These are problematics. If workers 
are as passive and perhaps naive, and management as 
powerful and rational, as Braverman appears to presume, 
the adoption of different control strategies as well as 
policies for the retention of workers become more 
difficult to explain. 
Although Braverman observed that "Taylorism raised a storm 
of opposition among the trade unions" (1974: 136), he 
marginalised the potentials of this opposition, showing 
little confidence in the ability of workers to influence 
work relations. However, there is considerable evidence 
to suggest that "Management intentions can ... be modified 
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or changed either by the influence of trade unions or the 
informal influence of workgroups and individual workers" 
(McLoughlin and Clark, 1988: 130). In this regard, Edwards 
(1979) draws attention to the compromises and adjustments 
that management have had to make in its attempt to 
minimize opportunities for workers' resistance. 
Similarly, Hill understands Volvo's Kalmar plant to be the 
result of resistance by workers. This resistance, he 
claims, forced management "to redesign production in order 
to increase the variety of job tasks and restore some 
limited degree of control to operatives" (1981: 114). Also 
for Littler (1982), different strategies of work design 
"must be seen ... not as consequences of the unilateral 
imposition by management on a passive workforce of 
specifications and prescriptions, but a two-way exchange 
in which an accomodation ... is achieved" (1982: 42). 
Quite apart from the influence derived from resistance to 
management strategies, Batstone et al, also draw attention 
to the implicit control workers are able to extract from 
the management control system itself. As they argue, 
while rules provide the basis for labour control, they 
also "provide a gauge for the actions of management, as 
well as providing a form of workers defence against 
changes in management demands" (1987: 20). For example, 
entrenched custom and practice may become a handicap for 
managerial decision. 
In the light of these consideration, it is quite possible 
to argue that the rationale for organising work may well 
be for purposes of control but that this control is 
neither always labour-oriented nor is it always uni- 
directional, from management to workers. That the control 
of labour may not be the key reason for organizing work is 
illustrated by the general lack of its consideration at 
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the strategic level in the organisation (Buchanan, D. and 
Boddy, D., 1983; Edwards, P. K., 1986; Batstone, et al., 
1987; McLoughlin, I. and Clark, J., 1988). Besides, Grint 
makes the point that since "the capitalist is coerced into 
... stitching up alliances where possible [so as to] limit 
the damage inflicted by foes where necessary" it is quite 
conceivable that the capitalist may at different points 
"seek reduced overt control and enhanced working 
conditions" (1991: 198). This argument in itself suggests 
an alternative reason for work organisation. 
Work organisation for "Humanisation": 
In principle, humanisation of work encompasses the tenets 
of both the human relations and human resource management 
traditions. Here recognition and respect for the 
subjectivity of the worker are seen as key determinants of 
organisation success and the object therefore is to make 
work more humane. Thus, the approach emphasizes the 
importance of satisfying inherent social needs of 
individuals for self-actualisation, status and 
belongingness. Work has to be organized in such a way 
that individual and organisational needs are properly 
integrated (Maslow, 1958; Agyris, 1957). This would 
supposedly result in "a more 'satisfied' work force, 
higher morale, higher output, and more profit" (Storey, 
1983: 138). 
In accord with this view, McGregor (1960) denounces what 
he calls 'Theory X' (which according to him reflects 
assumptions that the average human being must be directed 
at work because he or she is lazy and dislikes work, and 
is only motivated to work through monetary incentives), 
and he proposed aTheory Y'. 'Theory Y' is based on the 
assumption that a human being craves for satisfaction of 
ego and self-actualisation. He or she therefore accepts 
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job responsibility and is capable of generating self- 
motivation as well as exercising ingenuity and creativity 
at work. These theories represent contrasting beliefs 
about human nature and hence send contrasting signals in 
relation to work organisation. 
While 'Theory X' suggests managerial prerogative in 
organisation's direction and control, the assumptions of 
theory Y point to the principle of seeking and securing 
employee commitment to organisational goals even though 
management prerogative is maintained. Further, whilst the 
former apparently approves of formal control of the labour 
process, under the theory Y framework, 'order' in the 
workplace is achieved not by the control of labour but by 
providing conditions for fulfilling individual social 
needs, and achieving social integration. Hence in this 
latter framework, organisation structure becomes less 
hierarchical, supervision is limited, and relationships 
between organisation participants are as between peers. 
Thus, while labour process theorists see organisational 
conflict as logical and inevitable, despising only the 
edge management has over labour, humanisation' theorists 
believe that 
industrial discontent, strikes, absenteeism, low 
productivity and so forth do not derive from 
fundamental conflicts of interest but from 
ameliorable properties of the psychological 
relations of the factory (Rose, 1990: 58). 
In essence, these theorists point to the possibility of 
overcoming organisation conflict through improving 
interpersonal relations. 
Perhaps the various "participaton' schemes as well as job 
design techniques like job enlargement, job enrichment and 
group working would derive justification from the 
humanisation perspective (Storey, 1983; Davies, 1986). 
For instance, participation is deemed to encourage the 
redistribution of power" so that workers become able to 
34 
play more influential roles in the management of the 
enterprise (Tannenbaum et al, 1974, cited in Davies, 
1986: 74) and hence "more satisfied... " (Lewin, Lippitt, 
and White, 1939, quoted in Davies, 1986: 77). Through 
participation, the worker as a factor of production is 
taken into account not by coercive control but by 
%involvement'. Presumably, workers' participation 
improves the overall efficiency of the enterprise as "more 
effective utilisation of the human resources in the 
organisation will be achieved" (Davies, 1986: 77). 
Similarly, Willcocks and Mason see job enrichment as 
"concerned with giving the job-holder more of the 
planning, decision-making and control functions" 
(1987: 99). To these attributes, Buchanan (1979) would add 
social interaction and recognition, continuous learning as 
well as more desirable future. Also Wild (1975) had 
pointed to job enrichment's potential to increase the 
motivational content of jobs particularly when the 
technique also includes the provision of increased worker 
involvement and participation. It is argued that the 
higher order needs (Maslow, 1943) are better satisfied 
through such job enrichments rather than through simple 
enlargement of the content of jobs. 
Presumably, the need to communicate and interact with 
others is met through group-working, and the 'need to 
belong' is satisfied via different forms of participation. 
On the organisation's side, working in groups, 
particularly in autonomous or semi-autonomous work groups, 
supposedly reduces the need for close supervision and 
inspection and "produces more versatile and flexible 
working arrangements, thus speeding-up workflows and 
securing lower levels of work-in progress" (Storey, 
1983: 139). These, perhaps, explain Emery and Trist's 
(1960) recommendation in their Tavistock Institute study 
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that work should be organised on a group basis and work 
groups given discretion to work, with little managerial 
interference. 
Furthermore, Herzberg (1966) similarly sees a high 
likelihood of motivation and satisfaction in a job whose 
content offers opportunity for personal achievement, 
recognition, responsibility and growth. Herzberg also 
concedes the relevance of the job context. However, while 
he agrees that the absence of what he calls 'hygiene 
factor'12 - which are derivatives of the job context - is 
dissatisfying, he still insists that their presence is not 
necessarily a positive motivating force. 
Humanisation theorists, and particularly job enrichment 
advocates, operate against a background of assumptions 
which cannot be proved or disproved objectively. Quite 
apart from the point that the concept of 'inherent social 
needs' cannot be objectively defined and proven, the 
presumption that a satisfying job has to meet these human 
social needs is purely a moral judgement. As Grint (1991 ) 
has argued, the "criteria of satisfaction ... are seldom 
explicit and even less grounded in normative consensus" 
(1991: 279). Also contentious are, the assumption that all 
workers necessarily desire 'enriched' jobs; and the 
linkage between enriched jobs and job satisfaction. It is 
doubtful that every individual is moved to performing well 
and is delighted when his or her job offers challenge. 
Convincingly, Willcocks and Mason (1987) remark that job 
enrichment would be ineffective or even counter-productive 
when directed on individuals with little desire for self- 
actualisation and high status at work. 
Besides, there is no systematic evidence to suggest a 
causal link between job content and satisfaction or 
between satisfaction and productivity. Irrespective of 
the content of job, satisfaction may well be derived from 
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factors in the job context like pay, working conditions, 
and the quality of interpersonal relationships. Support 
for this argument is found in Goldthorpe et al's Luton 
studies. Goldthorpe et al., (1968a) distinguished between 
ýsolidaristic' and 'instrumental' workers. While the 
former sought intrinsically satisfying work which provided 
opportunity for participation in the community, the latter 
preferred extrinsic economic rewards such as high pay and 
job security. Goldthorpe and colleagues claim that the 
Luton workers they studied had an instrumental orientation 
to work13 and were unconcerned by the intrinsic content of 
work. Aside from the argument that there is no neat 
connection between job satisfaction and motivation to 
work, there is little evidence of a necessary link, 
whether positive or negative, between individual job 
content or job performance and organisational performance. 
Performance is a function not only of employee motivation 
but also a function of variables like workers' skills, 
abilities, training, and the efficiency of the production 
system (Willcocks and Mason, 1987). 
In any event, it is noteworthy that this behavioural 
orientation for work organisation also has other 
limitations. For example, by underplaying the need for 
control14, it ignores what Dubois et al., label "sins of 
omission" (1976: cited in Batstone et al., 1987: 16). This 
refers to the adverse effects workers' failure to act 
according to prescribed rules could have on production. 
In addition, humanisation programmes have been criticised 
for their apparent managerialist orientation15. For 
instance, Storey sees them as "techniques which seek to 
channel the dynamics of inter-personal relations towards 
the serving of managerial ends" and which are put into use 
"only ... when managerial problems are manifest 
... 
"(1983: 138-139). Similarly, Hill reckons that 
humanisation schemes arise from management's concern "to 
find new ways of raising efficiency and profitability by 
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minimizing ... the 
dysfunctional consequences of the 
dominant forms of control and employment" (1981: 45). He 
surmises that by adopting these "alternative forms of 
control... " management seeks to salvage itself from the 
problems created by the adoption of scientific management 
principles16. In effect, under humanisation programmes, 
classical production goals persist. It is only the means 
to these ends that are presumably altered. Apparently, it 
is hoped that a humane job would translate into increased 
employee effort. 
Another notable criticism of humanisation is the implicit 
subscription to a unitarist view of organisation. 
Conflict is seen as unnecessary and effort is channelled 
towards the achievement of harmony. Thus entrenched is 
the conviction about the right of management to rule. 
Evidence Hill's agreement that "managerial prerogative 
seems scarcely to have been challenged let alone altered 
in these experiments" (1981: 49). 
To summarize, since the relationship between management 
and workers often tends to be more conflictual than 
harmonious, job design that takes 'inherent social needs' 
of workers into consideration does not guarantee improved 
performance. Besides, since it is possbile that workers 
seek both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, it is not 
likely that 'humanisation' would be adopted as the sole 
criterion for organising work. A more coherent reason for 
work organisation needs to be sought elsewhere. 
Work organisation for profit optimisation: 
Neo-classical economics would point to the need for profit 
optimisation as the basis for organising work. Profit is 
considered important because of its implications both for 
organisational and individual growth. For instance, 
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without profit, internal financing of growth could be 
difficult in the short term and chances of securing 
external finance would be grim (Hill, 1981). For the 
individual, lack of organisation growth would have an 
impact on job security and personal income. It therefore 
seems reasonable within a market economy for management to 
seek the most efficient way to organise resources, 
including human resources, so as to generate profit, even 
perhaps sufficiently to increase surplus value. In this 
respect, Hill points out that decisions concerning 
profitability are foremost in the list of organisation 
decisions and "other considerations are taken into account 
only as far as they are compatible with profitability" 
(1981: 84). Similarly, Storey, whose work tends to be 
Marxian in outlook, states: 
The pursuit of profit remains an undiminished guiding 
force. It is the underlying principle defining 
rational' action. Even the supposed alternative 
goals of growth and higher market share can be viewed 
as interlinking ones which allow a sounder base for 
profitability (1983: 77). 
Hence control strategies, like the division of labour and 
specialisation, hierarchical arrangement of tasks and 
authority, as well as humanisation programmes like job 
enrichment and/or enlargment, could all be seen as means 
for enabling or increasing productive efficiency, and 
hence improved profitability17. That is, profit 
optimisation becomes a function of the ability of 
management to control and coordinate the work process as 
well as cater for the social needs of workers. 
In summarizing the reasons for organising work Wild (1975) 
includes: (i) greater productivity, (ii) improved quality, 
(iii) lower cost, (iv) fewer grievances, (v) improved 
worker attitudes, and (vi) better absenteeism and turnover 
records. These reasons are largely economic but control 
and humanisation dimensions are also implicated. In 
essence, while labour process theorists tend to 
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marginalize organisations' economic needs, and the 
humanisation perspective underestimates both individual 
and organsiations' economic needs, the profit optimisation 
approach would ideally recognize all these needs, although 
it appears the economic dimension gets the most attention. 
Indeed, it is possible to argue that by underplaying the 
importance of other rationales, both labour process and 
humanisation theorists ignore important realities of the 
workplace. If, for example, direct control of work by 
management is all that organizing work is about, 
unattended individual social needs would duly cause such 
instability that the control ojectives could not be 
achieved. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Work is an essential human activity whose organisation 
entails the planning and management of its various 
elements. Involvement in the organisation of work 
presumably creates 'order', and gives a leverage to the 
enterprise in its competition in the external market. 
However, the exclusivity of labour control, humanisation 
or profit optimisation as lone reasons for organising work 
is denied. What is more probable is that in real work 
situations, the organisation or 'ordering' of work results 
from a mix of rationales. Nonetheless, it is conceivable 
that some rationales may be more dominant than others at 
different points in organisation life. Furthermore, once 
the rationales are seen as underlying the planning and 
management of work, it becomes clear that organisations 
would target this mixture of reasons as they mobilize a 
variety of resources, including human and physical 
resources, for the accomplishment of organisational goals. 
However, for our concerns, the physical resource of 
particular interest is the technology. In this regard, it 
is presumable that questions concerning why a given 
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technology is employed in the first place would help to 
prove the existence, or otherwise, of the rationales for 
organizing work. However, of more importance here is the 
interest to find out whether these rationales are 
implicated or implicate technical change. If it could be 
shown that a rationale or rationales is (are) implicated 
during technological change, then the relevance of 
technology could be claimed. 
Further, work organisation, as stated earlier, could be 
seen as having to do with the ways in which various 
elements in work like skills, tasks, and the control 
systems generally, are planned and managed. Hence, 
interest in the role of technology in the organisation of 
work could translate into interest in the extent of 
technology influence in the planning and management of 
these elements in work activity. Furthermore, a 
technological change context directs attention to the 
extent of changes in the skill and task contents of jobs 
and in the control systems. For our present concerns, 
this begs questions regarding the extent of technological 
influence in changes in these elements in work. That is, 
is the technology the primary explanatory variable for the 
changes, if they occur? Is the technology simply inert? 
Do other factors play any part in change? The next 
chapter begins to address these questions. 
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NOTES 
1. Thus recognized as forms of work are unplanned or 
accidental inventions/creations as well as 
unproductive efforts. Although this differs from the 
physiocratic thesis that only productive agricultural 
engagements could be regarded as "work", it is 
compatible with Marxian distinction between 
productive and unproductive activity. 
2. What this view actually highlights is aspects of 
social relations in the capitalist mode of 
production. Its defect stems from its failure to 
give due attention to the need of the worker to earn 
a living. Besides, productive endeavours of the 
self-employed are apparently excluded. 
3. Need is considered an essential element in the 
conceptualisation of work. For the individual, 
involvement in work may be in response to the need 
for self-actualisation, for survival or indeed the 
need to satisfy the employer in order to earn a 
living. The survival need is equally relevant to 
organisations and even the society as a whole. 
4. Whilst apparently accepting that individual goals are 
identifiable, some analysts deny the existence of 
separate organisation goals. For example, Silverman 
is of the view that "to say that an organisation has 
a 'goal' may be to involve oneself in some of the 
difficulties associated with reification - that is, 
with the attribution of concrete reality, 
particularly the power of thought and action to 
social constructs" (1970: 9). 
5. Competing typologies of control inundate the 
literature. Amongst these are Friedman's (1977) 
distinction between "Direct Control' and "Responsible 
Autonomy'; and Edwards' (1979) *simple', 'technical' 
and 'bureaucratic' control types. It is not the 
intention here to review the different typologies but 
suffice it to state that non would effectively 
accomodate all the possible control issues that arise 
at work. At best, each provides a framework for 
analysing either techniques, strategies or forms of 
control. 
6. Landes is not Marxist but some of his works lend 
themselves to such categorisation. 
7. It appears the 'Prince' corresponds to the locus of 
power within a given context at a given point in 
time. As Latour emphasizes, "The dimension of the 
Prince ... varies in time from being a whole country 
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to being just one man in the crowd ... it is never 
certain whether the Prince ... is an individual, an 
assembly, a techno-structure, a nation or a 
collective" (1985: 25). 
8. Competition also occurs between different groups of 
managers within an organisation (Pettigrew, A., 1973; 
Ahlstrand, B., 1990). Mangement cannot be seen as an 
eternally coherent group, for in reality, it exudes 
different alliances and coalitions over time and over 
issues. 
9. For instance, labour control issues are likely to be 
of secondary importance in an organisation where 
profit is a function of the sales effort or is 
dependent on fluctations in the market. 
10. Collective bargaining means different things to 
different people. Farnham and Pimlott (1986) 
distinguish: (1) the 'marketing' concept which sees 
collective bargaining as an exchange relationship 
between labour and capital focusing on substantive 
issues like remunerations and hours of work; (2) the 
(governmental' concept of collective bargaining as a 
rule-making institution in which rules governing 
relations between management and workers or other 
representatives are made; (3) the 'industrial 
relations' concept highlights the participation of 
unions in organisational decision-making (Farnham and 
Pimlott, 1986: 114-116). 
11. According to Davies, the ideals which underpin the 
concept of participaton are "political, humanistic 
and efficiency... " (1986: 75). She points to 
"practical problems and difficulties... " which 
undermine the translation of these ideologies into 
reality. Examples are issues like workers'desire and 
ability to participate all of which could stall the 
practicalisation of these ideologies. 
12. Subsumed under Herzberg's 'hygiene factor' are 
categories like pay and working conditions. 
13. Goldthorpe et al's (1968a) "The Affluent Worker' was 
indicative of the reaction against technological 
determinism. For Goldthorpe and colleagues, workers' 
morale and integration to the organisation are not 
determined by technology, but by their "orientation" 
-a function of their social experiences outside 
work. Instrumentality corresponds to the need for a 
job and a decent wage to support dependents. It is 
conceivable that workers with such needs would be 
motivated and satisfied if the workplace caters for 
these needs. That the Luton workers had instrumental 
orientation may be expected because they were 
relatively young and middle-aged men with dependent 
43 
families (Hill, 1981). However, Goldthorpe et al 
have been criticized for failing to recognize that 
the concern with the nature of work never completely 
disappears and considerably accounts for workers' 
attitudes and reaction to work. In any event, 
Blackburn and Mann (1979) found no significant 
support for distinct orientations amonst workers; and 
where 'orientations' were found, they were multi- 
rather than uni-dimensional. That is, instrumental 
workers with mainly economic concerns also indicated 
a desire for non-economic rewards. 
14. A very contentious view. In the labour process 
literature, humanisaton programmes have been seen as 
control devices albeit of an indirect kind (Hill, 
1981; Storey, 1983). 
15. It is difficult to reconcile this view with the 
reported cautious rate of uptake of humanisation 
schemes in work organisations. For example, Storey 
declares that many managements in Britain "have 
displayed a marked suspicion of the new working 
methods" (1983: 139). If these programmes are really 
pro-management, a question which arises concerns why 
their uptake is so slow. One explanation could be 
the uncertainty surrounding their utility in the 
effectuation of 'order' in the workplace. Aside from 
the problems arising from Dubois et al's 'Sins of 
Omission', managements could soon find themselves 
saddled with escalation in demands by workers for 
even more rights and say. 
16. Hill (1981) distinguishes two sets of problems 
arising from scientific management. In the first 
place, the effectiveness of scientific management is 
reduced by workers' resistance to its consequent task 
fragmentation. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, "technical inefficiencies" which also 
arise from task fragmentation sometimes increase 
rather than reduce organisation costs. As Hill 
explains, these techincal inefficiencies have to do 
with underutilisation of labour. This is in view of 
the limited discretion at work; slow-down in the 
speed of problem-solving which is consequent upon 
increased organisational complexity and the increased 
need for coordination of overly fragmented tasks; and 
finally, difficulties in changing ossified structures 
when the need arises. 
17. Case studies evidence (Sayles, 1974, cited in Hill, 
1981) suggests that not all categories of management 
make profit optimisation their major focus. Hill 
(1981) agrees that while profit maximisation may be 
a major concern for top level managers, some others 
lower down the management hierarchy "adopt sub- 
optimal strategies regarding accumulation, aiming 
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more for personal comfort and security than for 
entrepreneurial profit maximisation that involves 
some element of risk; they 'satisfice' rather than 
maximise in order to regulate their personal 
environments against the vagaries of the market 
system" (1981: 76). 
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CHAPTER 3 
PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY AND WORK ORGANISATION 
It is evident in the literature that there are conflicting 
views about the meaning of technology and the nature of 
its relationship with work and work organisation. This 
chapter seeks to analyse these views. It begins with an 
examination of the various conceptualisations of 
technology and suggesting that the apparent lack of 
consensus in the definition deprives the concept of much 
clarity. Further, the different perceptions concerning 
the place of technology in work relations are then 
analysed within the context of three theoretical 
perspectives. These include the technological 
determinist, social determinist and the interactive 
perspectives. Based on the premise that technological 
outcomes cannot be convincingly explained in terms of the 
rather extremist determinist models, the interactive model 
is seen as more persuasive. This latter model thus 
provides the background against which the attendant 
research problem and question are stated. 
3.1 DEFINING TECHNOLOGY 
The elasticity of the concept 'technology' is evident in 
the many perspectival variations in its conceptualisation. 
Winner notes the rather historical progression from "a 
very specific, limited and unproblematic meaning" to an 
ambiguous one such that technology "is now used to talk 
about an unbelievably diverse collection of phenomena - 
tools, instruments, systems and the totality of all these 
and similar things on our experiences" (Winner, 1977: 8). 
Hence definitions of technology range from its narrow view 
as a physical object or artefact through the inclusion of 
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a process dimension to its conceptualisation as some vague 
and imprecise phenomena covering diverse actions and 
situations1. The physical dimension of technology is 
captured in its definitions as "apparatus" (Thompson, 1983) 
or "hardware" (Child, 1984). On the other hand, 
definitions which highlight the process dimension of 
technology include its consideration as "process layout", 
"patterns of operation" (Winner, 1977) and "workflow 
process" (Woodward, 1980). 
A rather universalistic definition is provided by Ellul 
(1954) who defines "La Technique" as: 
the totality of methods rationally arrived at and 
having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of 
human development) in every field of human activity 
(Quoted in Theobald R, 1981: 389). 
By this definition, "La Technique" comprises of more than 
simple machines. It also has psycho-sociological, 
organisational as well as process dimensions, although 
Ellul failed to state the position of each dimension in 
relation to others. In any event, Blauner reckons that: 
Technology signifies primarily the machine system, 
the level and type of mechanization, but it includes 
also the technical "know-how" and mechanical skills 
involved in production (1964: 6, emphasis added) 
On the other hand, Hill argues that technology "embraces 
all forms of productive technique, ... the physical 
organisation of production, the way in which the hardware 
of production has been laid out in a factory or other 
place of work". And in the circumstances, the term 
"implies the division of labour and work organisation 
which is built into, or required for efficient operation 
by the productive technique" (1981: 86). Put simply, 
technology involves machines and people as well as their 
organisation. 
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More recently, Clark et al (1988) offer a systems view in 
their contention of technologies as "engineering systems". 
Here technology is more than pieces of equipment. It is 
seen as an artefact but whose "pieces" are systematically 
arranged in a particular way in accordance with "system 
principles, an overall system configuration, and a system 
implementation ... 
" (Clark et al, 1988: 13). The systems 
approach notwithstanding, 2 this definition avoids a notion 
of technology as an imprecise phenomena. 
The more universalistic definitions demonstrate the 
different levels of meaning of technology and would be 
endorsed by some analysts (eg Latour, 1988) as an 
appropriate unit for analysis. Nonetheless, it must be 
emphasised that their ambiguity could be problematic when 
they are used as analytical tools. For instance, by 
failing to isolate technology from the social organisation 
required to use it, a conflation of dependent and 
independent variables is inevitable. In addition, when 
technology is presented as a process, a picture of 
continuity, incompleteness or temporariness is projected. 
This presents a problem in so far as where to start and/or 
end the analysis becomes contentious. To avoid these 
analytical problems, this work adopts a restrictive 
definition of technology as a physical artefact made up of 
systemic parts. 
Developments in technology have resulted in the emergence 
of systems with features which delineate them from the 
earlier technologies and have earned them the label new 
technology'3. As Jonas (1981) suggests, classical 
technology remained stable and unaltered for considerable 
periods of time, equilibrating means and ends, and 
representing an optimum of technical competence. This, he 
argues, contrasts with revolutionary changes in modern 
technology brought about by continuous research. Research 
has resulted in new systems which are based upon *'older' 
48 
mechanical and electro-mechanical systems but are 
distinguished from these old technologies' because of 
their instability (Jonas, 1981) and because they 
"informate as well as automate" (Zuboff, 1988: 10). As 
Zuboff explains, while the former depicts the generation 
of information, the latter refers to the ability of new 
technology to "displace the human presence" (1988: 10). 
Similarly, Buchanan D and Boddy D (1983) point to new 
technology's information handling capabilities and control 
over work processes. They conclude that the newness of 
technology has to do with its "widening range of 
applications, the conventional computer information 
handling features, extensions of control capabilities and 
the encouragement of convergence and integration of 
function and process stages" (1983: 13). For present 
purposes, new technology' and 'technology' are used 
interchangeably but more specifically, it is the presumed 
capabilities of the newer technologies that will guide 
analysis. Accordingly, the following sections look at the 
relationship between this , new' artefact and work. 
3.2 TECHNOLOGY AT WORK 
As already noted above, there is an apparent lack of 
consensus in views regarding the functions of technology 
and the nature of its relationship with work. While some 
analysts see technology as a key factor in workplace 
relations (Blauner, 1964; Woodward, 1965), some accord a 
more or less neutral position to technology (Gallie, 
1978), and still others contend that technology neither 
possesses overwhelming determinate qualities nor is it 
neutral in human-machine relationship (Latour, 1988; 
Callon, 1987). The differences in these arguments provide 
the basis for their categorisation into technological 
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determinist, social determinist and interactive (or 
network) perspectives. An analysis of each of these 
approaches follows. 
3.2.1 Technological Determinist Approach: 
Like technology, technological determinism is a concept 
which means different things to different people. 
According to Bimber (1990), three levels of meanings are 
identifiable, 4 namely: "Norm-based Accounts", "Unintended 
Consequences Accounts" and lastly the "Logical Sequence 
Account" which he suggests is its purest form. In this 
pure' form, technological determinism claims that 
technology independently dictates the course of social and 
organisational relationships. The 'logical sequence 
Accounts' foreshadows the analysis that follows. 
The technological determinist doctrine apparently stems 
from a 'world view' of technology also referred to as 
technological rationality'. This line of reasoning 
accords technology immense powers deriving from a dualism 
that effectively sets technological rationality distinctly 
aside from human action (Gulick, 1984). As Murphy and 
Pardeck (1986) note, technological rationality is 
appealing because, apart from emphasising objectivity and 
control over nature, it shuns ambiguity and the caprices 
of human action. The underlying presumption appears to be 
that human behaviour is irrational and the technical 
capacity of 'rational' technology enables co-ordination 
and control of individual action for the 'general good'. 
Whelchel (1986) seems also to authenticate this 
presumption in his suggestion that objectivity, 
quantification and utilitarianism are the hallmarks of 
technological rationality. As he explains, objectivity is 
valued because it places the "universal" above the %second 
rate' individual experience; quantificative value 
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excludes the rather subjective qualitative thought and 
discourse; whilst utilitarianism clearly rejects the 
frivolous. 
Hence, Ellul (1981) argues that "La technique" cannot be 
abandoned since this would mean an abandonment of 
rationality. After all, "technique" is "a totality ... 
rationally arrived at... ". Ellul can therefore declare 
that 'technique' is "autonomous ... self determinative 
independently of all human intervention" (1981: 205) and 
"techniques proper motion tends irresistibly towards 
completeness. To the degree that this completeness is not 
yet attained, technique is advancing, eliminating every 
lesser force" (1981: 389). Hence Ellul makes a case for a 
determinist and an autonomous technology. Seeming support 
comes from Winner who argues that "If [technology] were 
not determining, it would be of no use and certainly of 
little interest" (1977: 75)5. 
Further thrust for technological determinism is provided 
by Forsyth et al., (1982). Using the engineering 
characteristics of manufacturing technology as a reference 
point, they identify "fundamental physical barriers" and 
therefore contend that "technical rigidities" provide the 
basis for technological determinism. In their view, 
technical rigidities, inherent in the nature of the 
technology, may considerably shape the nature of tasks and 
the organisation of work itself. Further, Forsyth and 
colleagues distinguish between "inherent rigidities" and 
"rigidities imposed by the availability of 
techniques"(1982: 33). The former mode of rigidity refers 
to technological constraints which can be removed only by 
a shift in the 'architecture' of the technology, for 
example, a change from one product/process to another. 
The latter relates mainly to unadapted techniques usually 
imported along with a given technological system as well 
as to the restrictions on the availability of capital 
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goods. This latter mode of rigidity may be more obvious 
in developing countries where technologies are largely 
imported. Although this issue would be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter, suffice it to state here that 
importing' countries like Nigeria experience this mode of 
rigidity because the designs of the imported technologies 
are stipulated by situations in their countries of origin. 
These conditions are often very different from those of 
the countries to which the technologies are exported. 
Another case for technological determinism has also been 
made by Meissner. As he remarked: 
The technology of a workplace ... consists of 
physical objects which constitute the stage on which 
workers play their parts and which set the boundaries 
for the range of their performances (1969: 16). 
He also refers to a "teleology of production" which in 
similarity with Forsyth's 'technical rigidities' implies 
that the configuration of the technology in the workplace 
determines the events which must occur in a certain 
sequence in order that a specific outcome is realised. 
Further, Meissner suggests three forms of technical 
constraints as well as behavioural adaptations which are 
necessitated by technology. The technical constraints 
include spatial, functional and temporal/perceptual 
constraints. Spatial constraints have to do with 
technologically-determined location of workers at work 
stations. Functional constraints refer to the technical 
connections between work stations which might make tasks 
dependent on one another. In essence, the technical 
design regulates the relationships among work stations in 
the production system. Temporal/perceptual constraints 
concern the acts which individual workers must necessarily 
perform at specified times as they carry out their job 
tasks. 
Moreover, Meissner (1969) categorises behavioural 
adaptations in terms of those which are technically 
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required and those permitted by the technology. For 
instance, technically required behaviour includes the 
required co-operation and communication between 
individuals or groups of workers if the objective of the 
work process is to be achieved. By and large, Meissner 
sees technology as an independent variable which shapes 
the workplace. 
Several studies seem to give credence to the technology 
determinist position, although both enthusiasts and 
pessimists of technology provide a wide range of views. 
Robertson (1923) for example stressed that the leading 
feature of technology in the factory system "is the 
regimentation of large bodies of work people under 
conditions of routine and discipline" (1923: 12). 
Similarly, Landes (1969) notes how factory work was done 
"at a pace set by tireless inanimate equipment" (quoted in 
MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985: 12). Also, studies of 
automobile industries in the 1950's showed that in 
assembly-line technologies, as in the early factories, the 
pace of work was set by machines and the workers had no 
control over their work (Walker and Guest, 1952; Chinoy, 
1955: cited in Hill, 1981: 87). 
Investigations which include other forms of production 
systems also strengthen the determinist notion of 
technology, and suggest effects on organisational 
arrangements and the experience of work. For instance, by 
locating her dimension of technology at the control level, 
Woodward (1959) claimed a link between technology and 
variables like authority structure, spans of control of 
supervisors, and production control procedures. Her 
findings suggest that while in unit or small-batch 
production systems much of the control is exercised by the 
worker, greater managerial control is exercised in more 
complex production systems. In a later work, Woodward 
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reports that "the technology of process industry and the 
situational demands associated with it establish 
conditions particularly conducive to the development of 
harmonious and contributive social relationship" 
(1965: 199)6. 
For Blauner, "technology, more than any other factor, 
determines the nature of the job tasks ... 
" (1964: 8). As 
he further argues, it is "the character of the machine 
system [that] largely determines the degree of control the 
factory employee exerts over his sociotechnical 
environment and the range of limitations of his freedom in 
the work situation" (1964: 169-170). However, unlike? 
Woodward, Blauner is convinced that technology, as in 
continuous process plants, would make work more meaningful 
as it eliminates many sources of resentment about work and 
"gives workers a great deal of control over their 
immediate work processes" (1964: 135). 
Of course, many analysts in the labour process school 
would not subscribe to these views. For instance, 
Braverman seems to be certain that whatever the type of 
technology, 
The capacity of humans to control the labour process 
through machinery is seized upon by management ... as the prime means whereby production may be controlled 
not by the direct producer but by the owners and 
representatives of capital. Thus ... machinery ... in the capitalist system [has] the function of 
divesting the mass of workers of their control 
(1985: 81). 
What seems clear from this argument is that Braverman 
subscribes to the view of technology as a vital tool for 
control. But he differs from Blauner in emphasising that 
the control is managerial. Besides, whilst Blauner tends 
to see technology as an independent variable, Braverman 
seems satisfied with it as an intervening variable. 
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Another strand of argument, which could also be seen as 
having a technological determinist tone, comes from Bright 
(1958) who found that "automation had reduced the skill 
requirement of the operating workforce, and occasionally 
of the entire factory force". As he reasons: 
the machinery become virtually self-sufficient in 
terms of needing no worker-input. Such work that 
does remain is subject to more centralized control 
and closer supervision even though the tasks to be 
performed may have been sophisticated (quoted in 
Francis 1986: 44). 
Perhaps the most influential argument concerning the 
deskilling effect of technology was put forward by 
Braverman (1974). Braverman claims that Tayloristic 
principles, adopted by management in order to tighten 
control over labour and reduce dependence on worker co- 
operation, involve 'deskilling' of workers by the removal 
of knowledge and autonomy from the shop floor and putting 
these in the hands of management. Braverman argues that 
in its pursuit of Tayloristic principles, management finds 
a ready ally in technology. Management acquires 
production systems into which skills8 divested from 
workers are incorporated. The performance of tasks thus 
requires little human input as machines take over. 
Braverman is convinced that deskilling is a continuous 
trend; workers become appendages of machines as they 
"function as cogs and levers" (1974: 136) and may 
ultimately be denied the right to work. 
Hill (1981) gives similar credence to the deskilling 
theory in his reference to new microelectronic systems. 
These systems he elaborates: 
entirely removes the element of human skill ... Thus the cognitive planning element of craft work is now 
increasingly to be given to machines and not even to 
technicians. Designing, for example, is now heavily 
automated in large engineering firms with a 
consequent loss in the draughtsman's control and the 
opportunity he has to use his skills to say nothing 
of his increased prospects of unemployment. The 
search for profitability which results in the 
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continual transformation of the instruments of 
production implies the abolition of human 
intervention and control (1981: 117). 
Some studies seem to confirm the deskilling9 thesis. In 
his case study on the use of robots in a West German 
factory, Wobb-Ohlenburg (1982) discovered that robots had 
taken over the skilled elements of tasks in the welding 
operation. Before robotisation, the welding job required 
a considerable level of skill and welders set the pace of 
work. However, with robots, the job became less skilled 
and work was paced such that the cycle-time became 
dictated not by operatives but by the speed at which the 
robot did the welding. Cockburn (1983) reports a similar 
trend. In her detailed account of the replacement of "hot 
metal" by computer-based methods in typesetting, she 
reveals how new technology transforms typesetters' work 
and reduces the requirement for traditional manual craft 
skills. In her words: 
men ... feel helpless before computer technology ... [and] have moved from an active and interactive 
relationship to a passive and subordinate one 
(1983: 102). 
Boddy and Buchanan similarly concluded from their study of 
the computerisation of biscuit making that "the skilled 
and varied crafts of the doughmen had been replaced by the 
computer" (1982: 151). 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that there is no 
universality in the 'deskilling' phenomenon. For example, 
in the same study, Boddy and Buchanan (1982) also found a 
contrasting set of computer effects on another group of 
workers in the same factory - the ovensmen. As they 
write: 
the ovenman felt that the new system had reduced the 
pressure on him ... He also felt that the package had 
increased the challenge and interest in his job 
because it gave him a goal that he could see and 
influence (1982: 153). 
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This report runs counter to the rather simplistic 
deskilling thesis. Also debunking the thesis is Swords- 
Isherwood and Senker's (1980) conclusion from their survey 
of the engineering industry. They found no clear evidence 
of deskilling and in fact suggested an increasing demand 
for skilled technicians as more and more industries 
acquire new technological systems. 
Similarly, Fong, writing on the newly industrialising 
countries, takes the view the "computer technology and 
automation have weakened the demand for unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers, and increased the demand for 
specialists, technicians ... 
" (1985: 95). As it appears, 
this argument is not incompatible with experiences in the 
under industrialised countries where for instance Edquist 
finds that "mechanization of cane cutting led to a 
considerable generation of technical skills ... 
" 
(1985: 77). Besides, Colombo refers to "new jobs and 
skills that will in time add to the traditional ones, and 
replace them" (1991: 25) as a result of an anticipated 
extension of the 'technological revolution' to the third 
world. 
Aside from these indications of a possible 'enskilling' 
effect of technology, it is perhaps also necessary to note 
that 'deskilling' may not be the dilemma it is often made 
out to be. In the first place, it is not the case that 
all workers must necessarily require manual and 
intellectual skills (as Braverman's argument seems to 
suggest) nor is it proven that the acquisition of these 
skills is desired by all workers. Besides, it is 
presumable that what is happening is essentially a 
substitution of one skill for another. In this context, 
Batstone and his colleagues note that "under automated 
systems the traditional link between worker effort and 
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output is broken. What becomes important is a set of 
skills associated with monitoring the production process" 
(1987: 16). Similarly, in reference to their study of the 
replacement of the 'strowger' exchange by "'TXE4' - semi- 
electronic telephone exchange system - in British 
Telecommunication, McLoughlin and Clark state: 
The new skills required to accomplish TXE4 
maintenance tasks showed a qualitative change in 
contrast to strowger ... On one hand ... manual dexterities and elements of tacit knowledge ... were 
no longer needed. On the other hand, there was now 
a strong emphasis on mental diagnostic skills 
(1988: 109). 
Thus, it is possible to argue that a certain degree of 
deskilling may be going on but, at the same time, 
reskilling and/or upskilling are equally evident. Hence, 
suggestions concerning reskilling/upskilling or deskilling 
seem to be dependent upon individuals' notions of skill 
and the significance they attach to the various modes of 
skill. 
The presumed capabilities of new technology have provided 
the context for other determinist-ladden assertions 
concerning organisation life more generally. As Zuboff 
sees it: 
Computer-based technologies are not neutral; they 
embody essential characteristics that are bound to 
alter the nature of work within our factories and 
offices, and among workers, professionals and 
managers (1988: 7). 
Zuboff observes that new technology provides transparency 
to previously opaque work activities as well as enables 
continuity and control. Using her impressive distinction 
between 'informating' and 'automating' capabilities of 
modern technology, she opines that the former alters the 
intrinsic character of work while the latter tends to 
decrease the dependence on human skills. On the other 
hand, Buchanan and Boddy (1983,1986) stress the potential 
for changes in job profiles, roles and functions as a 
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result of the "Convergence" capabilities of new 
technology. They also point to the integration potential 
of new technology which generates inter-dependencies and 
cooperation between previously autonomous sections, units 
or departments in the workplace. 
In a similar vein, McLoughlin and Clark (1988) suggest 
that organisational integration enables "faster and more 
precise knowledge on work operations" (1988: 78). Also 
implicit in the integrating capability of technology is 
the blurring of traditional job boundaries and 
consequently, changes in the organisation of work as well 
as attitude to work. In essence, new technology may 
influence organisation structure, the number of available 
jobs, the way work is done, the content of the jobs, the 
skills and training requirements, the control systems, 
payment systems, and the productivity potential of 
individuals and organisations. 
Furthermore, it also needs to be mentioned that these 
perceived changes in organisational life raise important 
industrial relations questions. In this regard, Davies 
observes that "changes in skills, whether an upgrading or 
a deskilling, have already led to industrial relations 
problems"(1986: 14). She points to demands for "increases 
in pay to either compensate for the monotony or to reward 
the acquisition of new skills" (1986: 14). On the other 
hand, Clark et al., (1988) draw attention to questions 
regarding the extent to which existing collective 
bargaining arrangements could cope or would be altered in 
the face of technological change. Also notable is the 
extent to which trade unions participate and are able to 
influence change. As Willman puts it, "important 
questions surround the managerial intentions behind 
change, the characteristics of industrial relations 
institutions prior to change, and the nature and extent of 
bargaining and consultation" (1987: 135). 
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Evident in the preceding analysis are the graded meanings 
of technological determinism, from causal to simple 
associational links. While some accounts are categorical 
in their ascription of autonomy and independence to 
technology, others are satisfied with a simple recognition 
of some technology influence. However, technological 
determinism and technology determinist accounts generally 
have been widely criticised. 
To begin with, the view of technology as "rational" while 
human beings are "irrational" is objectionable. Quite 
literally it does not seem logical that the "irrational" 
human being produces rational human-made technology. Also 
questionable is the supposed objectivity of technological 
rationality and its separation from human action. If it 
is accepted that technology has meaning, then 
technological rationality cannot be treated as value free; 
and if it is not value free, it cannot be regarded as 
objective. On the other hand, the validity of 
technological rationality is doubtful since, in 
emphasizing objectivity and distance from ambiguity, the 
view makes assumptions about rationality which are 
themselves value-laden. Thus predicating technology are 
meanings and values - human dimensions which cannot be 
rightly overlooked. As Murphy and Pardeck also argue, 
"human action [indeed] creates the context that supplies 
technological rationality with its meaning" (1986: 1). 
Hence it is presumable that since human values underpin 
technological rationality, technology which it subtends 
can neither be autonomous nor deterministic. 
In a similar vein, Hughes (1987) rejects autonomism for 
technology. Using the metaphor "momentum" he contends 
that: 
Technological systems, even after prolonged growth 
and consolidation, do not become autonomous; they 
acquire momentum [and] they display a rate of growth 
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suggesting velocity. A high level of momentum often 
causes observers to assume that a technological 
system has become autonomous (1987: 76). 10 
Arguments against "autonomous technology' enable Ellul's 
extremist view, that social phenomena are "situated in" 
and are in fact defined by "la technique", to be seen as 
an exaggeration and highly contentious. It is difficult to 
see how, for example, the politics and economics of 
technological development are embedded within technology 
itself rather than being considerably human-influenced. 
Bimber attempts to clear this confusion be explaining that 
Ellul's "technique is not merely technology, it is the 
domination of social, political and economic life by the 
adopted goals of logic and efficiency" (1990: 337). But 
this explanation implicitly supports Ellul's view that 
humans are now helpless captives of technology, a view 
which unfortunately suppresses both the fact that 
technology does not have a life of its own and the point 
that the ultimate direction of technological development 
is determined by human decision and choice. 
Further, although the technical rigidities' concept could 
explain similarities in technological change outcomes, it 
fails to explain variations in these outcomes in different 
organisations with similar technology. These variations 
suggest the influence of factors other than technology. 
As Kling concludes from the study of two clerical work 
groups exposed to a similar technology, "different 
management approaches have resulted in very different 
changes from the computerisation projects" (1990: 12). On 
the other hand, Stewart and James do not find the 
technical rigidities argument acceptable. They stress 
that these rigidities are not "iron physical laws but are 
also products of human endeavour and organisation" 
(1982: 5). In effect, rigidities are, in fact, alterable. 
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Relatedly, it is possible to argue that human 
intervention, though in some cases very infinitesimal, is 
still essential, at least for the activation of the 
technical procedures. That is, "the existence of 
assembly-line facilities does not determine who controls 
its operation" (Grint, 1991: 280). Also arguing along the 
same line, Noble had stressed that: 
In reality NC [that is Numerical Control] machines do 
not run by themselves ... the new equipment, like the 
old, requires a spectrum of manual intervention and 
careful attention to detail ... (1985: 120). 
In essence, technical rigidities notwithstanding, 
technological systems have to be put into use by people 
who may not necessarily be compelled by them. Therefore, 
technology cannot be justifiably seen as exerting a 
determinate or even an independent influence. In so far 
as technological determinism fails to pay due attention to 
the question of human choice and that concerning "what 
shapes the technology in the first place, before it has 
%effects"? (Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1985: 6) it remains 
unconvincing. 
3.2.2 Social determinist or the 'social shaping' 
Approach: 
This perspective denies technological determinism. In its 
extreme, it assumes that technology is unimportant, if not 
irrelevant. Here social factors are given primacy and are 
seen as determining or shaping workplace relations. This 
view gets much inspiration from the social constructivist 
approach, a major theme in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Drawing on the Kuhnian tradition, the basic 
tenets of the social constructivist approach are that from 
the outset, there is no one interpretation to scientific 
findings. Competing interpretations undergo 
"stabilization rituals", that is, negotiation between 
social participants. Hence, ultimately this 
"interpretative flexibility" gives way to a consensus. As 
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Pinch and Bijker write, "social mechanisms ... limit 
interpretative flexibility and thus allow scientific 
controversies to be terminated ... 
" (1987: 27). In the 
circumstance therefore, they argue that scientific 
knowledge, and indeed all knowledge, are social 
constructs. 
Pinch and Bijker (1987) endorse the extension of the 
social constructivist perspective to sociological analysis 
of technology. They argue for the adoption of "a 
perspective that attempts to show that technology, as well 
as science can be understood as a social construct" 
(1987: 25). Using their detailed study of the development 
of the bicycle, they sought to demonstrate that 
technological artefacts are culturally constructed and 
interpreted. They insist that the ultimate design and 
indeed the 'technical content' of a technological artefact 
is agreed upon through negotiations among and between 
relevant social groups. In other words, the technology 
arising from the 'stabilization rituals' do not therefore 
have an "objective existence independent of the accounts 
given to it by individuals" (Grint, 1991: 283). Further, 
if, as Woolgar argues, 'interpretative flexibility' could 
be seen along the lines that "apparent 'self-evidence' and 
%incontrovertibility' are social accomplishments which are 
subject to change" (Woolgar, 1990: 19), then it follows 
that technological artefacts are unstable and 
indeterminate (Woolgar, 1990; Grint, 1991). h1 It also 
becomes conceivable that technological outcomes are 
socially determined. 
At a more empirical level, the social determinist approach 
appears to have found support in studies carried out by 
some analysts and researchers. For example, Singer (1958: 
cited in Bruland, 1985) suggests that the imbalance 
created by the invention of the spinning-machinery 
stimulated effort to speed up the technological 
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development of the textile industry as a whole. Also 
Bruland (1985) charts how the invention of the "self- 
acting mule' was engendered by the need to curb the 
excesses of spinners. Spinners reportedly always took 
undue advantage of their strategic position and strength 
in the production process to carry out strikes and 
stoppages in order to secure their ends. Thus the self- 
acting mule was the employers' answer for spinners 
challenge to their power and authority. This could be 
seen as a case of social need determining or shaping an 
invention. 
In his own account, Noble (1985) also highlights the 
import of management strategy and choice. He shows how the 
design of numerical control (NC) tool was literally 
determined by management in the American Airforce. As he 
remarks: 
Machine-tool builders were simply competing to meet 
. performance' %competence' specification for 
government-funded users in the aircraft industry 
(1985: 113). 
Moreover, in his analysis of the development of the APT 
(Automatically Programmed Tools), Noble made the point 
that the airforce helped to ensure that the APT computer 
language became the industry's norm in spite of its 
disadvantages. He similarly suggests the social, or more 
precisely managerial, determination of the adoption of 
numerical control (NC) in place of record-playback. 
Further credence for the socio-cultural determinist thesis 
is provided by Gallie (1978) in his comparative study of 
refineries in Britain and France. Gallie found that in 
spite of the similarities in technology, there was neither 
behavioural nor attitudinal similarities between French 
and British refinery workers. He therefore concluded 
that: 
the nature of the technology per se has, at most, 
very little importance ... [of more] critical importance are wider cultural and social structural 
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patterns of specific societies for determining the 
nature of social interaction within the advanced 
sector (1978: 295). 
Similarly, Wilkinson argues that "production technology 
and its associated working practices can only be 
understood by reference to the social actors involved in 
its design and use" (1983: 20). Hence he points to how job 
rotation practised in an optical firm he studied was 
management's choice of work practice in response to the 
undesired deskilling effect of the new technology it 
introduced. The technology did not demand that job 
rotation must be practiced. Apparently making a similar 
point, Buchanan and Boddy reckon that "the changes to job 
characteristics that accompany technological change 
reflect partly the capabilities of the technology, and 
partly the objectives and expectations of management" 
(1983: 246). Implicit in Buchanan and Boddy's remark 
however is an underestimation of workers' influence. This 
flaw is remedied by McLoughlin and Clark in their 
contention that "outcomes [of technological change] are 
not only chosen but can also be 'negotiated'... " 
(1988: 130). Similarly Wilkinson draws attention to the 
relevance of "the way workers respond, adapt and try to 
influence ... outcome" (1982: 165). 
In essence, the outcome of technological change is 
socially determined, but not only management is involved 
in the social shaping process. Another important 
implication of these arguments is that the observed 
differences between organisations with similar 
technologies become explicable under a social determinist 
framework. 12 
Nonetheless, the exchange of one mode of determinism for 
another, as is the case in the socio-cultural determinist 
framework, is unpersuasive. To accord socio-cultural 
conditions primacy whilst suggesting the neutrality13of 
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technology is hard to justify. It is difficult to see how 
technology would be inert during technological change. 
Besides, if one draws on a criticism of technological 
determinism, it is one thing to say that social factors 
constitute an active force in the development and use of 
technology and a completely different point to insinuate 
that social factors intractably determine technological 
outcomes. Hence criticizing Gallie's conclusions, Grint 
makes the point that "oil refineries are not composed of 
human-less oil refining technologies any more than 
technology-less workers comprise an oil-refinery" 
(1991: 285). 
It needs to be noted in passing that remarks from many 
analysts who reject the technology determinist thesis do 
not give credence to pure social determinist claim. In 
fact their remarks unwittingly confirm technology 
influence. For example, in his research on computer 
numerical control (CNC) machine tools in the engineering 
industry, Wilkinson accepts that technical constraints "do 
exist [built in during the design process] and do place 
some limits on the amount of control an operator can 
exert" (1983: 66). Similarly, Child agrees that workplace 
technology "may exhibit short-term rigidities and perhaps 
indivisibilities and will to that extent act as a 
constraint upon the adoption of new workplans" (quoted in 
McLoughlin and Clark, 1988: 100). 
Furthermore, one finds difficulty with the argument that 
technologies are unstable entities and therefore do not 
have "fixed and determinate uses" (Woolgar 1990; Grint, 
1991). It is conceivable that the design of technological 
artefacts is socially determined and that all such 
artefacts are subject to "stabilization rituals". But, it 
is equally conceivable that these artefacts have definite 
or fixed uses. To take a rather mundane example, the 
personal computer, as it is, has a variety of %fixed' 
66 
uses. It cannot be used on the production line for crude 
oil refining for instance. Besides, following Pinch and 
Bijker's (1987) account of the development of the bicycle, 
%stabilisation rituals' can only result in new or modified 
artefacts with new or modified uses. A technological 
artefact would therefore have 'fixed' use(s) at least for 
the brief period that precedes its modification. In the 
event, Woolgar and Grint's argument becomes more 
persuasive if by imputing that a given technology does not 
have a determinate use, they simply imply the possible 
modification of its use over time. 
Furthermore, a point has to be made in passing that it is 
not always that *stabilization rituals' are directed at 
the fine details in the design of the artefact. As Pinch 
and Bijker's account also shows, the 'technical content' 
need not be the basis for stabilization. Stabilization 
may simply mean that substantive or potent technical 
entities are competing for acceptance by those involved in 
the stabilization process. This does not necessarily mean 
that the technical entities, which do not earn acceptance, 
are non-viable or unusable. 
It also needs to be noted that the social constructivist 
approach suggested by Pinch and Bijker (1987) tends to 
focus on how a technology comes to be accepted not 
necessarily what happens after its acceptance. In their 
scheme, social groups would determine the shape of a 
technology during its design. However, once the design is 
complete, there remains some probability of escape from 
this mode of determinism to another, quite possibly 
technological. This effectively suggests the existence of 
delimiting boundaries for socio-cultural determinism. It 
also provides a credible basis for what Grint sees as the 
.. technicist' notion that "irrespective of the social 
construction of technology, once the technology is 
constructed its technical capacity is to a large extent 
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inscribed or encased into its fabric such that it operates 
as an independent variable" (Grint, 1991: 292). 
Considering the foregoing, it seems erroneous to suggest 
that technology itself does not matter and that what 
counts in the explanation of technology impact is the 
social system in which the technology is embedded. It is 
equally problematic to "fail to look behind technical 
things to notice the social circumstances of 
[technological] development, deployment, and use" (Winner, 
1985: 26). Put succinctly, both technological determinist 
and socio-cultural determinist perspectives are one-sided 
accounts and are therefore seriously flawed. A more 
persuasive approach is therefore required. 
3.2.3 The Interactive Approach 
This represents an extension of Barnes (1982) proposal of 
an interactive model for science and technology and the 
avoidance of hard analytic categories such as technology, 
politics and economics. This is necessary because a 
complex interrelationship exists between these categories 
which together form a complex 'whole'. Therefore, these 
"Parts simply cannot be understood separately from their 
relationship to the whole; in turn the totality is 
reflected in each part" (Storey, 1983: 49). 14 As Storey 
further emphasizes, "The whole is in the parts and the 
parts in the whole" (1983: 170). Hence a central argument 
in this approach, which has been variously referred to as 
a network (Latour, 198; Law, 1988) and as a systems (Hughes, 
1987,1988) approach, is that the distinction between 
technology, social, economic, cultural or political 
factors does not reflect what occurs in the 'real' world. 
All these factors interact with one another and thus need 
to be treated as mutually interdependent. Delineating 
68 
this approach therefore is the total rejection of any form 
of determinism which is seen as representing only a 
partial view and is thus likely to be defective. 
Hence Hughes (1988) emphasizes the "seamless web" of 
political, cultural, technical and economic factors. Law 
(1991) takes a similar view. As he aptly puts it; 
what appears to be social is 
we usually call technical 
practice nothing is purely 
anything purely social. And 
the economic, the political, 
the rest (1991: 10). 
partly technical. What 
is partly social. In 
technical. Neither is 
the same may be said for 
the scientific, and all 
Thus according to Law, "wherever we scrape the social 
surface we will find that it is composed of networks of 
heterogeneous materials" (1991: 10). Also for Law (1987, 
1988), organisational success is a function of the ability 
of "heterogeneous engineers" to mobilize and juxtapose 
heterogeneous elements like scientific theories and 
skills, organisations and technological artefacts. 
Similarly, Latour (1988) considers purely technical or 
social explanations for technological outcomes as 
untenable. He recommends "get[ting] rid of these twin 
artefacts, society and technology... "(1988: 22) since 
according to him, " humans, non humans... are never 
sufficient in themselves"(1988: 305). Latour suggests the 
assumption of "a socio-technical position in which we see 
the innovators, or entrepreneurs, appealing from one set 
of alliances with human actors to another set of alliances 
with non-human actors. .. 
"(1988: 22). For Latour, "machines 
are lieutenants; they hold the places and the roles 
delegated to them... "(1988: 309) and, as he sees it, 
technology "has insinuated itself in such a way that ... 
it spreads in a painless, quiet and necessary way ... 
" 
(1988: 31). This notwithstanding, these 'non-human allies' 
have been socially woven'. What therefore results are 
%social-technical stratagems', products of confused 
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overlaps, which he claims defy social explanation. On the 
other hand, technology cannot be seen as inexorably 
determining because its usefulness depends on "the 
solidarity it offers with other human struggles" 
(1988: 32). 
In essence, technology is socially constructed but it is 
still important. However, technology is not independently 
important since it needs other 'allies'15. As Law would 
put it, it "is recursively woven into the intricate dance 
that unites the social and the technical" (1991: 18). In 
his part, Latour concludes that the only relevant question 
when analyzing the relationship between the social and the 
technical is whether "this association [is] stronger or 
weaker... "(1988: 27), not the primacy of one over the 
other. 
An appeal for the interactive approach is demonstrated in 
the socio-technical systems design, the origin of which is 
associated with the Tavistock institute and is also 
propagated by the human-centred systems school. 16 
However, it must be noted in passing that the socio- 
technical system design does not fall neatly within the 
framework of the interactive model since it does not 
necessarily emphasize a coalition between the interacting 
actors. Nonetheless, both the interactive and the socio- 
technical system approaches share some commonality in so 
far as neither of them accords primacy to any factor, 
whether technological or human. The socio-technical 
systems approach recognizes the interactive mode between 
technology and people and hence differs from both 
technological determinist and social determinist models. 
However, the approach seems to imbibe elements of the 
determinist models in so far as, for instance, it is able 
to accomodate the argument that: 
[whilst] those in control of society may legitimate 
the rationality of technological progress through the 
rhetoric that denies human choice ... or through a 
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rhetoric which purports to conflate 'common sense' to 
technological progress, [it remains the case that] 
the subordination of choice to technological progress 
is itself socially determined (Grint, 1992: 57). 
Under a socio-technical framework, the relationship 
between technology and people is bilateral rather than 
unilateral. In other words, the technical or social are 
not sufficient in themselves. For instance, technical 
efficiency alone would not guarantee the effective 
utilization of technological artefacts. Mediation by 
humans is of a necessity. Probably arguing along similar 
lines, Hill (1988: cited in Grint, 1992) takes the view 
that a culture-technology alignment is a necessary 
condition for a technological system to be deemed viable. 
In making a case for socio-technical design, Rice, one of 
the early advocates of the model, explains that: 
the concept of a production system as a socio- 
technical system ... [refers to] the interrelations 
of the technical and socio-psychological organisation 
of industrial production systems ... The concept ... 
arose from the consideration that any production 
system requires both a technological, organisation- 
equipment and process layout - and work organisation 
relating to each other and to those who carry out the 
necessary. The technological demands place limits on 
the type of work organisation possible; but a work 
organisation has social and psychological properties 
of its own that are independent of technology. A 
socio-technical system must also satisfy the 
financial conditions of the industry of which it is 
a part. It must have economic dimensions, all of 
which are interdependent but all of which have 
independent values of their own (quoted in Kelly, 
1968: 104-5). 
In essence, the main theme of the socio-technical systems 
design is joint consideration and optimisation of both 
technical and social components in the human-machine 
relationship (Mumford, 1979). However, a problem with the 
model lies in its implicit assumption that the precise 
capabilities of a given technological system as well as 
the optimum social efficiency can be estabilished. With 
regard to the former, Grint (1992), for example, gives a 
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graphic account of the contested nature of the technical 
capabilities of technology. He makes the point that "what 
counts as a 'black box' and what the 'black box' will do 
are themselves social constructions" (1992: 60). Hence, 
determining optimum technical efficiency is problematic 
and indeed doubtful. Similarly, from an interpretivist 
perspective, different models of social efficiency would 
exist, depending on individuals interpretation of reality, 
particularly the dominant and most persuasive 
interpretations. Further, even if the most persuasive 
interpretation prevails, it still remains the case that 
what is regarded as socially efficient or optimum would 
vary from one social context to another. In essence, 
there can be no one universally applicable socio-technical 
system. 
One expectation of some advocates of the socio-technical 
model (notably Mumford, 1979; Ehn, 1988) is that its 
adoption would end the domination of humans by machines 
which then become no more than tools to augment rather 
than replace human skills. This is particularly notable 
because implicit here is a technology shaping process 
which effectively underscores the subjectivity of socio- 
technical design approach itself. Therefore, Law (1988) 
can justifiably argue that socio-technical systems are a 
function of tactics - "tactics for the mobilisation and 
juxtaposition of heterogeneous elements" (1988: 45) - 
rather than dependent on the availability of the various 
heterogeneous elements themselves. According to Law, it 
is important to analyse these tactics used by systems 
builders. In a similar vein, Wilkinson (1983) indicates 
a preference for an exploration of the roles of engineers, 
managers and workers when the technology and the working 
practices are contested and chosen. This strategy would 
tend to draw attention back to the social-determinist 
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thesis but would possibly also highlight the existence of 
options and constraints and the role of negotiation and 
choice when deciding on options. 
Overall, the attraction of the interactive model lies in 
its recognition of input from all the 'heterogeneous 
actors'. That is, variables are neither neutral nor 
deterministic. Also, whilst discouraging the treatment of 
variables as distinct entities, the interactive approach 
does not suggest that the 'actors' are lost in the 'web' 
nor does it clearly deny the capacity of these 'actors' to 
influence'. It is this underlying ambiguity that 
provides the platform for the research. Admittedly, the 
social and the technological are not "two estranged 
communities" (Latour, 1988: 23) and, the mechanisms of 
stitching up alliances between them are largely obscure. 
But, does these necessarily mean that the %allies' are not 
able to exercise discernable, though not independent, 
influences? A notable point is that the all-embraciveness 
of the interactive model generally tends to drown the 
feasibility of this direction of enquiry. Nevertheless, 
there is reason to believe that research in this direction 
is plausible. After all, that allies are interacting and, 
more specifically, the presence of the human ally per se 
do not alter the point that a crude oil refining plant 
would produce refined petroleum products whilst a steel 
mill churns out only steel bars. In any case, even Latour 
himself is able to convincingly chart out the function or 
influence of his *door-closer'. 
Therefore, from the premises that: 'actors' are not 
necessarily lost in the web; that each is able to exert 
influence without necessarily being deterministic; that 
this influence is not exerted independently since each 
ally needs the others; and that to exert influence 
suggests relevance, the research interest is to explore 
the areas of influence, and hence relevance, of an actor, 
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specifically technology, in a given phenomenon (in this 
case, the organisation of work), the 'actors' coalition 
network notwithstanding. Also of interest is to find out 
whether the importance attached to imported technology in 
a developing country like Nigeria makes it a dominant 
partner in its coalition with the 'social'. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
As suggested in the preceding analysis, many perspectival 
variations in the definition of technology are evident in 
the literature. However, for analytic investigations, a 
more restricted definition is preferred to a rather 
universalistic one because of the conflation of variables 
which is inevitable in the latter. Further, it was stated 
that the function of technology, particularly the 'new' 
variety, and the nature of its relationship with work has 
been an area of wide ranging speculations and assertions. 
For convenience, these varied views are grouped into three 
categories. 
Views which tout essentially 'technical' explanations for 
all that happens in the workplace are crudely17 
categorised under the technological determinist approach. 
For instance, within this framework, technology would be 
claimed to determine or unilaterally influence the content 
and character of jobs, as well as the mode of control in 
the labour process. In the technological determinist 
model, much seem to be made of the 'technical rigidities' 
which are presumed to enable technology to become the main 
explanatory variable. In the event, the inherent 
technical rigidities means that such thing like the 
spatial location of workers and, incidentally, their 
social relationship; the job tasks that must necessarily 
be performed, perhaps in a specific order and time; would 
all be determined by the technology. Furthermore, in 
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relation to developing countries, technical rigidities 
would presumably guarantee that the imported technology 
would meet the expectations of the importing country. Put 
differently, from a technological determinist perspective, 
a given technology would have the same effects no matter 
where it is employed. Hence, a developing country can be 
rest assured that a technology that supposedly enhances 
output would perform the same 'fits' for it. By the same 
token, a technology that is claimed to reduce manning 
level or deskill jobs would manifest exactly the same 
effects everywhere, both in its *"home' environment and in 
a foreign one. However, that technical rigidities are not 
iron physical laws is evidenced by reported variations in 
the outcomes of technological change in organisations with 
similar technologies. Hence, technological determinism, 
which is apparently sustained by the inherent technical 
rigidities of technology, is flawed. 
Another group of views, categorised as the social shaping 
or social determinist approach, proffer entirely social 
explanations for all work relationships. In this model, 
both the technology and any changes that accompany its 
deployment are socially determined. An essential argument 
here is that "the critical tool that led to the assembly 
of the megamachine were inventions of the [human] mind... " 
(Miller, 1990: 155). Besides, technological artefact comes 
into being only after 'stabilization rituals' and final 
acceptance by social participants. 
Under the social shaping approach, the deployment of 
skills and the 'systems' of control, as well as any 
changes in them, would be seen within the context of 
social relations and would be explained only by social 
means. For example, the divesting of control from the 
worker to the machine (Braverman, 1985) would, in no 
uncertain terms, be a socially or, more specifically, 
management determined phenomenon. Similarly, variations 
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in technological change outcomes in organisations with 
similar technology, as well as instances where the 'smart 
machine' has not delivered its promises, would be easily 
explained along social lines. 
However, one wonders, for instance, how the inability of 
a textile mill to process crude oil could be explained by 
purely social means. In other words, the social shaping 
approach fails to recognize the point that "men are never 
completely free to define their situations independently 
of structural constraints" (Rose 1975: 244). 
Finally, middle ground arguments which project the 
plausibility or rather viability of both technological and 
social explanations are grouped together under the 
interactive model. Although this model suggests a 
processual relationship between the social and the 
technological, its tenet of critical importance here is 
its recognition of contributions, and hence relevance, of 
all variables in the interaction. In other words, under 
the interactive framework, neither the technological nor 
the social is seen as 'the' determinant of all workplace 
relations. Rather, each could be seen as 'a' determinant 
in its own right. That is, each has the ability to exert 
influence. 
Furthermore, the interdependent relationship between the 
social and the technical suggests that their influences 
are not always unilateral. Neither of them exclusively 
determines all workplace relationships whilst the other 
remains permanently on the sideline. For instance, 
decision makers are not able to divest control from 
workers vacuously any more than technology is able to 
unilaterally control work. Put differently, management 
cannot possibly deploy or redeploy skills in a 
technologyless environment. Similarly, the capacity of 
technology can be manifest only when it is socially 
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decided to be put into use. Therefore, from an 
interactive perspective, whatever the reasons for 
organizing work, both technological and social factors are 
implicated, one way or another. Hence, in these 
relationships, Latour would "see only actors - some human, 
some non-human ... - ... entities that do things ... 
" 
(1988: 303). 
In summary, both technological determinism and the social 
shaping approaches are rejected for their one-sidedness. 
On the other hand, the interactive model is found 
generally more persuasive principally because of its 
denial of any form of determinism. However, its all- 
embraciveness tends to result in a situation where, to 
borrow Rose's words, "Nobody wins the race but everybody 
gets a prize" (Rose, 1988: cited in Mcloughlin, 1992: 34). 
But then, it is difficult to discount the view that making 
distinct claims about 'actants' like technology, for 
example, "are of central importance to both academic 
audiences, organisational practioners, and public policy 
makers, in evaluating both the implications of new ... 
technologies and the opportunities and constraints that 
they pose"(Mcloughlin, 1992: 25). But, as it appears, 
thoroughgoing interactive model seems to be dissuasive of 
such claims. In any event, by not clearly denying the 
ability of the various actants to exert discernable 
influence, the interactive model provides the leeway for 
the research. Thus, on one hand, I subscribe to the 
interactive view that actants are all relevant but not 
independent. On the other hand, one is persuaded by Clark 
et al's., recognition of "technology ... as a significant 
explanatory variable ... "(1988: 10), that is, in so far as 
this means a discernable technological influence. 
However, am unconvinced by these analysts contention that 
this influence could ever be independent. Recognized is 
the essential dualism surrounding technological influence 
in the extent that technology possesses potentials which 
77 
it cannot manifest on its own accord and in a vacuum. 
Therefore, it is considered worthwhile to explore the 
extent to which a factor, in this case technology, is able 
to exert influence whilst within the interactive network. 
This is the research issue. 
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NOTES (3) 
1. This is much in line with MacKenzie and Wajcman's 
(1985) identification of three layers of meaning for 
technology - physical objects; human activities; and "what people know as well as what they do" (1985: 3). 
2. A 'systems approach' posits that a system is only 
part of a wider environment upon which it is 
dependent and is itself made up of subsystems. The 
problem in systems analysis therefore lies in the 
possibility of accurately identifying the critical 
boundaries as well as the areas of interdependencies 
between the system and its external environment on 
one hand and, on the other hand, between the 
subsystems which make up the system under 
consideration. Such an analysis can only be 
tentative. In any event, one advantage of a systems 
viewpoint is that it tends to place more emphasis on 
the utility of the artefact rather than on the 
artefact as a tool in itself (Whelchel, 1986). 
3. Not all would accept this distinction. For example, 
Berggren rather cynically remarks that "it is often 
the interest in the new technology rather than the 
technology in itself which is new" (1985: 62). 
4. Bimber's (1990) attempt to rid Karl Marx of an 
alleged technology determinist cloak provides a 
useful analysis of the different perceptions of 
technological determinism. 
5. Winner's ambivalence in this issue is noteworthy. 
While on one hand he apparently takes a technology- 
determinist stance, on the other hand he argues: 
"The idea that technology or anything else could be 
the primary determinant ... is impossible to prove" (1977: 76). It must be noted however that in his 
seeming technology determinist stance, Winner seeks 
to make the point that technology shapes technology. 
Quite simply, technological invention does not result 
from a spontaneous flash of inspiration. New ideas 
are often a function of existing ideas. In this 
regard, MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) are convinced 
that "Existing technology is ... an important 
precondition of new technology. It provides the 
basis of devices and techniques to be modified, and 
is a rich set of intellectual resources available for 
imaginative use in new settings" (1985: 10). Also 
notable is Hughes' (1983) work on Thomas Edison which 
demonstrates that an invention may depend on the 
modification of existing devices. 
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6. Woodward cannot be strictly categorised as technology 
determinist. She recognises that situations might 
change and technology becomes a dependent rather than 
an independent variable. As she makes clear, she 
does not suggest that "the research proved technology 
to be the only important variable determining 
organisation structure, or that such factors as the 
history and background of a firm and the 
personalities of the people who built it up ... were 
unimportant" (1965: 50). Indeed, she later expressed 
the possibility that "the variations in 
organisational structure and behaviour ... are more dependent on the nature of the control system than on 
the technology itself" (1970: xii). 
7. The reason for this discrepancy in interpretation 
between Woodward and Blauner is not very clear. 
However Meissner (1969) suggested that it may derive 
from their differences in focus. While Woodward was 
particularly concerned with control over the 
production process, Blauner focused on social 
relations at work and on performance. In any event, 
the discrepancy notwithstanding, both analysts accord 
some order of determinism to technology. 
8. It appears many analysts share the view that the 
crucial significance of technology at work is its 
effect on workers' tasks and skills. But there also 
appears to be little clarity and specificity in the 
conceptualisation of skill. Skill has been variously 
defined as control, education, training and even 
process. For example, Broadbent sees skill as "the 
whole process of organizing a flexible series of 
actions ... the control system that makes work 
effective" (1987: 9). Similarly, Blauner (1964) and 
Braverman (1974) see skill as synonymous with 
control. Braverman's notion of skill derives from 
his holistic impression of traditional craftwork as 
involving both 'conception' and 'execution' so that 
craftmen have complete control over work. For 
Braverman, a job can be labelled as skilled only if 
the unity of %conception' and %execution' is 
maintained since, as he sees it, that is the only 
condition under which workers would be seen as having 
control. Thus in his critique on technology, 
Braverman uses the unity or otherwise of conception 
and execution as a basis for describing tendencies in 
the workplace. A different perspective is provided 
by Beechey (1982) who distinguishes between 
(objective skill' and %conventionally defined skill' 
depending on the method of acquisition. According to 
her, while the former refers to competencies acquired 
through eduction, training and apprenticeship, the 
latter is acquired via collective bargaining or 
conventional definition of occupational status. 
Implied here is the likelihood of changes in skill to 
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be a function of changes in training, education 
and/or apprenticeship. Also implied is that any 
"series of actions" can be regarded as a skill if it 
is so socially defined. However, Rolfe stresses the 
danger of conceptualizing skill in terms of education 
or training. She draws attention to the point that 
"work groups may be educated beneath or above the 
skill level of their work; ... [and] training time 
may be artificially extended by employers or by trade 
unions and professional associations" (1990: 110-111 ). 
Rolfe goes on to suggest a model of skill in which 
skill consists of two dimensions: technical 
complexity and discretion. Each has three 
. substructural' measures. Technical complexity is 
measured by complexity of tasks; knowledge; and 
range and variety of tasks. Similarly, the measures 
for discretion include: decision-making and 
judgement over the work process or product; control 
over the organisation of work; and supervision. 
Using Rolfe's scheme, it is probably possible to 
assess the effect of technological change on skills 
by looking at changes in the substructural measures. 
9. Three models of technological change effect on skill 
are discernable namely: The skilling theory; the 
de-skilling theory and the compensatory or polarity 
thesis. The central argument in the 'skilling' 
thesis is that advanced industrial societies require 
increasingly skilled workforces (Penn and 
Scattergood, 1985) as new technology will open up 
many opportunities for people to do meaningful work 
(Gershuny, 1978). On the other hand, the 'de- 
skilling' theory, which is prominent in many 
discussions arising from the labour process school, 
is couched in the claim that through time, technology 
has been used to fragment and derogate jobs. Finally 
the compensatory theory proposes that technology (i) 
has the potential to generate both skilling and de- 
skilling (ii) provides threats and opportunities to 
different categories of workers and (iii) places 
certain demands on skills and these demands vary 
depending on the type of technological system. 
10. Although in much of his work concerning technology 
Hughes clearly disagrees with the technology 
determinist thesis, he does concede that "Large 
systems with high momentum tend to exert soft 
determinism on other systems, groups and individuals 
in the society" (1987 : 55). It is not entirely 
clear whether by "soft determinism" Hughes simply 
means "influence". 
11. Woolgar S (1990) prefers to construe technology as 
text which may then be analysed along three 
dimensions he labelled (i) the instrumental response, 
(ii) the interpretivist response and (iii) the 
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reflexive response. For details see Woolgar (1990), 
"The turn to Technology in Social Studies of Science 
(Draft 1.2 Jan 1990 : 27-38). 
12. Actually, this need not be so, Kling (1990) for 
instance stresses that the differing effects could be 
explained in terms of the argument that technological 
software "is not cut from common cloth". As he 
explains, information systems differ in their 
capabilities and in their operations, some not 
requiring pre-programming before their databases 
could be navigated by users. It is this 'navigatory' 
opportunities which enable individual organisations 
to use the technology to meet their specific needs 
and hence observed variations in organisations with 
similar technologies. 
13. The neutrality of technology appears to be a rather 
ambiguous concept. On one hand it suggests complete 
inertness. But as Whelchel points out if being 
neutral means "having no effect" then technology is 
not neutral because it "profoundly affects our world" 
(1986: 3). However on the other hand, the neutrality 
of technology could be seen in the extent that 
technology does not have definite effects; its 
effects are a function of what, how and presumably 
where it is used. This argument is located in the 
conception of technology as merely a means "at the 
disposal of the social actors... " (Berggren, 
1985: 61). Thus, Winner argues that "technologies are 
neutral; they are simply tools that can be used one 
way or another; the benefit or harm they bring 
depends on how men use them" (1981 : quoted in 
Whelchel, 1986). This enables Whelchel to 
distinguish between moral and causal neutrality. 
This view of technology as purely a means earns it 
moral neutrality. On the other hand, technology is 
not causally neutral because it does affect our world 
(Whelchel 1986). 
14. An elaborate treatise of the concept of 'Totality' 
can be found in Lukacs (1971) work, *History of class 
consciousness'. For Lukacs, knowledge of facts can 
become knowledge of reality only when the isolated 
facts of social life are integrated in a totality. 
15. Jorges (1990) 
romanticization 
machines are 
interactive equi 
humans. 
has criticised the apparent 
of machines when both man and 
understood as . actors' in the 
ition, thus portraying "non-humans" as 
16. In any case, the tenets of the human-centred system 
school tends to run against the grains of the 
interactive approach. Whilst the former seeks 
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elimination of that which, tends to 'dehumanize' 
humans, some 'interactive' theorists would frown at 
this "speciesism" (Law, 1991) - the distinction 
between man, plant and machines. Thus Law contends 
that "our discrimination against machines hurts us 
just as much as it hurts the machines that we 
confine, in a second-order way, to the mechanical 
margins of our human civilisation" (1991: 17). 
17. Categorisation is crude because arguments which see 
technology as determining and those that simply 
suggest influence are lumped together. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR IN THE *DEVELOPING' NIGERIA 
In the last chapter various presumptions on the effects of 
technology were examined within the context of three 
theoretical models namely technological determinist, 
socio-cultural determinist and interactive or network 
models. This foreshadows the issue of technology and 
technological development in Nigeria addressed here. A 
central concern in this section is to highlight the 
importance attached to technology in 'developing' Nigeria. 
The chapter begins with an attempt to locate the basis of 
the concept, 'developing' and examines how countries come 
to be categorized into 'developed' and "underdeveloped' or 
%developing'. Production efficiency is identified as a 
major criterion in this classification. The presumed 
relationship between efficiency of production and 
technology enables the latter to be brought into focus. 
Following this, the technological situation in Nigeria is 
examined in some detail. This is mainly descriptive. 
From the standpoint that government is the representative 
of society, the focus is on government's attitude to 
technology and its technological development efforts. 
This is followed finally by an appraisal of these efforts 
and their outcomes in the context of the three theoretical 
models. It is suggested that in Nigeria, as in much of 
the developed world, technology could still be seen as 
essentially a "means... at the disposal of social actors... 
who have the privilege of outlining production systems" 
(Berggren, 1985: 61). But, it is not of "very little 
importance' as Gallie(1978) suggests. In Nigeria, 
technology is of immense importance but it is not 
determinate. 
84 
4.1 THE CONCEPT "'DEVELOPING', AS USED FOR COUNTRIES, 
AND THE LINK WITH TECHNOLOGY 
Although there does not seem to be any precise definition 
of the word development, and what development is about is 
not entirely clear, it still does seem to be a universally 
desirable phenomenon. Often implicit in the various 
conceptualisations of development is a directed change 
over time. In the context of a nation, development would 
be seen in terms of qualitative "changes in the socio- 
economic patterns of relationships, ideas and values in a 
society... " (Anya, 1989: 69). Within this context, 
development is processual, continuous and eternal and it 
would seem in order to suggest that every nation is 
"developing". However, from an international perspective, 
development relates to some notion of industrialisation, 
economic growth, wealth accumulation and mass consumption. 
This notion underlies the classification of countries into 
"developed" and "underdeveloped". 
Under the international framework, development has a 
processual dimension but also apparently implied is a 
phenomenon that reaches completion in time. In other 
words, whilst the developed countries have experienced 
this state of completeness, those in the underdeveloped 
category are still down the lower rungs of the development 
ladder. These countries have either commenced the process 
- that is "developing" - or are yet to begin the 
development journey. Although it could be argued that no 
society has or would ever reach a state of completeness, 
the demarcation into developed and underdeveloped or 
undeveloped countries is, in principle, generally 
accepted. 
The developed countries are advanced industrialized 
societies. They comprise countries in Europe, North 
America as well as Japan, Australia etc. These countries 
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are seen as having far more efficient modes of production 
and are more able to mobilize resources to meet their 
socio-economic needs. On the other hand, the 
underdeveloped' countries include countries like Nigeria, 
Kenya, India, Argentina and Mexico which neither possess 
the wherewithal for efficient production; nor the 
capability to meet their socio-economic needs effectively. 
The underdeveloped countries are therefore considered to 
be industrially and economically backward and inferior to 
their more affluent counterparts in the developed world. 
They are construed as 'developing' when they make attempts 
to reduce these contradictions between them and the 
developed countries. 
For development economists of the 1950's and 1960's like 
WW Rostow, underdeveloped countries are generally 
characterized by the dominance of agriculture in the 
economy and the absence of a capital goods sector. The 
unequal exchange in their internationally traded 
commodities means that income is comparatively too low and 
so would not support required level of savings for 
investments in capital goods. Rostow and his colleagues 
were convinced about the existence of a definite economic 
growth path through which all countries must pass in their 
process of development. The developed countries have 
successfully traversed this path2. The underdeveloped 
must necessarily follow the same "stages of economic 
growth, with assistance from the developed countries, if 
they are ever to become developed. Thus, these theorists 
saw development problems along economic lines and 
development itself was essentially seen as synonymous with 
economic growth. As Yahaya (1989) remarks: 
The development theorists ... tended to see economic 
growth as a process of steady increase in GDP which 
was to be realized through the development of 
manufacturing. This sector was perceived as the only 
truly productive and dynamic sphere in the economy 
(1989: 73). 
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However, this school of theorists have been variously 
criticized on a number of grounds among which are that: 
(i) when making their prescriptions, they apparently 
ignored environmental and idiosyncratic differences 
between societies. That is, they failed to 
acknowledge the socio-cultural and political 
dimensions in development. 
(ii) capitalism has not completely eradicated the problems 
of unemployment and poverty even in the centres of 
the capitalist system (Fadahunsi, 1986). 
The criticisms notwithstanding, prescriptions made by the 
development theorists for transition from traditional to 
modern society have remained attractive to development 
planners in the underdeveloped countries. Thus in these 
countries, development has been understood to mean "being 
like" the industrialised societies and, 
The core of development strategies-was concerned 
with rapid economic growth. This resulted in a 
predominantly larger allocation of resources to 
capital goods essential for accelerating the pace of 
growth. Emphasis was laid on production so that, as 
a result of increased productivity, more would be 
later available to be spent on social welfare 
activities ... Industrialisation in this strategy tended to be identified with economic development. 
Planning, social, political, institutional, cultural 
and other dimensions were taken into consideration 
but the goal was to maximize capital formation 
(Yahaya, 1989: 73). 
It has to be remembered that capital formation and 
accumulation in the form of technological innovation, 
invention and acquisition remain the cornerstone of growth 
in the developed world. For instance, the industrial 
revolution in Europe was made possible by technological 
developments in machinery which enabled the creation of 
new wealth through increased production and productivity 
(NISER, 1988). In fact, it is possible to argue that 
industrial revolution would not have been possible without 
technological inventions. More recently, developments in 
new technologies have helped to ensure sustained economic 
growth and hence a comparatively high level of material 
well-being amongst people in the developed world. 
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Apparently with this in view, underdeveloped countries 
have accepted neoclassical prescriptions for 
industrialising and modernizing along the path charted and 
followed by the West (Fadahunsi, 1986; Jayaweera, 1987); 
and it appears, have similarly located change and 
development in the production process. One therefore 
expects underdeveloped countries to pay attention to 
technology and have a desire for technological 
development. Apparent validation of this expectation 
comes from the United Nations which confirms "a greater 
awareness in developing countries of the need for 
acquiring ... technology in order to produce on an 
internationally competitive basis"(1973: 3). Of interest 
is the extent to which this observation holds for Nigeria. 
4.2 THE TECHNOLOGICAL SCENE IN NIGERIA 
4.2.1 General Background 
As already indicated, Nigeria fits into the underdeveloped 
but, in any case, "developing" category. Over 70% of her 
estimated population of 112 million3 are engaged in 
agriculture producing food crops such as maize, cassava 
and yam and cash crops like cocoa, groundnut and oil palm. 
At the time of independence in 1960, agricultural produce 
was the main revenue earner and singularly accounted for 
70% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the 
position shifted in the 1970's - the oil boom years - when 
Nigeria became a monoproduct economy relying solely on 
crude oil as the foreign exchange earner. The abundance 
accruing from the oil wealth attracted many to seek wage 
employment in the fast-growing urban centres thus leaving 
only a few to work the land. This neglect resulted in a 
sharp decline in agricultural productivity. Nigeria moved 
from a position of a major exporter of agricultural 
produce and self-sufficiency in food supplies to one of an 
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importer, even of food items. The contribution of 
agriculture to GDP at current prices fell from 61% in 1962 
to 28% in 1976 (Ubeku, 1983: 43). However, the devastating 
collapse of oil prices added to the instability of the oil 
market itself served to draw attention back to agriculture 
which continues to be an important sector in the economy. 
Hence, after the slump in the 1970's, agriculture started 
showing signs of positive growth. Its contribution to GDP 
increased from 25.5% in 1981 to about 40% in 1988 (First 
National Rolling Plan 1990-92, Vol. 1 page 4). 
Nonetheless, the technology and methods of agricultural 
production in Nigeria had been for the most part 
primitive. For example, bushes are still cleared with 
machetes and cutlasses; the land tilled with hoes; both 
sowing and harvesting of crops are still carried out by 
manual labour; and preservation and storage of 
agricultural produce is essentially by traditional airing 
and/or sun-drying methods. Furthermore, the traditional 
farm implements namely hoes, cutlasses etc are still 
fabricated using the primitive method of metal smelting 
and then manually beating the hot metal to shape (Koleoso 
and Nwosah 1988: 3). Thus, indigenous technologies and 
methods of agricultural production in Nigeria are "labour- 
intensive, time consuming, energy-sapping and often fail 
to respond to the demand and supply forces of modern 
markets" (Sodipe, 1981: 2). Only recently, the Nigerian 
government had blamed "low technology employed by the 
majority of the small-scale farmers who constitute the 
bulk of [the] farming population" for the difficulty in 
achieving desirable levels in productivity (First National 
Rolling Plan, 1990-92 Vol. I: 71). 
The industrial sector is only just beginning to take root. 
There was very little, if any, industrial enterprise 
during the colonial days in spite of the abundance of raw 
materials. The late take-off of industrialisation in the 
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country had been explained in terms of the British 
colonial masters' preference to use her colonies merely as 
providers of raw materials for her industries at home. 
The raw materials, bought at low prices, were then 
processed and sold back to the colonies at very high 
prices (Ubeku, 1983). Apparently, from Britain's point of 
view, it made no business sense to establish industries in 
her colonies for processing these raw materials. An 
alternative explanation for the late industrial take-off 
in Nigeria could be found in the argument that neither 
sufficient market nor skilled manpower nor technology nor 
even capital to finance industrialisation existed 
(Okigbo, 1987). Nevertheless, few industrial enterprises 
were established shortly before independence but, there 
was complete adherence to import - substitution 
industrialisation strategy prescribed by neo-classical 
economics. This strategy endured well after independence. 
As Igbani (1982) explains: 
Given the low base for industrialisation in the 
country and the existing demand for imported consumer 
goods, it was, therefore, simple and logical to base 
the rationale for industrialisation on the domestic 
replacement of these finished goods by importing the 
components or semi-finished materials and engaging in 
the final assembly process (1982: 7). 
In any case, the high level of dependency on importation 
of machinery and even raw material feed stocks could only 
aggravate the pressure on the balance of payment. This 
became evident with the collapse in the price of oil 
which, as indicated earlier, is the main source of foreign 
exchange earning in Nigeria. The manufacturing sector was 
thus unable to secure sufficient foreign exchange for the 
importation of the required raw materials and other 
industrial inputs. As a result, 
many manufacturing establishments shut down while 
others operated at ridiculously low level of their 
installed capacities. Labour was laid off and the 
level of unemployment grew. 
(First National Rolling Plan, 1990-92, Vol. I: 105) 
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Presumably no government would be complacent with these 
conditions in its society. This thus raises the question 
of how Nigeria confronted these problems in both her 
agricultural and industrial sectors. 
4.2.2. Technological Development Efforts: 
The theory that technology holds the key to modernisation 
seems to have found support in Nigeria. As Anya (1989) 
argues, Nigeria is classified as a developing nation 
precisely because of her limited potential to utilize 
science and technology to increase national productivity 
or to sustain a scientific and technological 
transformation of the society. Similarly for the Nigerian 
government, 
The adoption of science and technology in national 
life marks the difference between development and 
underdevelopment. The classification of countries 
according to their economic status reflects the state 
of scientific and technological development ... The developed world has attained technological sophistry 
by exploiting science and technology to create 
wealth, save human energy and provide technical 
services ... The developing countries on the other hand have economies which are very dependent on the 
industrialised world because they have not ... been 
able to use science and technology adequately to 
exploit their national resources 
(National Policy On Science and Technology, 1986: 7) 
Science and technology are 
catalysts in national develc 
Rolling Plan, 1990-92: 143) 
governments since independence 
and strategies geared towards 
and technology in the country. 
thus recognized as "the 
ýpment... " (First National 
and different Nigerian 
have had to adopt policies 
the development of science 
The first significant move towards science and 
technological development was made in 19704 when 
government established the Nigerian Council for Science 
and Technology (NCST) by Decree No 6 of 1970. The NCST 
was charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating 
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research and development activities in the country. It 
was, however, replaced by the National Science and 
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) established by 
Decree No 5 of 1977. The Agency was given "executive 
responsibility for the promotion and development of 
science and Technology ... 
" and its long list of duties 
included amongst others, 
- to advise the Federal Military Government on 
national science policies and priorities and on 
scientific and technological activities 
generally; 
- to prepare periodic master plans for the 
development of science and technology ...; 
- to take steps necessary to facilitate the 
application of the results of scientific and 
technological research ...; and 
- to advise on scientific and technical manpower 
requirements of Nigeria. 
(NSTDA Decree No 5,1977). 
Also formally established by Order 1977 of the same Decree 
were seven research institutes5 all of which came under 
the direct supervision of the NSTDA. The research 
institutes were mandated to conduct research into various 
areas of national interest, a major objective being to 
achieve greater self-reliance by increasing the capability 
of indigenous technologies. It is hoped that the growth 
of domestic technology and possibly engineering 
consultancy services would ultimately improve the chances 
for successful adaptation and development of acquired 
technology. 
The need to curb the hitherto uncontrolled technology 
transfer6 and to facilitate the acquisition of the 
necessary foreign technology led the Federal government to 
set up the National Office of Industrial Property (NOIP) 
by Decree No 70,1979. NOIP is a corporate body which 
serves as a technology regulatory agency. Sections 4(a) 
and 4(c) of the Decree which established it respectively 
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provide that NOIP functions for "the encouragement of a 
more efficient process for the identification and 
selection of foreign technology" and for "the provision of 
a more efficient process for the adaptation of imported 
technology". Probably the underlying aim is to closely 
dovetail foreign technology inflow with the desired 
pattern of industrial growth. In fact NOIP has indicated 
that the Office 
... ensures that there are adequate safeguards for 
effective transfer and adaptation of know-how to 
indigenous entrepreneurs through provisions in the 
technological agreements for maximum use of local raw 
materials, increased local value addition, employment 
generating capabilities increased research and 
development and adequate manpower development by 
Nigerian enterprises. 
(NOIP: Annual Report, 1989: 7) 
As a further help to Nigerian entrepreneurs, NOIP provides 
advisory services and supply information on the selection, 
sourcing and acquisition of relevant technology. Besides, 
Decree 70,1979 also provides that all Technology 
Agreements between Nigerian enterprises and their foreign 
partners must be registered with NOIP which is therefore 
able to monitor these agreements. The essence of 
monitoring is to ensure that the terms and conditions of 
Contracts are complied with during the execution of 
projects. Hence a two-pronged attack on technological 
backwardness has been launched - conducting research 
locally while monitoring the acquisition of foreign 
technology. 
To achieve better rationalisation and co-ordination of 
technological development efforts, the Federal government 
created the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology by 
the Science and Technology Act No 1 of January 1980. By 
the Act, the NSTDA was formally dissolved and its 
functions, assets and liabilities transferred to the new 
ministry. NOIP also became a parastatal of the Ministry. 
The statutory functions and mandates of the Federal 
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Ministry of Science and Technology include: 
(i) Formulation and monitoring of National Policy on 
Science and Technology; 
(ii) Promotion and administration of technology 
transfer programmes; 
(iii) Promotion and co-ordination of scientific and 
technological research and development 
activities in agricultural, industrial, medical, 
road and building, energy research and basic 
sciences; 
(iv) Promotion and co-ordination of scientific and 
technological innovation, development, 
adaptation and production; and 
(v) Establishing relations with the 24 national 
research institutes; with scientific, technical 
and technological research bodies of the O. A. U. 
(Organisation for African Unity), and with 
science and technology programmes of UNESCO and 
other United Nations Agencies, the ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of West African States) as 
well as other regional bodies and bilateral 
arrangements. 
(Fact Sheet on the Federal Ministry of Science 
and Technology, Vol I, 2nd Ed. pgs. 3-4). 
In pursuit of mandate (i), the ministry was able to 
formulate a "blueprint on Science and Technology" which 
was formally adopted in 1986, and launched in July 1987. 
The policy is a very detailed document that not only 
defines national objectives for science and technology but 
also provides policy guidelines and states strategies for 
achieving the objectives which include: 
- increasing public awareness in Science and 
Technology and their vital role in national 
development and well-being; 
- directing science and technology efforts along 
identified, national goals; 
- promoting the translation of science and 
technology results into actual goods and 
services; 
- Creating, increasing and maintaining an 
endogeneous science and technology base through 
research and development; 
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- motivating creative output in science and 
technology; 
- increasing and strengthening theoretical and 
practical scientific base in the society; and 
- increasing and strengthening the technological 
base of the nation. 
The priority areas of technological pursuits mapped out in 
the policy are agriculture, agro-allied industries, health 
and industry. 
Important developments, arising from the National Science 
and Technology policy, which are geared towards meeting 
the stated objectives have been recorded. There is the 
launching of the National Science and Technology fund 
(NSTF). The NSTF is a co-operative set up primarily for 
the "judicious management of the funds" (National Science 
& Technology Policy, 1986: 30) expected as contributions by 
government, both public and private sector industries, and 
made available for science and technology activities such 
as research etc. Another significant development is the 
setting up of the National Council for Science and 
Technology. This consultative body is "to foster closer 
collaboration among the Research Institutes, the private 
sector and the individual ministries which are involved in 
the implementation and development programmes in the 
various sectors of the economy" (Guidelines for the 
National Rolling Plan, 1990-92,: 59). It is noteworthy 
that research institutes have been reorganized and 
restructured, the objective being 
(i) to enhance the focus of each institute on 
specific areas of research (Guidelines to 
Rolling Plan, 1990-92,: 59) 
(ii) to promote interaction between them through 
collaborative research so as to make the 
institutes less isolated and to avoid 
wastages that arises through duplication of 
research efforts. 
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As also envisaged from the national policy, a Raw 
Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC) was 
created to ensure effective utilization of local raw 
materials. The RMRDC is therefore mandated to promote 
research geared towards raw materials development; and to 
advise on ways of adopting available machinery for more 
efficient processing of local raw materials. Besides, 
there is the creation of the National Centre for 
Agricultural Mechanisation with the responsibility of 
standardizing farm machinery and equipment and the 
production of locally designed prototypes (National 
Rolling Plan, 1990-92,: 73). This apparently arises from 
the policy that the "Production of machinery equipment and 
their spare parts shall be, as far as possible, local- 
based" (National Science and Technology Policy, 1986: 15). 
The Federal government has generally encouraged the 
development of capital goods production industries. This 
is in recognition of the crucial role these industries 
would play in ensuring "a solid and stable technological 
base for a self-sustaining industrialization process" 
(National Science & Technology Policy, 1986: 15). The 
government therefore holds substantial interests in key 
industries like iron and steel and petrochemicals. 
Furthermore, governments introduction of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986, amongst other things, 
also encouraged the direction of efforts towards the 
development of local capability in design and fabrication 
of equipment and spare parts (NISER 1988; Osinowo, 1991). 
Another area of government interest for the achievement of 
the science and technology objectives is general manpower 
development. Hence a range of policies on education, 
public awareness and motivation have been adopted. Here 
the central objective is to "promote effective interaction 
between the society and science and technology" (First 
National Rolling Plan, 1990-92, Vol 1: 145) and "To attract 
and retain a substantial percentage of the society in the 
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mainstream of science and technology activity in the 
country" (National Policy on Science & Technology, 
1986: 14). To this end, science education is encouraged at 
all levels in the educational system. The government has 
set a target of 60: 40 enrolment ratio in the universities 
in favour of science-based disciplines. To achieve this, 
efforts have been directed towards improving science and 
technology laboratories and workshops in secondary schools 
from where University entrants graduate. 
Probably in realization that "the economy is still in 
short supply of certain categories of critical manpower, 
particularly those possessing scientific and technical 
knowledge and skills" (First National Rolling Plan, 1990- 
92, Vol. 1: 187), the establishment of nine additional 
Federal Technical Colleges in the country was approved in 
1987. Futhermore, the course content of technical 
education is "geared towards acquisition of practical and 
applied skills as well as basic scientific knowledge that 
are directly relevant to industrial as well as 
technological needs of the country" (First National 
Rolling Plan, 1990-92, Vol, I; 215). In addition, the 
government has set up special employment and skills 
acquisition programmes like the Industrial Training Fund 
and the Industrial Development Centre. Moreover, a 
scholarship scheme for girls in senior secondary schools 
has been instituted primarily to encourage the education 
of women in science and technology. Also launched is the 
Nigerian Association of Women in Science, Technology and 
Mathematics. Presumably, these strategies are expected to 
aid the permeation of science and technology in the 
society. 
It is noteworthy that, although government has shown 
enormous interest in the acquisition and adaptation of 
technology, there does not seem to be a similar level of 
interest in how technology is used in the workplace. The 
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government is apparently content with the development of 
required manpower by its encouragement of science-based 
education, as well as training, for the acquisition of 
relevant skills. However, different forms of incentives 
such as tax rebates etc are offered to employers who 
provide training for their employees. Moreover, Trade 
testing services for the standardization and certification 
of various categories of skilled labour have been 
organised with the help of International Labour Office. 
Perhaps the moves most closely linked with how technology 
is worked are those by the National Productivity Centre 
established in 1987. This centre has been able to prepare 
the "Self Instructional Manual for Maintenance 
Productivity" to guide plant maintenance and an 
"Instructional Manual" for spare parts improvement (First 
National Rolling Plan, 1990-92, Col. I: 253). Thus, 
government leaves the formation of strategies for the day- 
to-day working of technology, whether indigenous or 
imported, to individual employers. In any case, it has to 
be noted that government itself has huge investment 
interests and is the largest single employer of labour in 
Nigeria. 
The foregoing is indicative of Nigeria's commitment to 
science and technology. A crucial question however is: 
what is the outcome of these multi-faceted efforts? An 
examination of this is considered necessary. 
4.3 APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT TECHNOLOGICAL SITUATION IN 
NIGERIA 
While it is true that many of the policy statements and 
efforts towards the development of science and technology 
are yet to bear fruits, some significant changes are 
discernable, particularly in the agricultural7 sector. In 
this sector, research and development efforts had led to 
improvement of different varieties of crops. This, 
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coupled with the increasing use of fertilizers and 
pesticides, had improved yields from the farms. The 
storage and preservation of farm produce have improved 
following the adoption of up-graded versions of 
traditional methods and adapted technologies. 
Although the use of traditional equipment and tools still 
persists, some degree of agricultural mechanisation has 
taken place. For instance, in accord with the desire to 
upgrade traditional technologies in order to improve their 
capacity and efficiency, Nigerian Research Institutes have 
designed and fabricated equipments such as planters, 
shellers, pelleters, graters, dryers, and fryers (NISER, 
1988). As Osinowo, (1991) also remarks: 
It is now possible to obtain locally designed an 
fabricated plants for cassava processing, vegetable 
oils, fruit juice processing, cereal processing and 
different forms of dryers for plant and animal 
products (1991: 12). 
In addition, two research institutes 
Institute of Industrial Research Oshod 
Projects Development Agency (PRODA) have 
working capabilities which include foundry, 
sheet metal fabrication, machining 
electroplating facilities (Osinowo, 1989). 
- The Federal 
i (FIIRO) and 
acquired metal 
structural and 
as well as 
Nonetheless, the dependence on imported technologies has 
continued. The materialisation of the country's 
aspiration to build up considerable local capabilities in 
science and technology seems to be a considerable distance 
away. As a report of NOIP's sponsored survey of Nigeria's 
manufacturing sector indicated, there is "a complete lack 
of local capability to perform [Engineering and Design] 
functions [which] has invariably made the disaggregation 
of imported technology packages extremely difficult if not 
impossible" (Toffs Consultancy, 1985: 97). In as much as 
this report is relatively dated8 and the problem seems to 
be exaggerated, it is plausible to suggest that Nigeria is 
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still far from possessing the ability to effectively 
unpackage and adapt imported technologies. In fact, the 
Federal government itself recently confirmed that "very 
limited capacity currently exists in the country for local 
fabrication of even the simplest machines and equipment" 
(First National Rolling Plan, 1990-92, Vol. I: 107). This 
begs the question concerning why there had been so little 
progress in technological development in Nigeria in spite 
of concerted effort by government in this connection. 
As was apparent in the literature, the answers to this 
question were often located in the mode of technology 
transfer. For instance, it had been asserted that many of 
these imported technologies arrived in forms that made 
%unpackaging' and adaptation difficult (Toffs, 1985; 
NISER, 1988) even though government had stated that 
"imported technology shall be procured in an %unpackaged' 
form (National Policy on Science and Technology, 1986: 19). 
This casts doubt on the efficiency of NOIP in carrying out 
its function of helping local entrepreneurs in the 
identification and selection of foreign technology. 
Furthermore, it is argued that many of the enterprises 
were established under the turn-key arrangment in which 
overseas suppliers often provided technical assistance 
including basic engineering services (Toffs, 1985). This 
reduces the level of local participation in projects thus 
limiting the use of local skills as well as delayed the 
acquisition of the technological know-how9. Put 
succinctly, "the process of learning-by-doing, which is 
just as important now as it was at the beginning of the 
European Industrial Revolution [is] not open to most 
Nigerians" (NISER, 1988: 4). In any case, many of the 
enterprises in the capital goods sector were basically 
involved in the local assembly of completely-knocked-down 
(CKD) components (Igbani, 1982). In the circumstances, it 
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is difficult to see how this strategy of putting "final 
touches" to semi-finished products would have helped in 
any meaningful development in design engineering and 
fabrication, so crucial in the establishment of a 
meaningful technological base. 
Another related problem is the local entrepreneurs' 
continued preference for foreign trade markslo and the 
services of foreign experts1 1. This preference could be 
explained in terms of the general apathy of Nigerians to 
"Made-in-Nigeria" goods (First National Rolling Plan, 
1990-92, Vol. 1: 144) and the lack of confidence in the 
credibility of Nigerian engineering designers 
(Osifo, 1982). This situation inevitably frustrates the 
indigenization efforts of local researchers while at the 
same time enables foreigners to make considerable input in 
local technological decisions. In essence, Nigeria seems 
unable to strike a balance between the necessity of 
developing indigenous technology and that of embracing 
foreign technology for her industrial sector. Thus, 
although some would claim that "Nigeria has definitely 
gone beyond the first steps towards industrialization" 
(Igbani, 1982: 14), some others take the view that: 
behind this facade of industrial development, is the 
reality of lack of an industrial base, as regards the 
local sourcing of raw materials, adaptation of 
exogenous technology, the application of upgraded 
local technology and the local design and manufacture 
of processing equipment and machinery (Osinowo, 
1989: 58). 
While Osinowo thus tends 
exogenous technologies, 
attention specifically to 
the issue concerning the 
technologies. Some analy 
necessary at this point. 
to blame both endogenous and 
some analysts have directed 
the exogenous variety, raising 
appropriateness of transferred 
sis of this issue is considered 
101 
4.3.2 THE APPROPRIATENESS OF TECHNOLOGY 
The issue concerning the appropriateness of technology has 
attracted attention over the years, underpinned by massive 
unemployment in many developing countries. It is proposed 
that the way out of these problems is the deployment of 
'appropriate', in the sense of more labour-intensive, 
techniques ... instead of capital-intensive ones" 
(Edquist, 1985: 78). The United Nations (UN) has seen the 
transfer of "new technologies and techniques [as] a 
prerequisite for an accelerated rate of growth in various 
industrial sectors in developing countries" (UN, 1973: 39) 
and recommends that: 
The flow of technology should be adequate to meet the 
basic needs of industrialisation ... be such as to 
cover the major technological and production gaps in 
a country's industrial programme; be effectively 
absorbed within the shortest possible period and 
adapted to local conditions (UN, 1973; 3). 
Presumably, the transferred technology is regarded as 
appropriate if it satisfies these conditions. However, 
while this view sounds impressive and in order, its 
attendant caveat has not been that agreeable. The UN 
surmises that in view of the need to link technology with 
available local raw materials and local skills, "certain 
highly sophisticated capital-intensive techniques ... 
appropriate primarily in very large scale production ... 
may be unsuitable in developing countries". Besides, 
Certain labour-saving techniques, developed because 
of the high cost of labour in industrialised 
countries, have little relevance in developing 
countries and may prove expensive to acquire and to 
maintain. In general, enterprises in developing 
countries should avail themselves of labour-intensive 
techniques, provided that a basic competitive level 
of productive efficiency can be maintained (UN, 
1973: 15). 
It is noteworthy that the industrialised countries from 
whom these technologies are imported generally have high 
incomes, a more educated and better skilled labour force 
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and, to a great extent, have internalized applied science 
and technology for sustained industrial and economic 
growth (Fadahunsi, 1982: 22). In contrast, the 'importing' 
underdeveloped countries are characterised by low incomes, 
shortages of capital, abundance of technically unskilled 
work force, "lack of a developed infrastructure to support 
and maintain sophisticated equipment, lack of management 
experience... "(Bessant, 1987). With regard to Nigeria, 
Ubeku writes: 
The bulk of the population is unskilled in the modern 
sense of the word ... the job seeker ... comes to the 
urban area for industrial employment with no 
experience of modern machinery and a general lack of 
rigid discipline which modern industrial employment 
demands (1983: 50-51). 
Hence the circumstances that prevail in the developing 
countries seem to make the less sophisticated labour- 
intensive technologies more suitable for these countries. 
Labour intensive technologies provide employment for a 
vast majority of the unemployed and at the same time 
require comparatively little capital outlay. It should 
therefore be attractive to the underdeveloped countries 
most of whom are plagued by massive unemployment, a 
predominantly unskilled workforce as well as sparse 
financial resources. Thus, for advocates of labour- 
intensive technologies, maximisation of employment takes 
priority over outstanding increases in productivity 
associated with the more sophisticated but more capital- 
intensive technologies. Also apparent is the relegation 
of technical progress as a prime issue of concern. 
However, some analysts find this circumscription to 
labour-intensive technologies rather enervating. For 
example, Chijioke (1982) is dissatisfied with the very 
idea of compartmentalizing technology into levels - the 
more advanced and sophisticated fitting the developed 
world whilst the less sophisticated is appropriate for the 
underdeveloped. He insists that this approach, wittingly 
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or unwittingly, implies the perpetuation of the technology 
gap. As he asks: 
If any group with potential for development were to 
be so sequestered to exist a half-century behind some 
others ... by what mechanism would it ever bridge the 
gap to the more advanced world? (1982: 25). 
Chijioke agrees with Hasan that developing countries must: 
develop [the] capacity for the most sophisticated 
research effort, [and] simultaneously think of simple 
solutions to simple problems which can be repeated 
and multiplied for the benefit of millions of our 
people so that their suffering and poverty are 
alleviated (Hasan, 1976; quoted in Chijioke, 1982: 26). 
Chijioke is convinced that technology is a monolith to 
which all nations aspire and each must be left to choose 
the 'mix' best suited to its development and advancement. 
Presumably, reliance on prescriptions from 'the outside' 
would only foster the condition of dependence as 
satellites of other economies. In view of global market 
competition and given that labour-intensive technologies 
are often associated with inferior economic efficiency and 
low productivity, it is doubtful that these technologies 
would be efficient enough to generate sufficient income 
for its users (Edquist, 1985). Besides, Edquist argues 
that: 
The strategy of appropriate technology does coincide 
with the interests of the workers, but only with the 
short-term interest of workers in capitalist 
countries with a high rate of unemployment. In the 
long run, ... the workers have very different interests. Thus the advocates of the appropriate 
technology strategy are trapped by capitalism in a 
very different sense. They are simply unable to 
think in terms of other socio-economic systems than 
the capitalist one. Their minds are trapped for 
ideological reasons since they implicitly consider 
this system as the only possible one and since they 
think of unemployment as exclusively technologically 
determined within this context (1985: 80). 
In any event, Igwe et al., (1985) have noted the tendency 
for these foreign technologies to arrive in wrapped up 
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packages which often "call for mere robot-like activities, 
and as a result, the human skill of the indigenous people 
are required merely for routine operations" (1983: 13). 
This contention apparently enables Anya to query even the 
concept of 'transfer' of technology. As he argues: 
Since a given technology ... bears the imprint of its 
social and ecological origin, the concept of 
technological transfer is philosophically and 
ideologically suspect especially as we know that we 
cannot also transfer the social dynamics and 
ecological constraints of the originating culture 
which guarantee its efficient function ... talks of technological transfer are merely co-terminous ... 
with ... the transfer of machines and industrial 
artefacts stripped of the creative potential of the 
autonomous human stimulus, acting in full integration 
with the peculiar social and ecological circumstances 
of the country (1989: 76-77). 
It appears Anya does not reject the transfer of technology 
in toto. Transfer of technology, it seems, becomes 
acceptable under certain conditions. According to him: 
Only the human definition of what our real needs are 
can determine whether we need machines and which 
type. If, however, the needs are defined against the 
background of foreign preconceptions, the machines we 
get will not be related to the tasks at hand but 
[are] alien artefacts (1989: 77). 
This argument implicitly suggests that a technology is 
worthy of transfer, and by implication appropriate, if it 
could be used to satisfy predetermined needs. However, 
Anya emphasizes the importance of carefully ascertaining 
what and whose needs a given technology is appropriate to 
and for. 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that the objectivity of 
needs-determination is doubtful. Besides, the variability 
as well as relativity of needs make their determination 
extremely difficult. For instance, a technology which may 
be considered inappropriate from the point of view of 
government because of its huge import demands may be seen 
differently by an entrepreneur whose foremost 
consideration is profitability. On the other hand, this 
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capital-intensive and hence inappropriate technology may 
later be seen by government as appropriate if there is 
evidence that it contributes to the development of needed 
technological skills and/or resources are available for 
its procurement. Further, bearing in mind the tendency of 
government to respond to pressures from powerful interest 
groups (Stewart, 1984; Edwards, P. K., 1986), the presumed 
needs at a given period in time may well be those of these 
dominant groups rather than of the society at large. 
In view of the inherent subjectivity in the determination 
of so-called needs, a more embracing conceptualisation of 
appropriate technology is required. Fadahunsi provides 
one such conceptualisation when he defines appropriate 
technology as: 
One that is suited to the ecological and socio- 
cultural environment of the people having optimally 
subsumed traditional and modern production practices 
and taking cognizance of the resource endowment of 
the country (1986: 31). 
Similarly, Nigeria's National Office of Industrial 
Property (NOIP) sees appropriate technology as that 
"contributing most to the economic, social and 
environmental objectives of a country, especially those 
relating to its applicable resource endowment" (NOIP, 
Annual Report, 1989: 8). 
It is noteworthy that these definitions of appropriate 
technology differ from the United Nation's 
conceptualisation in the extent that they seem more 
willing to sanction a combination of both sophisticated 
and traditional technologies. Here, choice does not have 
to be as between sophisticated capital-intensive or 
labour-intensive technologies. Rather, either or both 
technologies would be appropriate and acceptable so long 
as the available resources - materials, manpower, etc - 
and the socio-cultural requirements of the society are 
taken on board. However, these conceptualisations of 
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appropriate technology are similar to the United Nation's 
view in so far as they implicitly recognize the need to 
match technology with the prevalent local conditions. 
In essence, at least some of the reasons for success or 
failure of Nigeria's technological development efforts 
could be located in the extent to which this 'match- 
making' is successfully carried out. A mismatch results 
in difficulties and suggests inappropriateness of the 
technology employed. Hence NISER could point to 
"technologies 
... often constrained by irregular and 
insufficient availability of ... raw materials"(1973: 20) 
and Koleoso refers to the "sophisticated equipment we can 
never repair nor find the spare parts ... 
"(1982: 3). 
Presumably, these difficulties occur because the employed 
technologies are inappropriate. 
However, it seems plausible to argue that perfect linkage 
between technology and local conditions may not always be 
possible in the real world and its pursuit may be more 
wasteful than it is rewarding. In a situation where much 
of the technology is imported and is desperately needed 
for modernisation, the acquisition and use of foreign 
technology, even if this is later found to be 
inappropriate, is likely to be preferred to inaction. 
Does this then mean the primacy of technology? 
4.3.3 Determinist Technology? 
An issue which emerges from the preceding is the apparent 
tendency to accord a determinist status to technology. 
For example, the classification of countries in terms of 
levels of technological development tends to portray 
technology as determinist and so also does the yearning 
for technological development by countries like Nigeria. 
Technology is clad in a determinist cloak when it is seen 
as "the cornerstone of progress upon which Nigeria can 
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depend to attain self-reliance and self-sustaining 
development" (national Policy on Science and Technology, 
1986: 10). Similarly, technological determinism is 
apparently indicated when "low technology employed by the 
majority of small scale farmers" is blamed for the low 
levels in productivity (First National Rolling Plan, 1990- 
92). Thus, there is a general inclination to relate both 
success and failure to technology. It seems socio- 
cultural conditions are seen as neutral, the apparent 
presumption being that all desired changes in these 
conditions could be effectuated so long as technology 
permitted. This presumption is contestable. 
To begin with, the view of technology as improving the 
chances of successful industrialisation is very different 
from any contention of technology as determining success. 
Indications that the acquired technologies often did not 
yield "'intended consequences' (for example, efforts on 
mechanization have not eliminated the problems of low 
productivity in Nigeria) do not smack of a determinist 
technology, neither does the point that there are still 
problems in spite of concerted effort of government on 
technological development. These failures, which enable 
a perception of foreign technology in Nigeria as the 
proverbial square peg in a round hole, could be explained 
along social lines. Explanations would include the 
inability of social actors to make the appropriate match 
between existing conditions and the chosen technology as 
well as the dearth of skilled manpower. 
Furthermore, that efforts were also directed towards other 
areas like human resource development is indicative of the 
recognition of factors other than technology in Nigeria's 
modernization efforts. Although the establishment of 
technical colleges etc indicates government's appreciation 
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of the relationship between technology and skills, it also 
points to the fact that skilled manpower is required to 
%work' the technologies. 
A very crucial point that cannot be over-emphasized is the 
fact that interest in technology, particularly the foreign 
variety, apparently stems from the desire to satisfy 
social needs and wants. That is, social needs are the 
driving force of technological development in Nigeria. 
Whilst technological development could be seen as the end 
or goal, technology serves as a means to this end. Put 
differently, the case here is that of social ends 
requiring technological means for its effectuation. 
The acquisition process itself is a social phenomenon 
laced by human decision and choice. Hence, the idea of 
matching technology with the prevalent local conditions 
seems to suggest that the adopted technology, in the final 
analysis, is socially determined. Besides, it is 
perfectly feasible to contend that the acquisition 
process, during which decisions concerning the 
appropriateness of a range of available technologies are 
taken, could be seen as involving interpretative 
flexibilities' which are undergoing stabilization 
rituals'. 
Nevertheless, a purely social explanation for 
technological development outcomes in Nigeria is equally 
doubtful. Just as the failure of technology to provide 
the anticipated outcomes suggests social constraints, so 
also does the technology impose constraints such as its 
demands for unavailable or scarce technical skills. 
Further, the issue regarding a mismatch between technology 
and socio-cultural conditions suggests inappropriateness 
not only of the technology but also of the inability of 
the social actors to make appropriate matches. Thus, a 
bilateral relationship between the social and the 
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technical, or what Latour has described as social- 
technical strategem', seems apparent. Similarly, Law 
(1987,1988) would see Nigerian government's efforts - its 
decrees, policies, establishment of agencies - as 
modalities or tactics for the juxtaposition of the 
heterogeneous elements in the coalition. 
Put together, the above tend to add credibility to an 
interactive model. As is apparent, and in congruence with 
the interactive approach, neither the social actors, who 
define the social needs, nor the technologies for meeting 
these needs, can be said to be irrelevant; but nor would 
any be safely seen as autonomous. The acquisition of 
foreign technology does not on its own wipe away 
underdevelopment. Similarly, mere social recognition of 
development needs is not enough to ensure development. 
Technology is important because of its presumed 
capabilities to enable development. However, the 
technology has to be put into use by social actors. Only 
then could its importance or usefulness be manifest. In 
essence, the technological and the social are involved in 
an interaction to which each contributes. Both are 
therefore relevant. These point to the inadequancy of the 
technology determinist and social determinist models in 
explaining Nigeria's technological scene. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to highlight the 
importance attached to technology in Nigeria, and the 
point that this has not made it the determinate factor. 
It began by suggesting that for developing countries, 
development along Western lines is seen as the key to a 
successful transformation of their rural societies into 
modern industrialised nations. In these countries, the 
yearning for modernisation and the link between it and 
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technological development enables technology to assume a 
strategic role. Thus in Nigeria, a developing country, 
technology is regarded as "the cornerstone of progress". 
Also, there, low productivity of the labour force is 
blamed on the "low technology". Hence, upgrading of 
traditional technologies as well as extensive importation 
of Western technologies, as much as resources permit, have 
been embarked upon as important steps towards 
modernisation. Moreover, attention was given to manpower 
development in the effort to produce the necessary skilled 
labour force. 
However, the appraisal of Nigeria's development efforts 
revealed that these efforts notwithstanding, 
industrialisation as in countries in the West has remained 
a dream, still a long distance yet. This begs the 
question concerning why efforts towards modernization have 
not produced the expected results. The technologization 
strategy has yielded very limited success. It was 
suggested that the apparent 'failure' was not because the 
presence of foreign technologies was not a necessary 
condition for modernisation along Western lines. Rather, 
the presence of imported technologies is not a sufficient 
condition for modernisation or development to occur as 
desired. As the analysis attempted to show, modernisation 
is also predicated upon social factors. For instance, 
Anya recognises the relevance of social conditions in the 
exporting countries when he emphasises that it is not 
possible to "transfer the social dynamics and ecological 
constraints of the originating culture which guarantee its 
[that is, the technology's] efficient function ... 
" 
(1989: 76). 
In essence, what could be seen as social rigidities are 
built into the technology and exported with it. 
Presumably, the differences between the 'social dynamics' 
of both exporting and importing countries account for the 
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limited success of the imported technology. Accordingly, 
the appropriateness of many of the foreign technologies is 
queried. Hence, the UN notes that some of the 
technologies "have little relevance in developing 
countries"(1973: 15). Many analysts (Anya 1989, Hassan, 
1976; Osinowo, 1989; UN 1973) therefore stress the 
necessity of adapting the foreign technologies to local 
conditions. However, whilst some propose (UN, 1973) or 
prefer (Osinowo, 1989) labour - intensive technologies to 
help tackle unemployment, and other problems of the 
underdeveloped, others like Chijioke (1982) reject this 
confinement to what they believe ensures the perpetual 
dependence on the West. 
Furthermore, it was also suggested that aside from the 
imported social rigidities, there are indigeneous social 
factors which also impede success. Relevant here is the 
point that choosing the technology is a social phneomenon. 
In the light of this, failure or limited success with 
modernisation efforts in Nigeria could be rationalised in 
terms of the inability to determine the 'real' social 
needs and selecting the appropriate technologies for 
meeting these needs. As Anya (1989) contends, the alien' 
artefacts are often chosen against the background of 
misguided conceptions of what the local needs really are. 
On the other hand, Ubeku (1983) and Bessant (1987) note 
the inadequacies in the labour force such as the dearth of 
technically skilled workers and competent managers. It is 
conceivable that improvements in these aspects would 
enhance the chances for better utilisation of the 
technology. 
Evidently, the importance of the social' for 
technological development outcomes in Nigeria is 
implicated. However, in direct contrast to Gallie's 
(1978) proposition that technology is essentially 
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irrelevant, it is argued that technology is a very 
relevant factor. Mere social recognition and desire for 
development, as well as the prerogative to pick and 
choose, will not automatically ensure that development 
proceeds. Technology is needed as an essential enabling 
tool. However, that the technologies have not done for 
the underdeveloped countries, what they did, and continue 
to do, for the West clearly shows that no matter what the 
level of reverence and importance attached to it, 
technology is not the sole determinant of technological 
development outcomes. Various social elements exert 
influence. On the other hand, recognition and adoption of 
technology as a tool for development, and the fact that 
some effort was directed towards meeting the skilled 
demands of the imported technologies, suggest that 
outcomes cannot be pinned exclusively to the 'social' 
either. 
The overall conclusion therefore is : technological 
development is a social phenomenon the direction of which 
is determined by social actors at whose disposal are 
enabling instruments of which technology is a crucial one. 
This case of social 'ends' requiring technological 'means' 
suggests a coalition or network of interacting 'allies' 
rather than any clear supremacy of one ally over the 
others. It follows therefore that both technology 
determinist and social determinist models are inadequate. 
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NOTES (4) 
1. This is a catch-all phrase. Considerable variations 
in the paces and stages of development are apparent 
in countries within this group. For instance, South 
Korea, India and Argentina are far ahead of others 
like Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania. 
2. The route is from traditional farming through 
mechanized agriculture to manufacturing and thence to 
the current computer/microelectronics age. 
3. The latest population figures in Nigeria have been 
derived from estimates and projections. Nigeria is 
yet to carry out an acceptable and reliable census. 
4. This is not to say that nothing was done before then. 
As far back as the 1950's, the government had made 
moves to encourage industrialisation. An example is 
the Aid to Pioneer Industries Act 1952. Industries 
that satisfied its provisions were relieved of 
Company tax payment for a period up to five years. 
However, concerted efforts towards science and 
technological development was noticed for the first 
time in the 1970's. For this to have waited ten 
years after independence may have been due to 
disruptions caused by the Nigerian Civil War in that 
period. 
5. Many research institutes were already in existence 
before that date. These, among others include the 
Federal Institute of Industrial Research Oshodi 
(FIIRO) established in 1956 and the Projects Research 
Agency (PRODA) established in 1973. 
6. There was indiscriminate and unrestricted import of 
foreign technology without reference to costs and 
needs. It is not uncommon to see similar 
technologies acquired under different terms and 
conditions, and even costs, by different enterprises. 
7. Agriculture has apparently received the most 
attention. This is probably because of the need to 
be self-sufficient in food production. Added to this 
is the necessity of sourcing industrial raw materials 
locally in order to save scarce foreign exchange. 
8. This 1985 Report is considered only in view of the 
fact that many government policies and strategies for 
technological development were adopted later. 
9. Often, the only technical skills available to the 
locals are biased towards operation and maintenance 
rather than skills for design and fabrication of 
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capital goods (Toffs, 1985). 
10. In some cases however, entrepreneurs do not 
necessarily prefer but are compelled by their foreign 
partners to retain the trade marks. 
11. There is no doubt that the presence of these foreign 
experts, at least at the initial stages, is necessary 
for the transmission of relevant skills. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Methodology has to do with the logic and general 
principles guiding social science investigation. It is 
concerned with the question of how social knowledge is 
established, and how the researcher could make his 
discovery' accepted by others (Bulmer, 1977). For 
Hindess, "methodology lays down procedures to be used 
either in the generation or in the testing of propositions 
by those who wish to obtain valid knowledge" (1977: 3). 
These views inform the usage of methodology here to refer 
to the examination of the methods that could be used in 
the analysis of the relevance of technology in work 
organisation. 
In this chapter, the debate concerning the relative nature 
of quantitative and qualitative research is first 
discussed. Attention is given to the perceived 
%technical' and philosophical differences as well as the 
connection between methods and underlying philosophies. 
Also addressed are the relative virtues and vices of the 
methods. It is, however, argued that the supposed 
distinctness between the two methods, particularly along 
philosophical lines, is not that clear-cut. Against this 
background, the preferred research strategy is then 
outlined having examined the feasibility and the benefits 
of integrating both methods. As would become evident, the 
preferred research method is neither purely qualitative 
nor quantitative but triangulation -a mixture of both 
approaches. For our concerns, the adoption of a purely 
qualitative method, which stresses the subjective 
definition of a situation, would tend to be much in line 
with the social constructivist approach, for example. 
Similarly, an endorsement of a determinist framework could 
be levelled against any pursuit of "objective facts' often 
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associated with pure quantitative method. Hence, the 
preferred integration of research methods could be seen as 
representing an attempt to escape a determinist tag. It 
is presumable that the combination of research methods 
would enable better exploration of the varied social and 
technical dimensions of work organisation. This also 
seems to be much in tune with the more persuasive 
interactive model which, as indicated in chapter 3, guides 
the research. 
5.1 RESEARCH METHODS 
Procedures for investigation in the social sciences are 
broadly classified into quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. Experimental investigations as carried 
out mainly by social psychologists, and sociologists' 
survey techniques (involving mainly sampling, 
administering questionnaires and structured interviews) 
come under the quantitative approach. On the other hand, 
qualitative research is typified by observational methods, 
particularly participant observation (Bryman, 1988). Also 
in this category is unstructured in-depth interviewing. 
The debate concerning the differences in the procedures of 
quantitative and qualitative research, as well as their 
relative merits and demerits, are wedded in both technical 
and philosophical issues. Bryman (1988) remarks that 
earlier discussion on research methods focussed only on 
their technical adequacy. Quantitative research methods 
were given prominence and the preoccupation was mainly on 
technical issues, like how to draw up and use 
questionnaires, etc. Not until the 1970's did the debate 
witness a "systematic and self-conscious intrusion of 
broader philosophical issues ... 
" and quantitative and 
qualitative research methods "came to signify much more 
than ways of gathering data; they came to denote divergent 
assumptions about the nature and purposes of research in 
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the social sciences (Bryman 1988: 2,3). In a similar vein, 
Evans (1979) had suggested that the differences between 
the research methods are in terms of: 
i) the nature of description 
ii) the nature of explanation and 
iii) the procedures for testing theories. 
It seems therefore that the different research methods 
represent competing views concerning how best to acquire 
knowledge about social processes and indeed what is 
acceptable knowledge of the social world. That is, 
differences between the methods do not revolve only around 
the technical adequacy of techniques but also derive from 
differences in epistemological assumptions concerning the 
nature of individuals and society. As Rist (1977) 
emphasizes: 
when we speak of "quantitative" or "qualitative" 
methodologies, we are in the final analysis speaking 
of an interrelated set of assumptions about the 
social world which are philosophical, ideological, 
and epistemological. (quoted in Bryman, 1988: 50) 
The broad philosophical perspectives which underlie the 
assumptions are identified as positivist and 
phenomenological philosophies. Whilst quantitative 
research techniques are usually identified with 
positivism, qualitative research is associated with 
phenomenology. It is considered worthwhile to look at the 
nature and assumptions of the research methods within the 
context of their technical, philosophical and ideological 
underpinnings. 
5.2 THE NATURE OF QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
As noted above, survey and experimental techniques are the 
main examplars of quantitative research. Also included in 
this genre are structured observation, analysis of 
previously collected data as well as content analysis of 
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documents for the purpose of possibly making statistical 
comparisons (Bryman, 1988). The epistemology which is 
presumed to constitute the backcloth of quantitative 
research is rooted in the notion of positivism. 
The Positivist Perspective 
The term 'positivism' is given wide ranging expositions in 
the social science literature. It is used variously as a 
methodology, a philosophy or an epistemology. According 
to Kolakowski(1972: cited in Bulmar, 1984; Bryman, 1988) 
positivism is a philosophy which says nothing about the 
origin of knowledge but then aims to delineate between the 
knowledge that deserves the name of science and that which 
does not. ' This epistemology, it is claimed, presents a 
definite conception of the forms of knowledge which are 
warrantable and the conditions for the validity of claims 
to knowledge. From the wide expositions of the positivist 
philosophy, Kolakowski identifies four principles which he 
suggests represent the essence of positivism: 
1. the rule of phenomenalism2 which asserts that 
there is only experience, and which rejects all 
abstractions be they "matter' or 'spirit'; 
2. the rule of nominalism, which asserts that 
words, generalisations, abstractions are 
linguistic phenomena and do not give us new 
insight into the world; 
3. the separation of facts and values; 
4. the unity of scientific method. 
(quoted in Bulmer, 1984: 87). 
Hence, positivism seeks to define a system of rules for 
knowledge (Hindess, 1977) which could be regarded as 
scientific. 
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On the implications of the rule of phenomenalism, Bryman 
explains that: 
only those phenonomena which are observable, in the 
sense of being amenable to the senses, can validly be 
warranted as knowledge ... such a position rules out 
any possibility of incorporating metaphysical notions 
of "'feelings' or "subjective experience' into the 
realms of social scientific knowledge ... (1988: 14) 
Also commenting on Kolakowski's cannons of positivism, 
Bulmer notes that the first three principles are 
unacceptable as "a rational basis for knowledge". For 
instance, phenomenalism and nominalism reject cognitive 
knowledge. This he suggests "would lead sociologists to 
deny the search for underlying personality or social 
structures which have got dynamics which affect the world 
as perceived but which themselves are not directly 
perceivable. " (Bulmer, 1984: 87). One relevant issue which 
could arise from Bulmer's argument is whether sociologists 
should rather search for these 'underlying social 
structures' instead of being concerned with the conditions 
and consequences of social interaction. It appears that 
if these latter concerns more appropriately depict the 
preoccupation of sociologists, then the rule of 
phenomenalism in particular becomes more persuasive. 
Nonetheless, in the social sciences, the central tenet of 
positivism is often considered to be the acceptance of the 
logic, methods and procedures of the natural sciences and 
their applicability in the study of humans. This, in 
effect, ties in with Kolakowski's fourth principle - the 
unity of the scientific method. The question then 
concerns what constitutes the logic and assumptions of the 
scientific method. 
Natural scientists assume that the behaviour of matter, 
which is the subject of their investigations and 
explanations, are regularities governed by unalterable 
natural laws; every event has a cause which could be 
revealed by systematic observation, experimentation and 
measurement(Bryman, 1988; Bulmer, 1984; Haralambos, 1985). 
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The results of scientific investigations are "objective 
facts", correct for all times and all places and 
independent of the values or ideology of whosoever 
discovers it. From such 'objective facts' theories are 
constructed with which to explain the behaviour of matter. 
On the other hand, scientific theories structure 
scientific observations in the sense that hypotheses 
subjectable to empirical tests are derived from them. In 
essence, scientific knowledge is derived by both inductive 
and deductive strategies. 
Similarly, an idealized account of quantitative research 
often portrays a picture of a strategy which entails 
defining research problems against a background of general 
theories. Research problems guide the definition of 
research hypotheses which themselves often consist of 
constructs that could be operationalized and hence 
rendered observable and measurable, even if imperfectly. 
Data collected are analysed in order to demonstrate or 
refute causal relationship between constructs as specified 
by the hypotheses. In the circumstance, researchers in 
this bent are seen as accepting the positivistic 
scientific approach for the study of humans and thus 
ostensibly accepting that social behaviour and events, 
like those in the physical world, are largely determined 
by externalities. Accordingly, social behaviour and 
events can be objectively quantified and explained in a 
value-free way and in terms of regularities and causal 
relationships between variables. 
Interestingly, Durkheim (1974: cited in Silverman, 1985) 
recommends that the study of the workings of society 
should begin with the identification of regularities in 
people's actions and beliefs. Similarly, Weber (1940) 
contends that social science knowledge is derived via the 
establishment of "rules" and "regularities". He also 
lends support to the search for causal relationships when 
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he advises that a social phenomenon "must be causally 
explained in order to render its cultural significance 
understandable" (quoted in Silverman, 1985: 41). 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to regard Weber as 
positivist. He clearly rejects any "'objective' analysis 
of cultural events which proceeds according to the thesis 
that the ideal of science is the reduction of empirical 
reality (to) 'laws'... ". As he reasons "the knowledge of 
social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is 
rather one of the various aids used by our minds for 
attaining this end;... " (quoted in Silverman, 1985: 42). 
However, by this argument Weber effectively maps out two 
forms of knowledge in sociology -- of social laws and 
secondly, that concerning social reality. It appears the 
construction of social laws derives from scientific 
discovery' of causal relationships while social reality 
is rather more intangible, possibly more metaphysical and 
more sophisticated. In any case, how knowledge of social 
reality is actually acquired is not made very clear by 
Weber. 
It needs to be noted that the 'ideal of science' is not 
necessarily empiricist or positivist. Indeed, against the 
background of the essences of positivism, it could be 
argued that empiricism or more specifically positivism is 
a poor account of the nature of science. Relevant here is 
Hempel's (1952: cited in Evans, 1979) argument that many of 
the terms which natural science (and indeed social 
science) is concerned with are not directly observable 
characteristics but are either dispositions or theoretical 
constructs. Similarly, Harre (1972: cited in Bryman, 1988) 
observes that many scientific theories contain 
hypothetical concepts which may not be directly 
observable. Therefore, natural science is unable to 
satisfy the prescriptions of positivism's doctrine of 
phenomenalism and nominalism. Furthermore, both Popper's 
(1968) contention that scientific observations are theory 
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- impregnated and Kuhn's (1970: cited in Bryman, 1988; 
Silverman, 1985; Smith, 1981) argument that scientific 
knowledge is socially constructed highlight the difficulty 
of separating facts from values, even in science, and 
thus, draws science further away from logical positivism. 
Similar arguments may be made in relation to quantitative 
methodology. Hence, quantitative research may be 
scientific in terms of its methods and, like natural 
science, is not necessarily positivistic. 
Whether or not quantitative research is positivist, it 
does have merits and demerits, some of which are briefly 
analysed here. It must be noted, however, that the focus 
is on the survey method. Experimental method is excluded 
because it is more often used in social-psychologically 
oriented studies and it was never the intention of this 
study to delve into the psychological dimensions of work. 
Survey research entails the systematic collection of data 
through the use of interviews and/or questionnaires. In 
effect, the researcher decides what is important and tends 
to impose his/her own mode of rationality on those under 
study. Often survey questionnaires are close-ended, the 
rationale being to elicit similar ranges of responses from 
participants (Richardson et al, 1965: cited in Smith, 1981). 
This aids the quantification of results. However, when 
such a data collection instrument is used in a 'one-shot' 
survey, the implicit assumption seems to be that meanings 
and interpretations are fixed entities. But this is not 
exactly true of the real world where, as ethnographers 
would argue, individual meanings and interpretation vary 
and may change over the course of social interaction 
(Kelly 1955: cited in Bryman, 1988). This casts doubts on 
the appropriateness of survey method for the analysis of 
complex human interaction. As Denzin rightly argues: 
when sociologists find themselves in settings where 
the meanings and forms of interaction are relatively 
ritualized, it is quite probable that their 
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structured methods will satisfactorily record 
elements of the interaction. But in situations where 
symbolic meanings are in flux and where interactional 
forms are continually being redefined, the survey 
method will be found lacking because of its 
structured and relatively inflexible nature 
(1989: 146). 
Thus a "one-shot" data collection and analysis may prove 
wanting in validity. 
One attribute of survey research is that it is the 
foremost method for retrieving information about 
respondents' past history. Further support for the method 
comes from Selltiz et al (1959: cited in Smith, 1981) who 
pointed out that survey techniques are adapted to 
collecting generalizable information. Generalizability, 
as well as reliability of survey results, are afforded by 
the high data structuredness and collection efficiency. 
A caveat, however, is the tendency of survey research to 
make the individual the focus of inquiry thus apparently 
treating society, or a group, as a simple aggregate of 
individuals. Phillips (1971: cited in Smith, 1981) had 
clearly questioned the usefulness of such individual data. 
He argues that it does not apply to, or at best applies 
only indirectly to, inter-individual phenomena like social 
organisation or social interaction more generally. There 
is no evidence to suggest that social interaction between 
organisation members per se, or between the researcher and 
respondents are unproblematical. Therefore, survey 
methods may provide an efficient means of collecting large 
volumes of individualized though quantifiable data but 
again, it is doubtful whether this data is of much 
relevance in the analysis of complex social interactions. 
Thus, Denzin agrees that "While the survey permits 
statements to be made about large aggregates of 
individuals clustered in social units, it does not always 
provide clues about interaction" (1989: 146). 
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The nature of data collected also introduces another 
question mark on the validity of survey results. 
Questionnaires and interviews are subject to the influence 
of memory and view point bias (Smith, 1981). Respondents 
are unlikely to recall events accurately. Therefore, 
either valuable data are inaccessible to the researcher or 
aspects of the available data are inaccurate. 3 Besides, 
interview data are influenced by factors like the 
interview context, the participant's definition of the 
situation and the interaction between interviewer and 
interviewee. Also noteworthy is Deutscher's (1966: cited 
in Bryman, 1988) observation that what people say they do 
is often radically different from what they actually do. 
Thus by relying on attitudes and people's report of their 
behaviour, survey data is likely to produce spurious 
results. In addition, intrinsic variables like the time 
elapsed, the nature of the information and the 
circumstances in which it is collected, affect 
questionnaire data and generate rival causal factors. 
Inevitably, the reliability and even the validity of 
survey results become questionable. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, Denzin reckons that 
survey instruments can be used to measure the nature of 
"clusters of routinized meanings and interactions... " 
(1989: 154) which exist in social groups. However, 
according to him, this measurement is possible only if 
such "clusters" are predetermined by means of intensive 
field work and close observation. 
5.3 THE NATURE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The growing influence of qualitative research in the 
social sciences owes much to various intellectual 
currents4 which, because of their considerable congruency 
but also for convenience, are here given a fairly general 
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treatment within the framework of the phenomenological 
perspective. Phenomenology provides a different approach 
to the study of humans. Its central thrust is that people 
are fundamentally different from objects in the natural 
world. Positing an essential unity of the subject matter 
of the sciences, as positivism does, is therefore 
erroneous and unacceptable. This important difference 
between the subject matter of the natural sciences and 
social sciences is stressed by Weber (1949) in his essay 
on "%objectivity' in social sciences and social policy", 
which could be seen along phenomenological lines. As he 
writes: 
in the social sciences we are concerned with 
psychological and intellectual phenomena the empathic 
understanding of which is naturally a problem of a 
specifically different type from those which the 
schemes of the exact natural sciences can or seek to 
solve. (Quoted in Silverman, 1985: 41) 
Mainstream phenomenologists argue that human beings have 
consciousness and human action is purposive. A logical 
gulf therefore separates social science from the logic and 
method of natural science. 
In his work, 'The idea of a social science', Winch (1958) 
argues that social science is primarily about discovering 
the intelligibility of human action. Individuals 
construct their meaning systems based on their experience 
and interpretation of the world. Also for Schutz (1964: 
cited in Haralambos, 1985; Silverman, 1985), serious social 
science has to take cognizance of the view that human 
action is governed by subjective meanings. To understand 
human behaviour we must understand the meaning systems 
which shape individuals' interpretation of the social 
world. These subjective meanings can neither be observed 
nor be investigated as 'objective facts' according to 
procedures appropriate to the natural sciences. Besides, 
social meanings are not static but are negotiated and 
generated during social interaction between individuals. 
Rather than being 'objective facts', "social reality" is 
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seen as inter-subjective. That is, it is more a 
construction by 'actors' based on their perceptions and 
subjective rather than objective interpretation (Atkinson 
1971,1978). 5 
In essence, it is pointless to treat social phenomena or 
human actions as objective facts and proceed to explain 
their causes as positivists may suggest. A preferred 
approach is one which seeks to explore and understand the 
procedures used by individuals to construct their 'social 
reality'. Qualitative researchers claim this approach. 
Thus Bryman notes the general view of qualitative research 
as "an approach to the study of the social world which 
seeks to describe and analyse the culture and behaviour of 
humans and their groups from the point of view of those 
studied" (1988: 46). 
Consequently, qualitative researchers often favour 
participant observation6 as a data collection technique. 
This demands that the researcher shares and participates 
in the world of those under study. By participating in 
the forms of life which constitute and are constituted by 
human behaviour, the qualitative researcher hopes to be 
better able to understand and describe that behaviour in- 
depth. That is, studying social phenomena in their 
natural setting presumably brings the observer face to 
face with 'social reality' which (s)he is thus better able 
to understand and interpret. It is suggested that in a 
bid to check the imposition of their meaning systems on 
their subjects, participant observers, unlike their 
quantitative counterparts, often try to avoid an explicit 
formulation of theories until much later in the research 
process (Bryman, 1988: 68-69). 
Perhaps, it needs to be emphasized that the connection 
between perspectives loosely labelled phenomenological and 
the qualitative research is borne out by the latter's 
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commitment to the point of view of the people being 
studied. This commitment leads the researcher to detailed 
descriptions and also accounts for the flexibility, 
openness and unstructuredness often associated with this 
mode of research. Also accounted for is the apparent 
preference for contextualism, that is, a commitment to "a 
style of research in which the meanings that people 
ascribe to their own and others' behaviour have to be set 
in the context of the values, practices, and underlying 
structures of the appropriate entity (be it a school or 
slum) as well as the multiple perceptions that pervade 
that entity" (Bryman, 1988: 64). Put more simply, there is 
a predilection for understanding events and activities 
within the context of the specific milieu being 
investigated. 
Of course, qualitative research, or more specifically the 
participant observation method, is not bereft of problems. 
To begin with, although the presumed closeness to social 
reality accord some degree of validity, the adequacy, 
accuracy and hence acceptability of the researcher's 
observational and interpretation skills is problematic. 
Indeed Denzin (1989) agrees with Clifford and Marcus 
(1986) that participant observers construct culture. As 
Denzin argues: 
They do not simply record an objective reality that 
is "out there". They create ... the worlds that they 
study and then write about it (1989: 156-157). 
Implied in this argument is the point that distortion of 
%reality' occurs during the course of any study as the 
researcher, probably unconsciously picks out what makes 
sense to him/her. It is infact feasible to argue that 
there is no objective %reality' other than individuals' 
construction of their 'realities'. 
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Furthermore, in reference to and in agreement with 
Hammersley and Atkinson's (1983) view, Silverman writes: 
Observation is not a pure, "uncontaminated" activity. 
The observer may influence the setting and/or may 
miss the effects there of temporal cycles. Hence his 
conclusions may be contingent and invalid for that 
setting at other times and/or for other settings 
(1985: 115). 
This comment suggests an inherent prejudice in the ability 
of the researcher to see through the eyes of his/her 
subjects and hence points to the tentativeness of research 
accounts. 
Another related issue concerns idiosyncratic differences 
between individuals which cause variations in researchers' 
observations and interpretations (Bennet, 1960; Blalock 
1970: cited in Smith, 1981). Hence different researchers 
exposed to the same situations may not make similar 
observations. Aside from the idiosyncrasies of individual 
researchers, it is also logical to presume that 
individuals in the group studied would have different 
meaning systems. Thus "the injunction to take the 
perspective of the people you are studying may mean 
needing to attend to a multiplicity of world-views" 
(Bryman, 1988: 6). The feasibility of handling this 
commitment is in doubt. 
Doubt on the authenticity of the researcher's observation 
and interpretation is further highlighted by Moerman 
(1974: cited in Silverman, 1985) who is apprehensive of 
"trusting the native". In this regard, Moerman questions 
the excessive faith in the behaviour of people studied. 
It is presumed that the presence of the researcher may 
itself influence the action of those under study. 
Individuals may begin to behave in ways they believe the 
researcher would want them to. The crucial issue, then, 
is the researcher's ability to distinguish the actions 
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which are faked from those which are not. Also related is 
the difficulty of handling beliefs involved in an "alien" 
social setting. 
A point could also be made in passing that the participant 
observer's apparent craving for contextualist 
understanding inhibits comparative analysis and thus 
further discourages the development of theory. In any 
case, it has to be emphasized that not many would see any 
mode of research as atheoretical. For instance, Kidder 
and Judd are clear that: 
It is simply not possible to conduct research as pure 
discovery or to proceed purely inductively. Even 
when research is used primarily to generate 
hypotheses, the researcher inevitably makes 
theoretical assumptions in deciding what to observe 
or where a potential cause may lie (1986: 24). 
Similarly for Denzin, "theory ... organizes the research 
act" (1989: 38). According to him, the use of theory does 
not necessarily lie in its utility in explanation, 
prediction and control as logical positivist would 
suggest. Also important is "theory's use in the realm of 
understanding, making sense of, writing about, or 
interpreting a phenomenon"(1989: 38). In essence, 
contemplating a theory-free research, even in relation to 
participant observation for that matter, is erroneous. 
What is called into question is the ability of the 
researcher to suspend (until a later stage in the 
research) his/her awareness of relevant theories and 
concepts. 
Furthermore, even if one accepts the doubtful presumption 
that participant observation shuns the utilisation of 
theory as a precursor to research, other doubts still 
emerge. Bryman's comment illustrates one of these doubts. 
As he puts it: 
how one deals with the oncoming flood of data, or how 
one holds theoretical considerations in abeyance, or 
how one chooses a research site in the first place, 
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constitute practical difficulties for such an 
approach (1988: 87). 
Moreover, resulting from the supposed atheoretical and 
flexible approach is the generation of unexpected but 
interesting issues. This presents the researcher with the 
dilemma of delimiting the scope of research (Whyte 1984). 
Participant observation methods tend to assume that the 
acceptance of the observer and the establishment of 
appropriate trust relationship between him and his/her 
subjects is unproblematic. But apart from the obvious 
difficulty in achieving this, there is the problem that an 
observer who gains the acceptance and trust of the 
observed faces either one of two risks -- the danger of 
"going native" or that concerning role conflict between 
his/her normal and assumed roles. All these concerns are 
symptomatic of the considerable pressure on the 
reliability and validity of qualitative research or more 
specifically participants observation method. 
To summarize, while quantitative research is associated 
with positivism and an inclination to a natural science 
approach, qualitative methodology draws considerable 
inspiration from a distinctly different phenomenological 
approach. As a result, qualitative research is associated 
with emphasis on: 
1) adoption of actors' perspective 
ii) contextual understanding of events and 
activities and until recently 
iii) a relatively theory-free investigation. 
However, much as these features may be ideally desirable, 
their practicability is problematical. 
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5.4 THE DISTINCTNESS OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH 
As the previous sections attempt to show, quantitative and 
qualitative procedures are acknowledged as distinct 
methodologies, tied up with different intellectual 
traditions. While avoiding a critique of these traditions 
per se, the issue addressed here is whether these methods 
can actually be defined along distinct philosophical and 
ideological lines. The argument here seeks to suggest 
that the presumed philosophical underpinnings are not 
strait-jackets into which the methods fit perfectly. 
Besides, differences between these methods are not that 
neatly cut out. The main thrust of the argument centres 
on how scientistic and indeed positivistic (or otherwise) 
both are. Also addressed is the extent of "technical" 
differences between the two methodologies. 
The view that observation of 'objective facts' is 
fundamental to the construction of scientific theories 
conveys an impression of a distinction between theory and 
observation. In other words, scientific observation is 
uncontaminated by theory. What seems pertinent here is 
that although qualitative research strives to dismiss the 
notion of "objective facts", it could still be regarded as 
scientistic in so far as it is sometimes seen as favouring 
observation which is allegedly uncontaminated by theory. 
Similarly, quantitative research is equally scientific, 
though on different grounds--its preference for 
objectivity. It thus appears that the dualism in the 
nature of scientific theories (wherein theories are seen 
as being generated from observation as well as shaping 
observation itself) implicitly brings both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods together within a 
%scientistic' category and ostensibly closes the gap 
between them. 
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Furthermore, analysts suggest that scientific method does 
not necessarily imply the reduction of all empirical 
statements to statements of physical movements within a 
single set of space-time coordinates. From this premise, 
Bhaskar (1979) reasons that although "social objects are 
irreducible to natural objects and so possess 
qualitatively different features from them, [and] cannot 
be studied in the same way as them ... they can still be 
studied 'scientifically'" (Quoted in Silverman, 1985: 43). 
Further, Bhaskar sees similarity between human and natural 
sciences in terms of the concern of both for explanation, 
both differing only in relation to what is explained and 
how explanation is achieved. Therefore in Bhaskar's view, 
any explanatory procedure is scientific. On the other 
hand, for Silverman, studies become "scientific by 
adopting methods of study appropriate to the data at hand" 
(1985: 20). From these standpoints then, both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods are scientific. This is 
because researchers in both traditions seek to explain and 
use "appropriate methods" in their investigation. 
From the premise that quantitative and qualitative methods 
are scientific and, taking the view that to be scientific 
is synonymous with being positivist, it is logical to 
argue that both methods are positivistic. It is also 
noteworthy that the premium both methods place on 
observation satisfies the doctrine of phenomenalism - one 
of the essences of positivism according to Kolakowski. 
Hence, the distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative methods become even more blurred. 
Another dimension of commonness between the research 
methods could be located in the empiricist view -- the 
doctrine that factual knowledge derived from 'untainted' 
sense data alone is enough for social understanding. Put 
differently, that empirical data alone are a sufficient 
condition for knowledge about society. That both 
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quantitative and qualitative research have empiricist 
tendencies is borne out in their techniques. Qualitative 
researchers seem to have a preference for categories which 
are amenable to the senses. For example, in a text of 
qualitative research in sociology of deviance, Douglas 
(1976) writes: 
We begin with direct experience and all else builds 
on that [we] begin with and continually return to 
direct experience as the most reliable form of 
knowledge about the social world (quoted in Bryman, 
1988: 119). 
Thus to the extent that it seeks to establish connections 
between observed categories, qualitative research, and in 
particular, participant observation is empiricist (Willer 
and Willer 1973: cited in Bryman, 1988). Similarly, 
Atkinson (1980) would argue that in qualitative research, 
the apparent tendency towards atheoretical investigations 
or the postponement of theoretical issues until much later 
during the research renders this mode of study 
considerably empiricist. With regard to quantitative 
research, its empiricist tag also has to do with its 
strategy. This refers to its particular strategy of 
rendering theoretical problems either directly or 
indirectly observable by means of hypothetical 
propositions which are subsequently submitted to empirical 
testing. 
The phenomenological dictum of understanding and 
interpreting meanings of actors cuts out qualitative 
research as an interpretivist methodology. Similarly, 
quantitative researchers also claim concern with the 
meaning systems of their respondents. March (1982: cited 
in Bryman, 1988) draws attention to the use of social 
surveys to solicit respondents' views and reasons for 
their action. To buttress this point, Bryman (1988) also 
cites Morse and Weiss's (1955) classic study of a sample 
of adults in the USA. Using the survey method, these 
researcher "found that work does not simply mean the 
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ability to earn money, but has a number of other meanings 
for people" (Bryman, 1988: 121). If, as thus claimed, the 
quantitative researcher is able to tease out the range of 
respondents' meaning systems via quantitative means, then 
quantitative research could be seen as interpretivist. In 
any case, by even adopting the mundane meaning of 
interpretation, the analysis of statistical data, a major 
element in quantitative research, can be conceived of as 
a form of interpretation. 
The above analysis attempts to give credence to the view 
that categorization of research methods along distinct 
epistemological and ideological lines is misleading. 
Nonetheless, areas of contrasts do exist. But then, these 
contrasting dimensions do not necessarily suggest that the 
research methodologies are mutually opposed ideal types. 
It thus appears worthwhile to undertake a brief comparison 
of some of the discernable differences with a view to 
highlight their relativeness. 
As indicated previously, whereas investigations within the 
quantitative framework often begin from theories and 
concepts, qualitative researchers often avoid the use of 
theories as starting points for their studies. That is, 
while researchers adopting a quantitative approach 
generally seek to verify theories, those in the 
qualitative tradition are more concerned with the 
construction of theory. In any case, this view lacks 
universal support. First, there is evidence to suggest 
that quantitative research is not only concerned with 
theory-testing. For instance, in reference to their 
quantitative research study of the International 
Typographical Union in the USA, Lipset (1964) indicates 
that the: 
analysis did not merely test hypotheses already held 
before the survey was conducted. Rather, the earlier 
hypotheses pointed to a fruitful line of enquiry, but 
many of the ideas and insights regarding the bearing 
of shop size on union politics emerged only in the 
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course of the analysis of the survey data (quoted in 
Bryman, 1988: 98). 
On the other hand, qualitative research is not necessarily 
an endeavour strictly concerned with theory-discovery. As 
Bryman contends "some qualitative research is showing an 
explicit concern with theory, not solely as something 
which emerges from the data, but also as a phase in the 
research process which is formulated at the outset" 
(1988: 98). In the light of these, Bryman concludes that 
"the contrast between quantitative and qualitative 
research in terms of verification of theory against 
preferring theory to emerge from the data is not as clear- 
cut as is sometimes implied" (1988: 98). 
The tendency to focus on specified issues from the outset, 
and the employment of prior-constructed data gathering 
instruments, mark out quantitative methodology as a highly 
structured approach. By contrast, qualitative research is 
characterised by unstructuredness possibly because of its 
emphasis on the subjects' point of view and a recognition 
of the situated and processual nature of human 
interaction. In addition, whilst in qualitative research 
observation is directed towards "linking interaction 
patterns with the symbols and meanings believed to 
underlie ... behaviour" (Denzin 1989: 158), observation 
seems to be for a different concern in quantitative 
research. Here, the apparent assumption of a pre- 
constituted world of phenomena that needs to be 
investigated makes the focus of observation that of 
recording frequency distribution of events. 
Furthermore, the specificity of participant observation, 
for instance, makes findings in this approach 
unrepresentative, less generalizable but more valid. On 
the other hand, random sampling of the study population 
makes survey results more representative, more 
generalizable but less valid. In any case, it is 
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noteworthy that this distinction is also only relative. 
Bryman points out that "Surveys are often not based on 
random samples and, even when they are, they refer to 
highly restricted populations ... Further, the consistency 
of findings over time is rarely given much attention" 
(1988: 101). 
A plausible contention from the preceding discussion is 
that distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
research methods is not as rigid as some analysts suggest 
and that differences are more 'technical' than they are 
epistemological. Specifically, the distinction between 
the methods appears to be mainly in relation to their 
strategies for the collection and treatment of data which 
in turn underscores the ability of each method to answer 
only certain types of questions. 
5.5 THE INTENDED RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Implicit above is the point that the choice of research 
method is dependent on the research intention and on the 
premium placed on validity or reliability rather than on 
purely epistemological considerations. In this vein, 
Bryman suggests that "the decision over whether to use a 
quantitative or qualitative approach should be based on 
%technical' issues regarding the suitability of a 
particular method in relation to a particular research 
problem"(188: 106). This argument implicitly conveys an 
"either/or" impression and thus tends to overlook the 
feasibility of usefully combining both approaches when the 
research problem so invites. Although such a combination 
is inconceivable from an epistemological stand point (Guba 
1985), there is increasing evidence in literature that 
many writers clearly recommend the strategy and many 
research studies are carried out along this line (Bryman, 
1988). 
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Two main arguments underline the case for triangulation? 
- the employment of more than one data collection 
technique. Firstly, the different methods have their 
strengths and weaknesses and often the strength of one 
method seems to be a weakness of the other. Therefore a 
blending of the methods is thought to enable the 
researcher to tap most of the strengths while minimizing, 
if not completely eliminating the flaws. Besides, Webb 
(1966) emphasizes that: 
Every data-gathering class - interviews, 
questionnaires, observation, performance records, 
physical evidence - is potentially biased and has 
specific to it certain validity threats. Ideally, we 
should like to converge data from several different 
data classes, as well as converge with multiple 
variants from within a single class. (quoted in Denzin 
1989: 244). 
Secondly, it is argued that multiple research methods 
enable the researcher to gain a "total" or more complete 
picture of the phenomena under study. Presumably each 
method, which "implies a different line of action toward 
reality - "(Denzin, 1989: 235), captures only certain 
aspects of a given phenomenon. Therefore, 
if each method leads to different features of 
empirical reality, then no single method can ever 
completely capture all the relevant features of that 
reality; consequently, sociologists must learn to 
employ multiple methods in the analysis of the same 
empirical events (Denzin 1989: 13). 
Hence the different research methods are seen as different 
ways of examining the same research problem. Thus in 
Newby's (1977) study of Suffolk farm workers, he combined 
a structured interview survey with participant observation 
in order "to make valid inferences from survey data, while 
insights gained from the participant observation could be 
checked for representativeness against knowledge gained 
through the survey" (quoted in Bryman, 1988: 154). 
Similarly, Gallie (1978) used survey, documentary material 
and "longer and deeper interviews" in his study of oil 
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refineries in Britain and France. As he contends, 
bringing different types of data to bear on a research 
problem provides "The best chance of grasping the reality 
of the situation" (1978: 48). 
Furthermore, Webb et al(1966) see triangulation as a 
viable strategy for reducing the problem of rival 
interpretations when causal propositions are being 
developed. For them: 
when a hypothesis can survive the confrontation of a 
series of complementary methods of testing, it 
contains a degree of validity unattainable by one 
tested within the more constricted framework of a 
single method ... (quoted in Denzin 1989: 26). 
It may also be added that by enabling comparison of data 
generated from different techniques, triangulation helps 
to reduce bias. This adds to triangulation's positive 
implication for validity claims and, as Webb and 
colleagues also suggest, is likely to increase the 
confidence of social scientists on research findings. 
While accepting that triangulation seeks to overcome the 
seeming partiality of single methods of data collection, 
critics point to some weaknesses. For example, Garfinkel 
(1967: cited in Silverman, 1985) had argued that 
triangulation reduces the researcher to an "ironist". 
This he says is because the researcher fails to recognize 
the contextual nature of action and hence proceeds to use 
one account to undercut another. Similarly pointing to 
the "situated character" and uniqueness of action, 
Silverman (1985) stresses the point that presenting a 
complete picture of a phenomenon is more problematic than 
advocates of triangulation will concede. 
8 Silverman also 
points to underlying elements of positivism evident in the 
hypotheses testing orientation of Webb and his colleagues. 
As he argues, triangulation in principle "assumes a single 
(undefined) reality and treats accounts as multiple 
mappings of this reality" (1985: 105). 
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Of course Silverman has an appeal for "non-sectarian 
versions of research practice" (1985: 114) but in place of 
"positivistic" triangulation he recommends analytic 
induction. Analytic induction "is a strategy of analysis 
that directs the investigator to formulate generalizations 
that apply to all instances of the problem" (Denzin, 
1989: 165-6). For Silverman, analytic induction enables 
the avoidance of "fine-sounding [epistemological] 
polarities", and its logic "adds rigour and comparative 
flavour"(1985: 111) to research. Although his profound 
rejection of positivism filters through much of his work, 
Silverman's support for analytic induction suggests 
support for research that combines "elements of both 
positivism and ethnomethodology" (1985: 116). This view of 
analytic induction as a strategy for epistemological blend 
of some sort differs somewhat from Denzin's (1989) 
treatment of analytic induction. According to Denzin, 
analytic induction involves six steps: 
1. A rough definition of the phenomenon to be 
explained is formulated. 
2. A hypothetical explanation of that phenomenon is 
formulated. 
3. One case is studied in light of the hypothesis, 
with the object of determining whether or not 
the hypothesis fits the facts in that case. 
4. If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either 
the hypothesis is reformulated or the phenomenon 
to be explained is redefined so that the case is 
excluded. 
5. Practical certainty can be attained after a 
small number of cases have been examined, but 
the discovery of negative cases disproves the 
explanation and requires a reformulation. 
6. This procedure of examining cases, redefining 
the phenomenon, and reformulating the hypothesis 
is continued until a universal relationship is 
established, each negative case calling for a 
redefinition or a reformulation. 
(Denzin, 1989: 166) 
140 
Denzin's model of analytic induction thus places much 
premium on hypothesis testing and on this ground is more 
positivistic than it is a blend of epistemologies. More 
important, however, is the point that the strategy can be 
envisioned as that which encourages rigorous tests for 
theories or hypothesis by virtue of its emphasis on a 
search for negative cases. According to Denzin, analytic 
induction relies more on theoretical than on statistical 
sampling models but at the same time provides a means by 
which both models can be brought together. He adds that 
the strategy leads to the development of what he calls 
"processual theories" as well as allows the movement from 
substantive to formal theories. 
While the concern here is not to offer a critique of 
analytic induction, suffice it to state that since: 
i) the aim is not to search for universal 
propositions (which in any case can never be 
beyond doubt since absolute proof seems 
untenable), 
ii) the study is not longitudinal or intended to be 
long term; and 
iii) not many cases are involved, 
the research would not subscribe to analytic induction in 
its ideal or rather more complete form. 
Gallie's research informs the preferred strategy for the 
research study. Following Gallie, the intention is to 
adopt some degree of triangulation but excluding 
participant observation. This is for a number of reasons. 
Participant observation seems suitable for research in 
workplace relations by virtue of its commitment to direct 
observation and interpretation of social interactions. 
However, weighed against the background information from 
literature that workplace processes are influenced by 
extraneous cultural, political and economic factors, which 
are not directly observable, the suitability of this 
method becomes doubtful. Also noteworthy is the point 
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that unlike Gallie's, the study would not necessarily seek 
behaviourial information. The attention is on the 
perceptions of individuals. 
Implicit in the research topic is a technology which is 
already in place. If the reverse were the case, that is, 
that the technology is about to be introduced, then a 
longitudinal study using participant observation method 
may be a useful strategy for monitoring change. Even 
then, it would be difficult to tease out the influence of 
the other factors mentioned. Besides, a longitudinal 
study is not feasible in view of limitations on time and 
resources as well as the scope of the research. On the 
other hand, to the extent that both technology (already in 
place) and work organisation at a given point in time can 
be seen as stable, interviews and questionnaires 
administration seem appropriate for the investigation. 
Undoubtedly, some information on the existing structure in 
work organisation could be obtained by direct observation. 
But, relevant past histories on the organisation of work 
obtained from secondary sources, cannot be observed in the 
present. 
Given the above circumstances, a case study approach, in 
which a mixture of data-gathering techniques would be 
utilized, is preferred. The intention is to combine 
questionnaires and semi-structured interview data with 
those obtained from secondary sources for analysis. Also, 
short non-participant observation sessions would be 
undertaken mainly for the purpose of verifying information 
obtained through survey techniques and secondary sources. 
Analysis will involve theoretical sampling but this will 
not mean going the whole length of seeking cases that 
would invalidate hypotheses, as obtains in analytic 
induction. Rather it is limited to a focus on the extent 
to which each hypothesis or observation "fits the facts". 
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The result of this would be the basis for any inferences 
that may be made. For instance, inferences on any changes 
in the content of jobs may be made by assessing the level 
of association between technology and the changes and 
then, consideration of management as well as workers' 
influences in the changes. In effect, this also means 
taking cognizance of a major theme in the research, 
namely, a tacit recognition of the interactivity between 
organisation 'actants'. 
Furthermore, this strategy nearly approximates what Denzin 
labels "causal-interpretive" (see Denzin 1989: 98-9). In 
a way, the approach may be seen as tending towards causal 
explanation since theoretical guidance is employed. 
However, much depends upon whether or not "cause" is seen 
along "scientific" lines or as bounded by time and space. 
As Denzin argues, if cause is seen as residing in social 
experience or in social interaction and hence is bounded 
by time and space, then it is in order for research to 
address "both the why and the how problems of everyday 
life" (1989: 37). 
Nonetheless, the concern of the study is not necessarily 
the pursuit of causal explanations; the interest is to 
reveal associational links by means of logical inferences. 
That is, interest is on the extent to which, and how, 
technology is relevant rather than an attempt to make 
predictions concerning the conditions under which 
technology would or would not be relevant. Further, it 
needs to be added that investigation of 'technology 
relevance' does not seek a determinist position for 
technology. Rather it is more an attempt to show the 
unpersuasiveness of pure technological determinist and 
social determinist explanations whilst, at the same time, 
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show that both the technological and the social do matter 
and hence are relevant in the organisation of work. In 
any case, like many case studies, the research would 
neither lay claims to representativeness nor to limitless 
generalizability. 
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NOTES (5) 
1. For logical positivists, demarcation between 
scientific and non-scientific knowledge is 
correspondingly as between the meaningful and 
sensible and the meaningless and non-sense. Logical 
positivists take the view that no norms or ideas 
would dictate to humanity; that is, if a convention 
is agreed which delimits the scientific or the 
meaningful (Gellner, 1985) 
2. It seems necessary to distinguish between the 
doctrine of phenomenalism and the phenomenological 
perspective. The former refers to the positivist 
belief that those "... phenomena which cannot be 
observed either directly through experience and 
observation or indirectly with the aid of instruments 
have no place [as warrantable knowledge]" Bryman, 
(1988: 14). On the other hand, Phenomenology 
similarly endorses observation but goes further to 
insist that such observation from the "outside" may 
be suitable for the subject matter of natural 
scientists but certainly inadequate for that of the 
social scientist. The consciousness and 
purposiveness of human action makes it mandatory that 
the internal logic which directs human actions must 
be explored and interpreted by the social scientist. 
3. An elaborate list of sources of error in survey 
research is provided by Demmings (1944). 
4. The intellectual traditions include phenomenology, 
symbolic interactionism, Verstehen, Naturalism, and 
Ethogenics. See Bryman (1988: 51-61) for an analysis 
of these traditions. 
5. In rejecting the logic and procedures of positivist 
methodology, Atkinson maintains that there is no 
reality beyond the meanings given to it by social 
actors. 
6. Participant observation takes many forms. Denzin 
(1989) has given a detailed account of the different 
identities which participant observers assume. These 
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include: complete participant; participant as 
observer and participant, and complete observer. 
7. Although triangulation is more often seen as the use 
of multiple methods, Denzin (1989) has identified 
different types and subtypes. (See Denzin, 1989: 
236-240). 
8. Advocates of triangulation insist that the aim is not 
primarily to produce a coherent picture of reality 
but to enable different pictures of reality to emerge 
(Denzin, 1989; Trend 1978). But the nagging question 
which remains unanswered is how to achieve convincing 
and coherent interpretations of these multiplicity of 
pictures. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
Oil refining is one sector where the craving for 
technological development in Nigeria has made its mark. 
From a very humble beginning, the sector has changed 
dramatically to the use of very modern refining 
technologies. This chapter starts with a brief historical 
overview of the development of Nigeria's oil industry 
generally and the Port Harcourt refinery in particularly. 
This will help explicate the prominence of government 
agents in the industry. As will be seen, all refineries 
in Nigeria are government-owned, contrary to what applies 
in most Western developed countries. Discussed next are 
the general operations and the organisational structure in 
the Port Harcourt refinery. Finally, the particular 
research methods employed are described. 
6.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA 
Oil prospecting in Nigeria dates back to 1908 when 
exploration activities were undertaken by a German 
Company, the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation. However, it 
took almost five decades, barring interruptions by the 
First and Second World War, before oil was discovered in 
commercial quantities by Shell Diarcy1 in 1956. This 
major find was at Oloibiri in Nigeria's Niger delta, from 
where production of crude oil started in 1958. While 
Shell remains the dominant producer, accounting for 50% of 
Nigeria's oil production (Lukman, 1989), other 
multinational companies like Mobil, Elf, Gulf etc secured 
exploration rights and have made considerable contribution 
in crude oil production. Crude oil production in Nigeria 
rose from 5100 barrels per day (bpd) in 1958 to a peak of 
2.4 million barrels per day (MBD) in 1979, after which it 
plummeted to as low as 1.4MBD in 1989, mainly because of 
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the collapse of oil prices. However, production is 
gradually picking up and now stands at 1.85 MBD 
(Amino, 1991: 7). 
In Nigeria, government's role in the oil industry varied 
according to the perceived importance of the product in 
the national economy. Before the late 1960s when oil 
played a relatively insignificant role in the country's 
economy, government's interest was only in the collection 
of royalties from oil companies and its role was mainly 
that of making regulatory laws binding on the oil 
companies. As Amu remarks, "the primary concern of 
government was to provide the right climate for the smooth 
operation and development of the industry ... " 
(Amu, 1982: 7). 
However, with the progressive dominance of oil in the 
country's economy since the early 1970s, the government 
needed more than just token benefits from her natural 
resources. To be able to finance its development 
objectives, government's direct involvement and active 
participation became a matter of necessity. From 
government's point of view, if the goal of rapid 
industrial development of the country was to be achieved, 
it seemed necessary "to develop a sound petroleum policy 
to broaden ... [the] production base, enforce appropriate 
conservation policy, exercise control in the operational 
activities of producing companies and to attain equitable 
values for our crude oil ... 
"(Lukman, 1989: 2). As an 
immediate step, Nigeria, in 1971, joined the Organisation 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which is 
apparently perceived as a useful, protective umbrella for 
its now mono-product economy. It is noteworthy that 
OPEC's principal objectives as spelt out in Article 2 of 
its statute, include: 
- the coordination and unification of the 
petroleum policies of member countries and the 
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determination of the best means for safeguarding 
their interests ... 
[to] devise ways and means of ensuring the 
stabilization of prices in international oil 
markets with a view to eliminating harmful and 
unnecesary fluctuations 
[have] regard ... at all times to the interests 
of the producing nations and the necessity of 
securing a steady income to the producing 
countries ... (OPEC statute, June 1989). 
In essence, OPEC member countries are able to price their 
own oil, that is, along guidelines set by the 
organisation. This is quite unlike before the creation of 
the organisation when the "seven sisters" multinational 
companies namely Exxon, Texaco Royal Dutch/Shell, Mobil, 
Gulf, British Petroleum and Standard Oil of California 
"created 'states-within-states' in the oil producing 
countries, controlling the amount of oil extracted, how 
much was sold, to whom it was sold and at what price". 
(OPEC at a glance, Undated: 7). Furthermore, in its 
Resolution XVI Article 90 of June 1968, OPEC enjoined all 
member countries to acquire participating interests in oil 
companies operating within their territories. It also 
prescribed that member countries achieved 51% equity 
participation in their oil industry by 1982. 
Subsequent to its OPEC membership, the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria established the Nigerian National 
Oil Corporation (NNOC) by Decree No 18 of 1971. Unlike 
the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) which was 
established before it and whose role was mainly 
regulatory, the NNOC was charged with the responsibility 
of participating in both 'Upstream and downstream' 
activities in the industry. Under this new arrangement, 
government successfully negotiated and increased its level 
of participation interests in the oil companies. Hence, 
by 1982, government's share of crude oil production in 
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Nigeria rose to about 70% having acquired 80% interests in 
Shell and 60% in each of the other oil companies namely 
Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, Agip, Elf and Pan Ocean 
(Agbejule; 1987). Meanwhile, to enhance efficiency and 
optimize the use of scarce human resources, government 
merged the MPR and the NNOC by Decree 33 of 1977 to form 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which 
then combined their respective regulatory and 
participatory functions. 
The NNPC strives to manage government's participating 
interests in the oil producing companies and as Lukman R 
(1989) explains, engages in purely commercial and 
profitable ventures. That is, all of governments's share 
of crude oil produced is managed by NNPC. It is 
responsible for processing the crude oil for local 
consumption as well as responsible for the sale of the 
portion for export. Consequent upon a reorganisation 
exercise in 1988 in anticipation of brighter prospects 
(Lukman; 1989), NNPC is now made up of 12 subsidiary 
companies, among which is the Port Harcourt Refinery. 
6.2 THE PORT HARCOURT REFINERY 
Concerted effort to establish a petroleum refinery in 
Nigeria began when the production of crude oil in the 
country reached the 0.5 MBD target2 in 1959. After 
preliminary surveys by foreign experts, Alesa-Eleme near 
Port Harcourt was chosen as the most suitable of six 
alternative sites. In December 1960, the Shell-BP 
Petroleum Refining Company of Nigeria was formed and 
charged with the responsibility of constructing the 
planned refinery. 
In 1962, the Nigerian government concluded an agreement 
with the two parent corporations of Shell-BP which enabled 
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it to acquire a 50% equity share in the refining company 
while the remaining 50% was shared equally between Shell 
and BP. As a result, the name of the refining company was 
changed to The Nigerian Petroleum Refining Company Ltd 
(NPRC). Construction work on the refinery began soon 
afterwards and in 1965 the refinery became fully 
operational. The initial refining capacity was 35000 
barrels of crude oil per day but this was later increased 
to 60000 bpd following a plant 'debottlenecking exercise' 
in 1970/71. Further, the government increased its equity 
participation to 60% in 1972, This was followed by a 
complete buy-out in 1978 by the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria in conjunction with some state 
governments in the Federation. As a result of the buy- 
out, ownership rested with different Nigerian government 
agents thus: 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 40% 
Ministry of Finance Incorporated (MOFI) 30% 
Odua Investment 10% 
Other State Governments 20% 
However, state governments and MOFI relinquished their 
shares to NNPC in 1979 and 1984 respectively. Thus NNPC 
became the sole government agent, responsible for the 
running of the refinery which was renamed NNPC Refining 
Company. The refinery mainly served the domestic market 
producing: Premium and Regular motor spirits; liquid 
petroleum gas for domestic cooking; dual purpose kerosene 
for aviation and domestic uses; gas oil for fuelling heavy 
duty engines; and high and low pour fuel oils for 
industrial use (Amu, 1982). NNPC purchases crude oil from 
government at less than the international market price 
(Lukman, 1989), refines the crude and sells products to 
marketing companies. 
Nevertheless, the production of refined petroleum products 
in the refinery was outstripped by the nation's 
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consumption requirements for these products. This, added 
to the need to export refined petroleum products, resulted 
in the commissioning of two other refineries in the West 
(Warri) and the North (Kaduna) of Nigeria, both also 
solely owned by NNPC. In any event, ever increasing 
demand led to the addition of a new plant to the refinery 
in Port Harcourt. Both the old and the new plant together 
make up what is currently called the Port Harcourt 
Refining Company (PHRC). PHRC is a subsidiary of NNPC. 
Although the extent of its autonomy from NNPC is not very 
clear, PHRC has its own board and chairman. 
6.2.1 THE TECHNOLOGY 
The process of crude oil refining basically involves the 
passage of crude through distillation columns at specified 
temperatures and pressures. The old plant had3 the 
traditional refining technology, that is, a basic crude 
distillating unit (CDU) and had capacity for refining 
60,000 barrels of crude per day. On the other hand, the 
new plant, commissioned in 1989, has the most modern 
refining technology in Nigeria and has a refining capacity 
of 160,000 bpd. Apart from having a much larger CDU than 
old plant, it also has additional units. As a senior 
manager (Anah*: June, 1991) explained, much of the 
"atmospheric residues", like high-pour fuel oil which was 
produced in the old plant, had to be exported because of 
the lack of facilities to crack and fractionate it 
further. But the new plant, is a more integrated outfit. 
In addition to the CDU, it also has a Vacuum Distillation 
Unit (VDU) Naphta hydrotreating Unit (NHU) Catalytic 
reforming Unit (CRU), Kero hydrotreating unit etc. These 
additional facilities enable further processing of crude 
oil for increased yield and purer products. 
* This, and all other names given to respondents in the 
study are fictitious. 
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Besides, in the old plant, pneumatic control systems were 
in use and these were located partly on large panels as 
well as at various locations in the plant itself. On the 
other hand, in the new plant, control of production 
processes was effected through electronic monitoring and 
control devices located in control rooms. Hence, another 
distinctive feature of the new plant is its high level of 
technological sophistication. Thus a top manager (Anah: 
June, 1991) aptly described it as the only refinery in the 
country which is "controlled almost centrally and 85% of 
equipment is started and stopped from one spot". 
The existence of new electronic monitoring and control 
devices, coupled with the suggested relative 
centralisation of these controls, bring to mind issues 
like the structure of authority, the patterns of 
supervision, and the content and character of jobs. A 
crucial question is whether changes in them were 
experienced as a result of the acquisition of the new 
plant. 
6.2.2 THE ORGANISATION STRUCTURE: 
The total workforce in the old plant was approximately 800 
and has almost doubled since the addition of the new 
plant. As at July 1991, the total workforce was put at 
15584. As figure 6.1 indicates, these are shared between 
the two main divisions: operations and services. At the 
head of each division is the executive director who is 
answerable to the refinery's managing director. The 
services division comprises: Administration and 
Personnel, Business Development and Planning, Finance and 
Accounts, General Services, and Medical departments. 
Similarly, the Operations division includes Engineering 
and Technical Services, Fire and Safety departments as 
well as Production, and Maintenance departments both of 
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which are the foci of the study. Each of the departments 
has a head who reports directly to the appropriate 
executive director. 
The Production department is made up of three sections 
namely: the process plant, power plant and utilities, and 
oil movement and jetties. The process plant section is 
directly responsible for the processing of crude, while 
power plant and utilities is responsible for the 
generation of steam and power used for crude oil 
processing as well as power needed in other sections of 
the refinery. The functions of the Oil Movement Section 
range from receipt of crude oil for processing through 
storage of refined products to blending of relevant 
distillates and discharge to marketing companies. The 
majority of the workers in the production department work 
either as operators in central control rooms from where 
they monitor the various processes by means of digital 
control systems (DCS), or they work outside as external 
operators adjusting valves, pumps etc. as directed from 
the control rooms. Other categories of staff above the 
operators and in hierarchical order are the supervisors, 
suprintendents, and then the OCs, each in charge of a 
section. The OCs are responsible to the head of 
productions. 
Similarly, the maintenance department generally carry out 
maintenance work either in the centralized workshops or at 
the site of faults. It consists of mechanical, 
Electrical, Instrument, Civil, and Planning sections. The 
names of the sections correspond to their different areas 
of responsibilities. Thus, the mechanical section 
undertakes maintenance of all mechanical tools and 
equipment while the Instrument section is responsible for 
maintaining all process and control instruments. Also, 
while the electrical section handles all electrical jobs, 
be they in the plant, workshop or estate, the civil 
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maintenance section takes charge of all civil works. The 
planning section is responsible for planning and co- 
ordination of the jobs of all the sections within the 
department. In the sections, those lower down the 
hierarchy are categorized as crew. Above the crew are the 
foremen, supervisors, suprintendents and the OCs who are 
the head of sections. All heads of sections in 
maintenance report to the head of maintenance department. 
Production and maintenance workers run a four-shift 
system. While one shift is off duty, the three others 
operate: morning (7.00 a. m. - 2.00 p. m. ), afternoon (2.00 
p. m - 10.00 p. m. ) and night (10.00 p. m. - 7.00 a. m. ) 
duties. However, there are also permanent day staff, the 
majority of whom are senior staff. After hours, all shift 
workers are under the Refinery Shift Suprintendent who in 
theory then becomes the overall refinery boss. 
6.2.3 Industrial Relations: 
Workers are organised but on seniority rather than along 
occupational lines. They are represented by two bodies - 
Petroleum And Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of 
Nigeria, PENGASSAN and National Union Of Petroleum And 
Natural Gas Workers, NUPENG. As implied by the name, 
PENGASSAN is for senior staff while NUPENG caters for 
junior staff. Apart from Chief Officers who are inhibited 
from joining, membership of the body appropriate to ones 
level is open to all staff. There are no closed shops and 
membership of the association or union is optional. 
It is noteworthy that these two bodies serve the entire 
oil industry in Nigeria. Hence each has a central 
national body under which are the branches. The branches 
correspond to the individual oil organisations or 
companies in the industry like NNPC, Shell, Gulf etc. 
Each branch is made up of zones and each zone of chapters. 
Figure 6.2: Unions Structure 
National 
PENGASSAN 
or 
NUPENG 
Branch 
e. g. NNPC 
Zones 
e. g. Port Harcourt 
Chapters 
e. g. Port Harcourt 
refinery 
155 
Thus, for instance, the Port Harcourt Refinery senior 
staff forms a chapter of PENGASSAN. This chapter, 
together with other chapters, in other subsidiaries of 
NNPC located in Port Harcourt, make up the Port Harcourt 
zone of PENGASSAN (see figure 6.2). Further, the Port 
Harcourt zone along with 4 other zones constitute the NNPC 
branch of PENGASSAN. The same structure applies to 
NUPENG. 
In the Port Harcourt refinery, there are no shop stewards 
nor are there full-time union officials. However, 
consultations with the part-time union/association leaders 
do take place on a monthly basis. At this level, the 
focus of consultation is on local welfare issues, like 
transport and canteen services, but issues concerning 
production targets are also discussed. Bargaining for 
salaries and fringe benefits occurs at the NNPC corporate 
(branch) level. In any event, salaries and fringe 
benefits are negotiated separately at different periods 
and each agreement reached has a two-year duration. 
6.3 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The choice of Port Harcourt refinery for the study was 
mainly for two related reasons. First was the presence of 
a new technology by western standards. Second, the Port 
Harcourt refinery offered the opportunity to compare 
experiences with both old and new technologies on the same 
site. The two other refineries in Nigeria started off 
with relatively modern technologies and therefore may not 
provide similar opportunities. Besides, a key question in 
the study was whether the foreignness of the technology, 
and the apparent reverence with which it was held, made it 
determinate. Since all the Nigerian refineries used 
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foreign technologies it was assumed that the research 
question could be reasonably answered with data from one 
of the refineries. 
Research access was secured without many difficulties 
through management but it was never completely open 
access. For example, my ambition to make use of 
documentary information was nipped in the bud when, at the 
commencement of the study, it became clear to me that 
access to company documentations was not possible. As 
already indicated, the refinery is government-owned. 
Consequently, staff of the refinery are government 
employees and the apparent forbiddance of government 
workers from speaking to the press (which it seemed 
included all outsiders) resulted in staff being overly 
reluctant to 'expose' what they considered as sensitive 
government records. Hence the research relied mainly on 
primary data. The study took place from June to August 
1991 in addition to a further 3 weeks in April, 1992. 
During the first period of the study, fieldwork was 
carried out on all the weekdays including Saturdays. 
Since access was through management, it followed that 
managerial staff cadres were reached first. It therefore 
seemed logical and more feasible to start off with the 
collection of data from this category of employees. 
Besides, this strategy gave me a bit of time to make some 
informal contacts with some lower level staff, at least 
for a short while, before approaching them for information 
more relevant to the research. 
The interest in the process technology meant that the 
central focus was on operations staff, that is, production 
and maintenance workers. The selection of the study 
sample was random and data were collected through (1) 
Semi-structured interview (2) Administration of 
questionnaires (3) Non-participant observation. 
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Interviews were the first and main data collection 
technique. This was because, considering that documentary 
materials were inaccessible and that time constraint 
inhibited prolonged observation, talking to people on a 
personal basis seemed the quickest and best way to begin 
to learn about work in the organisation. Moreover, 
information from the interviews provided insights useful 
in the other data collection techniques. The main sources 
of the interview data were managers and supervisors 
connected with the operation and maintenance of the 
refinery technology. In production, 3 senior managers, 3 
suprintendents and 7 supervisors were interviewed. Apart 
from this 6 operators were also interviewed. Similarly, 
1 top manager, 5 senior managers, 4 suprintendents and 5 
supervisors were interviewed in the maintenance 
department. Moreover, there were interviews with 2 top 
managers, 2 senior managers and 4 middle managers in 
administration and Personnel. Also interviewed were 
Officials of the employee organisations. Altogether 3 top 
managers, 10 senior managers, 11 middle managers and 12 
supervisors were interviewed. These are apart from the 
staff organisation leaders and the operators. 
The length of interviews varied from 45 minutes to 11 
hours and took place at respondents' offices or work 
stations. In some cases, respondents demanded, and were 
provided with, a preset list of issues to be covered. 
Apart from two managers who refused the recording of the 
interviews with them, one for reason of his being a 
government employee, all the other participants agreed to 
be recorded. In any case, some agreed only after 
persuasion and guarantees that the tapes were for my 
personal use. Generally, the interview procedure was to 
first explain my research interests. This was then 
followed by asking respondents open-ended questions about 
their sections/units and functions. As the dialogue 
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progressed I was then able to ask more specific questions 
aimed at providing insights on: 
(a) management considerations on choice and 
acquisition of technology 
(b) work tasks, skills and content of jobs 
(c) supervision and control of work and 
(d) industrial relations. 
A number of respondents were interviewed on more than one 
occasion but second interviews were considerably shorter 
and were mainly to clarify unclear points that arose from 
the first interviews. Besides, useful information were 
derived from informal chats with a cross-section of staff. 
In addition, I returned to the refinery in April, 1992 and 
spent another 3 weeks in the effort to literally plug 
holes discovered at the preliminary stages of data 
analysis. 
Another source of data was questionnaires distributed to 
a sample of operators and maintenance staff. The 
questionnaire, which comprised of both closed and open- 
ended questions, mainly provided information for assessing 
changes in work and job tasks etc. Perhaps, it needs to 
be noted that maintenance workers in Civil and planning 
sections were deliberately excluded because of the 
presumption that they are not in direct contact with the 
technology under study. Here again respondents were 
requested to contribute in the research by filling in the 
questionnaires. I urged them to be frank with their 
responses stressing that the questionnaires were for my 
personal use and pointed to the underlying anonymity since 
names were not requested. 
Altogether 220 questionnaires were distributed, 140 and 80 
to operators and maintenance workers respectively. Of 
these, 117 completed questionnaires were received, 79 from 
operators and 38 from maintenance staff. That is, overall 
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response rate was 53% whilst the response rates of 
operators and maintenance workers were 56% and 48% 
respectively. I pin the relatively high non-response to an 
emergency that occurred during the period when the 
questionnaires were distributed. There was a breakdown in 
two process areas and the urgent need to identify and 
rectify the faults meant that workers had a busy schedule, 
some having to work round the clock without going home. 
In any event, there was reason to believe that workers had 
little interest in what they saw as a non-management 
initiated project which they felt would not affect their 
jobs in any way. 
The third source of data which largely played a 
complementary role was non-participant observation. Some 
time was spent observing control room operators and 
maintenance workshop technicians at work. Besides, the 
breakdown which occurred in the process plant provided 
opportunity for watching some external operators and 
maintenance technicians at work. However, for security 
and safety reasons, access to the plant was highly 
restricted and so permission for such observation sessions 
had to be sought separately. Simple observation combined 
with informal chats when possible enabled me to have a 
better feel of the workers experiences and perceptions of 
their work. 
Nonetheless, in spite of efforts to draw data from as many 
sources as possible, there is no doubt that sources of 
bias exist. For instance, the study, to a great extent, 
relied upon respondents' memories for information about 
past experiences at work. This brings to mind Smith's 
(1981 ) argument (discussed in chapter 5) concerning memory 
and view point bias which essentially draws attention to 
the point that aspects of the available data may be 
inaccurate. This is because of the probability that 
respondents would not recall events exactly as they 
160 
occurred in the past. As indicated earlier, access to 
documentation was not possible. Aside from the fact that 
some potentially valuable data, thus, became inaccessible, 
this also meant that the corroboration of some of the 
memory-based information, via such historical sources, was 
virtually ruled out. 
In any event, since the technology was acquired fairly 
recently, it seems in order to assume that responses from 
the respondents are fairly accurate accounts of the past. 
Also, in the extent that written documents "do not tell 
the whole story (as) ... some important observations ... 
never reach the point of formal recording ... 
" (Ahlstrand, 
1990: 71), documentation has not necessarily been accepted 
as a source of reliable data. As Gallie (1978) also 
stresses: 
documentary sources can be misleading because it may 
be difficult to know the unwritten rules of the way 
in which they are compiled, and it is often 
impossible to assess whether the events they recount 
are anything other than a specific version seen 
through the eyes of elites with their own particular 
interests at stake (1978: 46) 
However, a further source of bias is discernable from a 
phenomenological point of view. As discussed in chapter 
5, this view posits that meaning systems and 
interpretation of events differ amongst individuals. 
Therefore, it is probable that some respondents may have 
defined phenomena differently from me and interpreted the 
questions very differently from the meaning I intended. 
On the other hand, the period of fieldwork was relatively 
brief so that longer and deeper' interaction with 
respondents and their workplace was not possible. 
Therefore, my inability to share and actively participate 
in the world of those under study, as Schutz (1964) and 
Atkinson (1971,1978) would recommend, may have impeded my 
understanding of the respondents' '**reality'. Besides, my 
outsider' status may have also meant an added difficulty 
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in deciphering factual information from those which were 
given simply to please the *outsider' but camouflage 
reality' in the refinery. Thus, implicated here is the 
bias arising from what Moerman, (1974) describes as 
"trusting the native". 
Hence, although the use of different research techniques 
might generate complementary data, I can neither claim to 
have understood the procedures used by individuals to 
construct their 'social reality' nor claim to have 
"accurately captured the workplace reality ... " (Clark et 
al., 1988: 8) nor even claim the generalizability of the 
findings to other workplaces in Nigeria or elsewhere. In 
any event, analysis was against the background of the 
three theoretical models namely, technology determinist, 
social determinist and the interactive models. And, 
Mitchell (1983) and Ragin(1987) have argued that 
inferences from case studies are valid in so far as they 
are based upon linkages between events and the guiding 
theoretical propositions. Therefore, even though the 
study was not a pure "uncontaminated activity" (Silverman, 
1985) in so far as I may have picked on aspects that made 
sense to me, I still remain convinced that useful insights 
into the extent of relevance of technology in a third 
world workplace has been provided. 
In the next chapters, the extent to which technology is 
determinate in various dimensions of work organisation is 
evaluated. For instance, if change in a given aspect of 
work organisation occurs with technological change, the 
relevance of technology, with regard to that aspect, could 
be presumed. On the other hand, technology is not 
relevant for any dimension of work organisation which 
remains stable or unchanged inspite of a technological 
change. In this regard, social factors are seen as more 
influential. By this mode of analysis, the tenability of 
the interactive (or network) model would, hopefully, 
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become evident. Moreover, it will also become clear that 
even in a Third World workplace, which depends mainly on 
external sources for much of its technology at work, 
technology can only claim importance not dominance. 
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NOTES (6) 
1. Shell Diarcy was an Anglo-Dutch consortium which 
became the forerunner of Shell-BP in Nigeria. 
2. One of the terms of agreement when Nigeria granted 
Shell-BP oil prospecting rights was that a refinery 
would be built in Nigeria when crude oil production 
reached 0.5 MBD mark. 
3. There was an on-going refurbishment of the old plant 
during the period of the fieldwork. 
4. This figure is very tentative because recruitment 
exercises were still going on as at the period of 
study. Besides, in view of the enormous difficulty 
I experienced in obtaining this figure, one can only 
presume a lack of seriousness with keeping accurate 
statistical data on staff. This makes the figure 
even more suspect. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CHOICE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
STRATEGIES FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE NEW 
This chapter explores how the new refining technology was 
chosen and employed at the Port Harcourt refinery. The 
chapter begins with an examination of the way the 
technological change was decided upon and the conditions 
under which the decision was made. Following this 
-1 strategic' decision stage was the decision implementation 
stage. This second stage is shown to involve the 
appointment of a project team, choosing the new 
technology, and manpower development arrangements. As the 
analysis would show, it was at the implementation stage 
that attention was given to the potentials of the 
technology. Concomitantly, attention was also given to 
the presumed skill demands of the chosen technology. This 
was by way of extensive training programmes. As will be 
evident, neither at the initial decision stage nor at the 
implementation stage was labour control or the 
humanisation' of work an issue. Furthermore, profit 
optimisation was only implicit at the initial decision 
stage. Finally, the operation of the acquired technology 
is examined. This is against the background of the often 
suggested integrative and control potentials of new 
microelectronic technologies (Buchanan and Boddy, 1983, 
1983; Wolfe, 1988). As the analysis attempts to show, the 
new technology was relevant to the extent that it provided 
opportunities as well as inhibitions to social actors. In 
conclusion, it is suggested that both social and technical 
factors mediated the choosing of, and the application of 
the new refining technology. 
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7.1 TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICE DECISION 
As stated in Chapter 6, the need for a new refinery arose 
because the production capacity of the existing refineries 
could not meet the national demand. The decision to build 
the refinery in Port Harcourt to help ease shortages of 
petroleum products was taken by top corporate managers in 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 
consultation with the Federal government. The intention 
was to eliminate, or at least reduce, the dependence on 
imported petroleum products and subsequently, to export 
any surplus. Previously, local production of these 
products had to be augmented with imports. 
Being a governmental unit, NNPC's choice of technology for 
the new refinery had to be within the context of 
institutionalised government guidelines. Aside from the 
basic government requirement that the imported technology 
had to be strictly for the production of goods and 
services associated with it (NOIP, 1989), an important 
consideration was the estimated cost of acquiring the 
plant'. Therefore choice did not necessarily mean 
choosing between alternative technologies2. Rather, 
choice was mainly a matter of selecting between 
alternative vendors whilst putting the prices, guarantees 
and general conditions of sale of each vendor in 
perspective. In any case, this does not mean that 
technical considerations were ignored. The confidence in 
the capacity of modern technology to assist in economic 
development programmes meant that technical factors were 
also considered. This concerned the assessment of the 
varied potentials of the various machinery available in 
the market in the context of national needs for refined 
products. 
In effect, socio-economic, political and technical factors 
affected the technological choice decision. This is 
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consistent with what obtains in advanced economies (Davies 
A. 1986; Batstone E. et al., 1987; McLoughlin and 
Clark, 1988). As in Britain, technological choice 
"decisions were not purely a matter of commercial 
calculations in response to technological imperatives but 
rather a product of political processes ... 
" (McLoughlin 
and Clark 1988: 48). For instance, here, choice had to be 
made against the background of government regulations for 
importation of foreign technology, availability of funds, 
estimated needs for refined petroleum products, and 
capabilities of the refining technologies on offer in the 
marketplace. 
Nonetheless, unlike in Britain, the focus of commercial 
calculations was not profitability, reducing production 
costs or improvements in product quality. In this case, 
the central concern was with quantity, that is, with 
increasing the availability of the products3. Also, much 
of the political processes involved in the decision-making 
were not carried out within the organisation in which the 
change was to occur but was outside it. It is possible to 
argue that the "change masters" (Kanter, 1984) had to be 
external to the firm because strictly speaking, this was 
a case of a new government-owned organisation coming into 
being. But then, there was nothing to suggest that the 
corporate decision makers intended to set up a new 
management. Essentially, what happened was that the 
existing management in the old plant took over the running 
of the new plant when it became operational. In other 
words, senior managers in the old plant were hardly 
involved in the decisions even though the responsibility 
for running the new plant rested on them. Similarly, 
there was little evidence of the involvement of middle- 
level managers in the decisions. 
Furthermore, it needs to be noted that the personnel 
function was not a party to the decisions at the 
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strategic' level just as is generally typical in Britain 
where "personnel specialists are marginal to managerial 
decisions and planning over technological change" 
(McLoughlin and Clark, 1988: 56). What is remarkable in 
Port Harcourt is that personnel staff did not even expect 
to be involved in such decisions. Therefore, as was 
apparent, there was no feeling of alienation amongst 
members of that function for non-participation. Hence, a 
top manager in personnel blandly confirmed that their 
"participation was nil" (Uche: June, 1991). He took the view 
that technological change was a corporate development and 
decisions to that effect were within the portfolios of the 
corporate Planning and Development, and the Engineering 
and Technical Services divisions. Whilst the former was 
involved in determining whether a refinery was necessary, 
the latter was responsible for technical design 
considerations. 
Nonetheless, whilst personnel issues may have been 
"squeezed out at the design stages ... 
", this does not 
correspondingly mean that there was "no coherent strategic 
planning concerning the human aspects of the new system 
" (McLoughlin and Clark, 1988: 57). As would be seen 
below, alongside the technological choice decision was 
that concerning extensive manpower development programmes 
which came within the ambit of personnel. In any event, 
the non-participation of the personnel function during the 
initial decision stages effectively reduced the likelihood 
of due consideration to the finer human aspects of change 
like tasks and the content of jobs. 
It is also noteworthy that the staff unions made no input 
in the technological choice process nor was there direct- 
employee involvement. Apparently, such decisions were 
taken for granted as belonging to management. That is, 
management, as representatives of owners of the firm, 
reserved the right to determine the factors to be used for 
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production. In some settings, non-involvement of workers 
may be expected to result in some resistance4 to 
technological change or to unsuccessful implementation of 
the new technology (Mumford, 1983; Kanter, 1984; Hirschheim, 
1985; Francis, 1986). For instance, Kanter (1984) insists 
that involvement would build consensus and commitment to 
change. Similarly, Francis (1986) posits decreases in 
workers' motivation and commitment as a result of non- 
involvement. 
However, from all indications, change was welcomed and the 
implementation was successful in so far as it was claimed 
that intended outcomes of the technological change were 
realized. The whole-hearted acceptance of change could be 
explained by the general interest in foreign technology, 
particularly that which did not threaten jobs but instead 
provided opportunity for acquiring new skills and for 
enhancement of technical knowledge. Besides, union 
organisation provided little room for any resistance to 
change. As stated earlier, union organisation was not 
along occupational lines, a situation that would have 
enabled workers, whose jobs or skills could be adversely 
affected, to oppose technical change. In any event, the 
actual employer here was the military government whose 
orders, apparently, must be obeyed unquestionably, and 
hence, quite possibly ruled out the feasibility of 
resistance. Besides, it is also noteworthy that, as would 
be seen in the next section, many of the workers expected 
to work the new plant were yet to be recruited. Thus, as 
a top management respondent clearly put it, "They did not 
exist [in the first place] to resist"(Uche: June, 1991). 
The dominance of corporate management in the decisions 
notwithstanding, there was no explicit concern with the 
regulation of labour in the technological change 
decision5. In fact, the non-participation of the 
personnel function at the initial stages of the 
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technological change decisions does seem to effectively 
rule out any interest of the top decision makers in labour 
regulation by means of technology. In reference to their 
decision on the chosen technology, a top manager who was 
involved in the decision-making emphasized that "although 
you have to optimize the number of people you have, this 
was not an impelling condition" (Eke: June, 1991). Evident 
here is another similarity with Britain where decisions at 
this level often focus on "strategic objectives' (Buchanan 
and Boddy, 1983) and "Labour regulation ... is rarely the 
subject of serious deliberation at this highest level 
within management" (Batstone et al., 1987: 31). 
It is possible to argue that these are two different lines 
of argument here. Whilst the Nigerian manager articulated 
labour regulation in terms of reductions in staff 
strength, Batstone and his colleagues were referring to 
the control of job tasks and the deskilling of jobs. 
However, as would become evident in the next chapter, even 
these aspects of labour regulation were hardly on the 
Nigerian agenda. In fact, whereas there is evidence to 
suggest that in some British establishments, labour 
control objectives do exert considerable influence in the 
choice of technology (Martin, 1984; Jones, 1985: both cited 
in McLoughlin and Clark, 1988), it seems the relative 
cheapness of labour6 in Nigeria made such a consideration 
in the new refinery project unnecessary. Besides, it was, 
and still is, considered the responsibility of the 
government to provide jobs and improve the skills of its 
workforce. In view of the high rate of unemployment and 
the dearth of skilled manpower in Nigeria (National 
Rolling Plan, 1991-93 Vol. 1: 132), it seems inconceivable 
that a government-owned organisation would contemplate the 
elimination of jobs or skills with the acquired 
technology. Hence, just as in Britain, although 
presumably for different reasons, there was "no overriding 
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objective to introduce new technology in order to control 
labour"(McLoughlin and Clark, 1988: 49). And certainly, the 
suggestion that "new technology may enable managers to 
bring about reductions in the overall employment levels 
... [and] eliminate and deskill jobs" (McLoughlin and 
Clark, 1988: 52) would not apply. As one superintendent 
aptly puts it: 
Even though we have a system that really requires 
less manpower, the situation in the country demands 
that we have to employ more people not sack them 
(Umanna: July, 1991). 
It therefore 
circumstances 
decisions. 
seems safe 
intervened in 
to suggest that 
the technological 
social 
change 
In any case, taking a decision is quite different from its 
execution. Whilst corporate management dominated the 
initial decisions, it could not execute the decisions on 
its own. At some point, other organisation participants 
had to be let into the change process. Having decided to 
adopt the new technology, corporate management proceeded 
to effectuate the decision by involving a spectrum of 
other organisation participants. This commenced with its 
setting up of a project team. This "top-down" approach 
could be rationalised in terms of 'situational factors' 
like the dearth of experts, and possibly the relative 
indifference, or rather complacency, of workers and their 
representatives. On the other hand, since the experts 
amongst the workers were so relatively few in number, 
selecting a group of them to work together seemed more 
likely to produce better results. 
The project team consisted mainly of senior engineers from 
different areas of the Corporation and also some foreign 
consultants in specialized areas. In addition, a few 
personnel as well as accounts staff were members. It is 
presumable that concern for the unknown resulted in 
members of the team being drawn from different areas of 
171 
talent within the Corporation and in the use of foreign 
experts. At this level, priority was apparently given to 
the technical aspects of the change. This was evidenced 
by the preponderance of engineers and technical experts in 
the team. In any case, to the extent that different areas 
of interest in the organisation were in the team, what 
Francis (1986) refers to as a 'centralized participative 
approach' could be posited, although here, lower level 
users' of the technology, like operators and maintenance 
technicians, were not represented. 
The team appeared to have enjoyed a considerable degree of 
autonomy7. It was involved in the site survey, 'design' 
of the processes, inviting bids from international 
contractors, and even in sourcing of foreign finance for 
the project. They were also responsible for choosing the 
machinery from an array of designs presented by the 
numerous vendors. By its composition, the team was made 
up mostly of members who apparently understood the 
characteristics of the refining technology and were aware 
of the latest developments in that field. The major 
development in refining technology at the time was the 
incorporation of highly automated production monitoring 
and control systems. Hence, according to respondents who 
were also members of the project team, the team settled 
for a design which featured highly automated starting-up 
and turn-down procedures as well as sophisticated 
production monitoring controls. This was seen as the 
technology of the future which developing countries, that 
could afford it, necessarily have to embrace. Moreover, 
it was believed that such a sophisticated system would 
boost production performance. The gain in time- 
utilization which the system would enable was deemed 
helpful for beefing up overall productivity. In effect, 
the technical characteristics of the technology was given 
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priority at this stage. As one respondent enthused, "The 
attraction of the technology kind of reigns supreme"(Uche: 
June, 1991). However, choosing the technology was only a 
first step. The human side of the technological change 
subsequently attracted attention as the team turned to the 
implementation of the chosen technology8. 
7.2 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
Having chosen the new refining technology, the next stage 
was its implementation. This refers to the installation 
of the machinery and the arrangements for the workers who 
would operate the plant. The installation of the 
machinery was left with its suppliers but the project team 
maintained close contact by regular inspection of work 
progress. Inspection was considered necessary to ensure 
that the installations were carried out according to 
specifications. With the help of foreign consultants, the 
team embarked on manpower development programmes. A 
member of top management had noted that before then, there 
was no concerted effort towards manpower development in 
the corporation. Hence, although technical considerations 
guided the choice of technology, plans were made early 
enough for the supply of the required manpower to man the 
machines. 
Much of the manpower planning was left in the hands of the 
consultants who were also part of the plant installation 
group. It was thought that having been using similar 
machinery in their home countries, these consultants were 
more conversant with the machinery and were therefore 
better placed to know the skill requirements of the new 
system and how best to go about meeting these 
requirements. Thus, to a considerable extent, the 
technology also influenced the parameters within which 
manpower development arrangements were made. 
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With the identification of the presumed staff and training 
needs, a massive recruitment exercise followed. Most of 
the new intake had never worked in a refinery before. 
These were sent for formal training at the Petroleum 
Training Institute, Warri, Nigeria. For this group, the 
training period varied from between 6 to 12 months, 
depending on an individuals educational background and the 
area of deployment after training. At the completion of 
formal training, many were initially deployed to the three 
existing refineries in the country for more training 
whilst on the job. Those who would work in units in the 
new plant which did not exist in any of the refineries 
were sent abroad to train on those units. 
The staff in the old plant in Port Harcourt were not left 
out of the training exercise. Most old members of staff 
were sent for one form of training or the other. However, 
because the plant was fully operational at the time, 
training had to be offered to groups of workers at 
different periods. Many were offered general training or 
refresher courses as they were called. The major 
objectives of the courses were the general development of 
staff knowledge about the industry in order to "improve 
performance standards of staff ... [and] ... meet possible 
changes in products, production techniques and technology" 
(NNPC conditions of service, undated: 87). In addition to 
the anticipated general . appreciation' of modern 
microelectronic systems, training was also intended to 
update the skills of some of the participants. For some 
others however, the purpose of training was to reskill. 
For instance, a number of middle and senior level managers 
were sent abroad to update their skills. Similarly, many 
supervisors were sent for management training courses. 
Also, some of the experienced workers were sent abroad for 
more specific training on how to operate and/or maintain 
the new system. 
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It is notable that for staff in the old plant, the 
criteria for determining who went for what training were 
not made clear enough. A top manager stated simply that 
"those who are able ... are identified if 
(Eke: June, 1991) and sent for training geared towards 
specific skills required for working certain units and 
equipment. Further, there was little evidence to suggest 
that the skills profile of the workers was the basis for 
planning and provision of training. Since not all aspects 
of the new plant were really novel, such data would have 
enabled planners to determine the exact areas of need more 
closely9. But here, the starting point seemed to be the 
usual assumption of a dearth of skills. This approach 
could only be wasteful in time and resources. A 
considerable number of workers ended up with training 
programmes the content of which were either what they 
already knew or were of little relevance to their jobs. 
An incident concerning laboratory workers, which occurred 
during the study, further buttresses this point. These 
workers had been nominated at the corporate level for 
administrative training. However, they had considerable 
difficulty in securing their release from work and in 
getting the usual allowances which were often provided at 
the local level for those going on training. This was 
because local management failed to see any relevance for 
such training to the jobs the workers performed. For 
them, the intended training was more destabilizing than 
useful. In any event, they ultimately gave in to the 
directive of the corporation for whom "the training policy 
will be geared more to the needs and initiatives of the 
corporation ... and training activities must arise from 
recognized corporate needs" (NNPC Conditions of Services, 
Undated: 87). 
Broadly speaking, however, success with regard to manpower 
provision for the new plant could be claimed in so far as 
much of the staff to run the plant were already in place 
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by the time its installation was complete. Most of the 
staff for the new refinery who were either deployed in the 
older plants or sent abroad for specific training were 
withdrawn and were available for the trial runs by the 
vendors. This interaction with the foreign experts helped 
to reinforce learning and increased workers' confidence in 
their ability to operate and maintain the new plant. 
7.3 OPERATING THE NEW PLANT 
The concern here is on how the new system had been 
operated and maintained in order to achieve the intended 
improvements in organisation performance. Buchanan notes 
that "the key decisions that affect organisational 
performance are those concerning the reorganisation of 
work that accompanies technical change"(1986, quoted in 
McLoughlin and Clark, 1988: 67). However, an important 
question is why it is so necessary to embark on work 
reorganisation in the context of technological change. 
Explanations, which are clearly managerialist in 
orientation, are technology-linked and rest mainly on the 
integrative and control potentials of the production 
technology (Buchanan and Boddy, 1983). The former offers 
the opportunity for the convergence of previously distinct 
tasks into the same job and/or the overlapping of roles. 
Implicit in task convergence is the intensification of 
effort and hence desired increase in labour productivity. 
Similarly, role overlap has important implications for 
manning levels like reductions in the number of required 
hands. 
On the other hand, the control potentials are manifest in 
the possibility of substituting electronic for manual 
controls; obtaining direct feedback on results and/or 
performance; and the use of the more reliable technical 
control instead of the more conflict-prone direct personal 
control (Storey, 1983). Also offered by the technology is 
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the possibility of choice in control-related 
centralization and/or decentralization in decision-making. 
Thus, if as it appears, the acquisition of new technology 
opens up prospects for work reorganisation, we need to 
examine the extent to which attention was given to the way 
work was organized in the new Port Harcourt refinery. 
Although the personnel department was represented in the 
project team and were thus involved right from the early 
stages of implementation, this did not result in the 
consideration of issues concerning the way work would be 
done as well as other industrial relations matters as 
might have normally been expected. When the new plant 
became operational, there were no set guidelines with 
regard to issues like the design of jobs, manning, and how 
the operation of the system would be organised. Hence, in 
as much as the personnel function played an active role by 
virtue of its involvement in the manpower development for 
the new plant, it was not sufficiently 'proactive' to 
ensure that the other human dimensions of the change were 
attended to. In essence, McLoughlin and Clark's 
conclusion, from their review of empirical evidence in 
Britain, that "the introduction of new technology has not 
been accompanied by significant innovations in policies of 
the regulation of labour ... 
"(1988: 70) is equally 
applicable in the Port Harcourt refinery's case. 
Furthermore, Woodward's proposition that "there was a 
particular form of organisation most appropriate to each 
technical situation"(1980: 72) seems to suggest that for 
any given change in technology, there has to be a 
corresponding change in the social organisation of the 
workplace if commercial success is to be achieved. From 
this premise, one would expect differences in the 
organisation structure and practices in the old and new 
plants. In broad terms, this had not happened. What 
happened was that practices in the old plant were carried 
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over to the new. The fact that most structures and 
practices persisted suggest that they were not determined 
by technology. 
In spite of the process innovation" which was the 
essential difference between the old and new plants, there 
was little evidence of any new modes of job design or of 
social organisation of work. For instance, the structure 
of authority did not change, evidenced by the stability in 
the levels of management. Also, the pattern of shift work 
in the old plant had persisted in the new. Besides, just 
as the rotation of jobs was not widely practised in the 
old plant, there was nothing to suggest that the extent of 
its practice had been significantly affected by the 
application of the new technology. For example, 
commenting on their practice in Oil Movement Section in 
the old plant, a supervisor noted: 
before you sat down on the panel and call yourself a 
panel operator, you must be ready to know all that 
happens outside (Ngo: July, 1991). 
That is, workers were moved around jobs within the 
section. The main motive of this strategy was to acquaint 
individuals with the different job tasks. Similarly, in 
the new plant, the supervisor stressed that although at 
the initial stages, "if you belonged to the control room 
you remained there", the section had recently reverted 
back to its old system of moving staff around. 
In any event, it is necessary to emphasise that there was 
no clear evidence to suggest that the practice of job 
rotation was a conscious effort on the part of management 
of 'humanize' work. In fact, it had never been a uniform 
strategy in the organisation. Hence, for instance, whilst 
some job rotation occurred in the Oil movement section, 
the reverse was the case in the power plant and utilities 
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section. According to a supervisor in the latter section: 
Although these external operators can move from one 
unit to another, we try to give them specific units. 
This is so that at any given time you want grassroot 
information, you know exactly who to ask (Sule: 
August, 1991) . 
What is notable for our concerns is that the non- 
uniformity of the practice continued in the new plant. 
Similarly, the sub-contracting of maintenance jobs 
requiring specialized skills, which were not available in- 
house, had endured. The persistence of these structures 
and practices could be explained from the premise that the 
new technology was not radically different from the old, 
both being refining systems. But then, there were still 
subtle differences between them, like the ability of the 
new technology to handle 'atmospheric residue' unlike the 
old, and the former's electronic monitoring and control 
capabilities which were lacking in the latter. Hence, 
change in structures has to occur if Woodward's 
technological determinist suggestion of a distinct 
organisation form for every technical situation is 
credible. The transfer of old structures and practices to 
the new plant in Port Harcourt, therefore, casts doubts on 
Woodward's view and, more importantly, represent an 
indictment of technological determinism. This 
persistence, or "organisational conservatism", as Child 
explains, builds up "through progressive sedimentation 
[of] a solid structure of statuses, rules and practices, 
which now present a formidable barrier against 
organizational change" (1987: 128). For Child therefore: 
the difficulties of evaluating the cost and benefit 
of new technology in the short-term, and the degree 
of learning required... speak for the wisdom of 
leaving the organisation well alone in the meantime 
(1987: 129). 
This view is consistent with the feelings of many 
respondents one of whom was emphatic that "established 
norms and traditions of the refinery should not be 
destabilized because of new technology". 
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Nevertheless, areas of novelty were discernable. For 
example, 'convergence' seemed to have occurred in the 
roles of chief and senior operators as many supervisors 
noted the possibility of dealing directly with the senior 
operator, side tracking the chief operator, even though 
this was not officially encouraged. However, on the other 
hand, instead of a cross-functional integration of roles 
which the convergence thesis suggests, there was 
dichotomisation of some roles and functions. For 
instance, the Oil Movement and jetty had one supervisory 
chain in the old plant but, in the new plant, two 
supervisory groups existed, one for oil movement and the 
other for the jetty. Also, in the new plant, an 
instrumentation unit was carved out as a distinct unit 
within the maintenance department. Although 
dichotomisation was attributed to the size and complexity 
of the new plant, it is still possible to argue that 
splitting of the functions was embarked upon for 
convenience of operations and was not a demand imposed by 
the new plant. 
Another area of novel practice was the use of 'technical 
back-up staff'. These were foreign experts who were hired 
to assist with the operations. The rationale for their 
hire can be found in the comment by a respondent in 
production thus: 
You see, operating an equipment is one thing and 
being able to operate an integrated plant of this 
nature is another. So this is where the back-up man 
comes in with his experience and expertise ... what 
our people have been doing over this two years is to 
under-study the back-up men because they are supposed 
to be people with experience who have a lot of 
knowledge and who have operated similar plants in 
their countries (Umanna: July, 1991). 
In essence, the complexity of the technology is the reason 
for the use of technical back-ups. However, this is again 
different from suggesting that the technology had imposed 
the use of back-up staff. The technology can function 
without back-up staff if the local staff are able to come 
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to terms with its complexity. In fact, this was already 
happening. There was a reported decrease in the numbers 
of back-up staff from 90 at the commissioning of the plant 
to 60 as at the period of study. It was hoped that their 
services would no longer be needed in the next few years. 
In the event, the use of back-up staff can be seen both as 
a deliberate social choice as well as a technological 
demand in so far as the technology required its 'handlers' 
to possess certain skills. The control potentials of the 
new technology seemed to have been more extensively 
exploited. Whilst this would be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 9, suffice it to state here that in Port 
Harcourt, manual controls had been effectively displaced 
by the electronic variety. Also, improvements in 
production performance feedback mechanism were reported. 
These developments could be considered as indicative of 
technology influence. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
In the preceding, the stages in the application of the new 
refining technology in Port Harcourt were examined. 
Firstly was the strategic decision stage in which the 
decision to adopt the technology was taken. Then was the 
implementation stage during which the project team was set 
up and mandated to choose the technology, make 
arrangements for the needed manpower and see to the 
installation of the new plant. The final stage 
corresponds to the period from when the new plant was 
commissioned to date. 
It was stated that the decision concerning the 
technological change resided exclusively in top corporate 
management in liaison with the Federal government 
authorities. It was at the implementation stage that the 
decision base was widened to include more professionals. 
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The choice of technology, at the implementation stage, was 
guided by the technical characteristics and potentials of 
the technology. These included electronic controls, which 
enable automatic start-ups and turn-downs; as well as 
electronic monitoring of production processes. These 
features were expected to enhance time-utilization, reduce 
wastages and, hence, improve production performance. As 
was apparent, the technology was chosen essentially 
because of these characteristics and potentials. As the 
analysis in chapter 3 suggested, it is by virtue of its 
capabilities that a given technology is able to exercise 
some degree of constraint over what is, and is not, 
possible in the workplace. 
In any event, it was also evident that social actors "have 
influence over its [the technology's] utilization and the 
ends to which it is applied" (Willcocks and Mason, 1987: 10) . 
For instance, although the extensive training arrangements 
were actually in preparation for the new technological 
system, the modalities of the training were socially 
determined. The new technology may have pointed to the 
need for training in certain specialized skills but 
nothing in the technology stipulated that certain groups 
of workers should be sent locally or abroad for the 
specific training. These were social decisions just as 
social considerations, like satisfying national needs for 
refined petroleum products, influenced the choice of 
technology in the first place. Besides, not all the 
training programmes were technologically-oriented. For 
instance, the general training programmes as well as the 
management training courses for supervisors, which were 
all on offer, could not be seen as technically-based. In 
any case, since generally both technical and human aspects 
of the change were considered, one could presume the 
adoption of a socio-technical approach, even if 
rudimentary. 
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Furthermore, as was apparent, structures and practices 
persisted. The persistence, which Child describes as 
%organisational conservatism', increases the feasibility 
of the argument that technological change does not, as a 
matter of course, lead to changes in the design of work or 
organisational restructuring generally. Opportunities for 
restructuring may be thrown open by technological change 
but its actuation depends upon socially-determined 
preferences and concerns as well as actions. 
This does not imply that technology is of no consequence. 
The technology may not have an objective existence outside 
that provided by humans (Grint, 1991), but the 
opportunities it clearly offers cannot realistically be 
discountenanced as the social determinist model tends to 
suggest. At the Port Harcourt refinery, the relevance of 
the technology is located in these opportunities it 
offers. Undoubtedly, the technological system has to be 
operated by humans. But on the other hand, the purpose 
for which it is operated, which in Port Harcourt was to 
produce petroleum products, cannot be achieved outside of 
the technology. The technology has to exist to provide 
the locus for work or operation. In other words, at the 
refinery, an interdependent relationship existed between 
the technological and the social. This observation is in 
line with the interactive model. However, in contrast, 
neither technological determinism nor social determinism 
seems to recognize this relationship. Indeed, nor are 
arguments which suggest independent technological 
influence truly compatible with the recognition of this 
interdependent relationship between the social and the 
technical. 
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NOTES (7) 
The cost of acquisition really has to be 
distinguished from the running cost. Bureaucratic 
measures for controlling the former may exist, 
although these may not necessarily be effective. For 
instance Ejiofor and Osiji note how "equipment ... are usually imported at highly inflated cost and ... are too old to function profitably ... and supplied to technically unqualified public officials, or even 
technically qualified, [who] are rendered gullible by 
debilitating Kickbacks" (1987: 37). In contrast, 
similar controls for running costs are not apparent. 
In Nigeria there is a general (unfortunate) tendency 
for government owned organisations not to bother much 
about running costs. 
2. Of course, baring subtle differences, refining 
technologies are similar. 
3. This is not to say that the other factors, which were 
considered elsewhere, were not considered in this 
case. Rather, these factors were background 
considerations which seemed to be of secondary 
importance. Without doubt, the hope of being able to 
export surplus products, at some point, meant that 
the quality of products was not totally ignored. 
4. %Resistance to change' may be manifest in many ways 
including rejection/non-use of the technology; high 
labour turnover; excessive fault finding; strike 
activity or work slow-downs. 
5. Perhaps, the apparent relegation of labour control in 
the change decisions could, at least in part, be 
explained in terms of the non-involvement of middle- 
level managers for whom, according to Boddy and 
Buchanan (1983), control objectives are often a 
priority. 
6. A manager justified over-manning in certain sections 
of the refinery in so far as "They don't pay so much 
... like Shell". However, he conceded 
that "if a 
Company like Shell owns this refinery, surely they 
would have fewer staff". 
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7. A rare occurrence in Nigeria where constant 
government interference in such activities is often 
the norm. 
8. This strategy corresponds to what Nadler and Robinson 
(1987) describe as 'hard systems approach'in which 
there is a dichotomy between design and 
implementation, the former coming before the latter. 
They argue that this demarcation creates 
'implementation problems' which could be avoided by 
the adoption of a holistic approach in which 
planning, design and implementation are integrated. 
However, their recommendation would not quite fit the 
Port Harcourt refinery situation where the design was 
more or less pre-packaged by the foreign vendors who 
supplied the technology. It is presumable that the 
modifications, which many respondents claimed were 
carried out in the plant after its commissioning, 
would have been avoided if a 'holistic approach' had 
been adopted. 
9. This view finds support in Buchanan and Boddy's 
(1986) recommendation of a training strategy which 
systematically 
(i) identifies workers who require training, 
their present skills and the relevance of 
these skills to the proposed new system 
(ii) identifies the new skills required 
(iii) determines the content of training and 
(iv) determines the time and phasing of training 
and how training would be conducted. 
10. The change could be regarded as such in so far as it 
entailed the introduction of new processes for 
further cracking of crude 'residues'. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON THE CONTENT 
AND CHARACTER OF JOBS 
As noted in Chapter 3, a plethora of views concerning the 
implications of technology in the workplace abound in 
literature. On one hand are views that the new technology 
makes jobs less tedious and more pleasant; and also 
upskills or enskills work. On the other hand, technology 
is seen as an instrument for the dehumanisation of work as 
well as for deskilling. Whilst some tend to take a 
technological determinist stance, attributing much of what 
accompanies technological change to the technology itself 
(Ellul, 1981; Meissner, 1969; Walker & Guest, 1952), others 
(Child, 1984; Gallie, 1978; Wilkinson, 1983) stress that 
technical change outcomes are dependant upon social choice 
and/or negotiation between social actors. Nevertheless, 
all seem to agree that the adoption of new technology is 
accompanied by changes in the content and character of 
jobs, whether negatively or positively. Further, the 
content of a given job is seen as including such 
dimensions as: the variety of tasks, the complexity of 
tasks and the skill requirements of the job (Mcloughlin 
and Clark, 1988; Rolfe, 1990). The analysis which follows 
focuses on broad patterns of change in the job content in 
the Port Harcourt refinery. However, an attempt is also 
made to look at salient changes in the content of jobs 
even though detailed analysis of jobs is avoided. For 
ease in analysis, production and maintenance jobs are 
considered in separate sections. The approach is to 
compare the nature of some jobs in the old and new plants 
in order to identify changes and differences between 
them. Finally, the extent to which differences could be 
attributed to the technology, to human factors or both is 
examined. The hub of the argument here is that, in the 
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Port Harcourt refinery, the technological system employed 
does significantly influence the content of jobs but not 
unilaterally. 
8.1 THE CONTENT AND CHARACTER OF PRODUCTION JOBS IN THE 
OLD AND NEW PLANTS 
As stated earlier in Chapter 6, the production department 
in the refinery included the process plant, power plant 
and utilities, and the oil movement sections. The jobs of 
the different categories of operators in these sections 
are pivotal to production work in the refinery. This view 
underlies the analysis which follows. 
In the old plant, individual monitoring and control 
devices, which gave indications of what was happening in 
the plant at any given time, were spread on a large panel 
but some manual gauges were also mounted on locations 
inside the plant itself. The panel was manned by panel 
operators whilst external operators attended to the 
outside gauges. Manning the large panel entailed 
considerable physical movement on the part of the panel 
operator in order to reach the different control switches. 
It was the responsibility of the panel operator to 
manually select and operate the production control 
switches in the correct sequence. More importantly, the 
panel operator was relied upon to maintain the operations 
within the set limits. This meant frequent checks on the 
trends and fluctuations of these parameters. When the 
need arose, he was expected to undertake measures to 
correct any deviations from the prescribed limits or 
inform his superiors in more complicated situations. 
Mechanically driven tracks and pens provided charts which 
indicated to him the behaviour of different operation 
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parameters. According to one respondent, 
you only see a pen moving and you use your experience 
to estimate what it is actually saying ... (Ojo: July, 1991) . 
Thus, the panel operator's job demanded manual dexterity, 
and 'experiential' and mental skills to read and interpret 
the graphic charts. Also needed was the ability to decide 
on the appropriate course of action. However, the 
probability of human error was quite considerable. This 
was because the frequent movements coupled with the 
continuous demand on his mental and manual skills made the 
panel operator's job strenuous and exhausting. 
Similarly, the external operator went round the plant at 
prescribed intervals to take readings from the external 
gauges and to see how the pumps were performing. This on 
many occasions involved climbing up onto platforms. It 
was also the responsibility of the external operator to 
manually open and/or close various external pumps and 
valves as the need arose. This job required diligence and 
considerable skill to be able, for instance, to determine 
how many turns a pump required. The external operator's 
job was particularly cumbersome especially during 
emergencies when he had to run helter-shelter in the plant 
to shut or open valves and/or pumps etc. In the 
circumstance, operations required the involvement of 
relatively large numbers of operators and close 
supervision was of a necessity. 
Conversely, the new plant showed more of what, as noted in 
chapter 3, Zuboff(1988) describes as 'automating' and 
.. informating' capabilities. The manual control devices of 
the old plant gave way to automated control gadgets. In 
place of the conventional panel was the keyboard and the 
DCS (digital control system) screen. Production 
parameters became electronically controlled. Deviations 
of these parameters from the set limits were automatically 
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detected by the technological system which either sent out 
visual and/or aural alarm signals or, in certain 
situations, undertook the required corrective measures by 
itself. In effect, the control operator's (as the 
inside' operator was then preferably called) job became 
more automated. He was relieved of direct monitoring and 
adjustments since much of the monitoring and control were 
taken over by the technology. He no longer needed to 
worry about achieving the proper setting for the knobs. 
Hence, a qualitative change had occurred in the kind of 
manual skills the control operator required. This was 
evidenced by the fact that instead of turning knobs in 
order to set controls, the control operator now had to 
key-in operations' parameters by means of the keyboard 
whilst the screen served to provide instant visual 
feedback on his performance. Hence, the new system was 
more user-friendly, unlike the rather intimidating large 
control panel. As it appeared, skill become more 
dissociated from effort as little effort still yielded 
outstanding skill-influenced outcomes. This is very 
similar to findings in some work- places in more developed 
economies. For instance, from her research of such 
workplaces, Zuboff concludes that "skill and effort are no 
longer inextricably linked. The operator must put forward 
a minimum of strenuous physical exertion ... 
" (1988: 53). 
Zuboff is convinced that "the new technology ... 
diminished [the] importance of action - centered skills 
" (1988: 76). As she elaborates: """ 
[workers who] knew themselves to be the ones who gave 
their bodies in effort and skill, and through their 
bodies ... made things ... 
[and were] accustomed to 
gauging their integrity in intimate measures of 
strain and sweat ... find that information 
technology 
has challenged their assumptions ... the rules of 
the 
game had changed (1988: 74). 
Furthermore, in Port Harcourt, instead of having to read 
and interpret graphic charts, the computerised system 
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provided most of the information required first hand. 
Hence, the type of interpretive skill required by the 
control operator in the old plant became of little use. 
Nonetheless, since his job now entailed the monitoring of 
monitoring/control equipment, he still needed interpretive 
skills, albeit of a new kind. For instance, he still 
needed to interpret alarm signals, and there was still 
room for him to use his own judgement at such crucial 
times. Besides these, the control operator now also 
needed new skills and knowledge to enable him to use the 
computer codes to call up menus required at different 
times. Further, there is reason to suggest that the 
control operators "push-button' mode of operation was not 
actually as straightforward as it appeared. In the words 
of one respondent: 
Pressing buttons is challenging in so far as you are 
thinking first before pressing; you are thinking 
about what you are going to achieve (Ugoh: 
August, 1991). 
In essence, the new system may have been easier to operate 
but it still demanded logical thinking and interpretative 
skills and action on the part of the controlman. 
Profound changes also occurred in the external operator's 
job. For example, the manual operation of most pumps and 
valves became unnecessary. Concerning this, an 
interviewee pointed out that "you can now press a button 
and motorised valves are shut precisely to the level you 
want them" (Onye: July, 1991). This new arrangement had 
other direct effects on the job of the external operator. 
The frequency with which he undertook checks on outside 
gauges was drastically reduced. Relatedly, the incidence 
of climbing platforms to take readings or check on valves 
etc was also curtailed. In effect, the external 
operator's range of tasks became narrower and much less 
complex and consequently, his job became easier and less 
demanding. 
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The preceding points to changes in the content and 
character of the jobs of operators generally. However, 
the mode and extent of change varied. For instance, a 
respondent remarked that the "new system lessens the job 
of those outside since the majority of operations are more 
or less done by the man in the control room" (Okon: 
July, 1991). That is, external operators experienced 
attrition in the variety and skill content of their tasks. 
Automating pumps etc, in effect, meant the deskilling of 
this group. On the other hand, changes in the control 
operator's job seemed to be more of trading one set of 
skills for another. ' For him, the content of his job 
apparently increased, in comparative terms, in so far as 
he tended to pick up additional responsibilities. By 
virtue of his role as the monitor of process control 
monitors, the control operator became increasingly more 
accountable for trouble-free operations and for the 
quality of the products. A clear affirmation of this 
tendency towards increased responsibility for the control 
operator could be found in the comments of a respondent 
that in the new plant, unlike the old "if a problem 
attracts a query, the man in the controlroom is 
automatically connected because he is supposed to be 
monitoring everything that happens"(Ngo: July, 1991). 
Besides, considering a process manager's remark that: 
the new system gives the control operator more 
authority over his work; [and] the external operator 
really does not have much of a discretion [but] ... 
has to follow directives ... 
2 (Anah: June, 1991), 
it is conceivable that the control operator had more 
influence than the external operator. As Storey (1983) 
would also argue, the influence of the control operator 
derives from his immediate control over uncertainty. 
Further support for changes in the content of the jobs of 
operators generally is provided by the questionnaire data. 
As table 8.1 shows, the majority of operators reported 
increases in the variety of tasks; the technical 
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complexity; and the knowledge and skill requirements of 
their jobs. Similarly, Table 8.2 indicates that 76% and 
73% of operators respectively found their job more 
challenging and more interesting. At the same time 78% 
and 52% respectively claimed increases in the speed and 
physical effort required. 
The claim concerning physical effort is particularly 
ambiguous since it is incompatible with assertions that 
work was less physically strenuous and more relaxing in 
the new plant. Perhaps these claims could be explained in 
terms of a possible desire by the workers to give the 
impression that they performed difficult tasks. The 
claims regarding increases in the knowledge and skill 
content of jobs also requires comment. On one hand, 
judging from the relatively high non-responses, it could 
be suggested that the workers were not too clear about 
what 'skill' is. On the other hand, it is equally 
feasible to contend that workers would, perhaps for 
prestige, claim to possess the revered technical skills. 
This point may similarly explain the assertions that work 
was more challenging and interesting. 
Further, whilst confirming that "skill requirements have 
changed ... significantly because of 
the additional [new] 
processes in the new plant" (Anah: June, 1991), some 
respondents also emphasized that some areas in the new 
plant were identical to those in the old. In these areas 
therefore, the skill requirements had not really changed. 
In the circumstance, it could be argued that the supposed 
increase in the skill content of jobs may not be as 
widespread as claimed. For the old process workers, 
working in the 'unchanged' areas in the new plant, the 
claim of skill increase is very probably bogus. 
Nonetheless, the claim may still be justifiable for the 
many new entrants who had to acquire the necessary new 
skills anyway. 
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Table 8.1: Changes In the content of Jobs 
Ques 5b: Are your tasks increased or decreased? 
6b: Are your tasks technically more complex than 
before? 
6c: Did you require new knowlegde to be able to 
perform your current job tasks? 
11e: Did you acquire any new skill(s) from training, 
which is (are) useful in performing your job 
tasks? 
Operators Maintenance 
% workers % 
Number of tasks: 
Increase 
Decrease 
No response 
Technical Complexity: 
More 
Not More 
No response 
Requires new knowledge: 
Yes 
No 
No response 
Acquired new skill: 
Yes 
No 
No response 
76 79 
33 
21 18 
80 69 
16 13 
4 18 
68 76 
24 11 
8 13 
80 76 
28 
18 16 
n= 79 n= 38 
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Table 8.2 : Changes In the Character of Jobs 
5c: Has the speed with which you do your work increased, 
decreased or remained the same? 
6a: Does your current job tasks require you to exert more 
physical power than previously? 
18: In your opinion, is your work 
i Sufficiently challenging? 
ii interesting? 
iii More of a routine? 
iv Boring? 
Operators Maintenance 
Workers % 
Speed: 
Increase 78 79 
Decrease 13 
Remained the same 35 
No Response 18 13 
More physical effort: 
Yes 52 40 
No 46 45 
No Response 2 15 
More Routine Job : 
Yes 67 45 
No 14 29 
No Response 19 26 
Job Boring: 
Yes 18 24 
No 47 53 
No Response 35 24 
More Interesting: 
Yes 73 87 
No 53 
No Response 22 11 
More Challenging: 
Yes 76 76 
No 10 13 
No Response 14 11 
n= 79 n= 38 
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8.2 MAINTENANCE WORK IN THE OLD AND NEW PLANTS 
Maintenance work involved services on mechanical equipment 
and the various control instrumentations in the refinery's 
process plant and other utilities. Services rendered 
included predictive, preventive, and corrective 
maintenance of the facilities. Predictive maintenance 
involved what a respondent (Amadi: July, 1991) described as 
"condition-monitoring" of equipment. This activity, on 
occasions, exposed possible future problems which were 
then nipped in the bud through preventative maintenance. 
On the other hand, corrective maintenance was carried out 
when actual breakdowns occurred. Whilst the mechanical 
section serviced both moveable and immoveable mechanical 
equipment like pumps, compressors, turbines etc, the 
instrument and electrical maintenance sections3 took 
charge of the refinery's control instrumentation. 
Instrumentation in the old plant was mainly pneumatic in 
nature. Put simply, process control was effected by the 
passage of air through tubes at set pressures; the 
signals, received from the controls and interpreted, were 
essentially dependent on the flow of air. The range of 
tasks of the instrument engineer included frequent checks 
for tube blockage, which could prevent the passage of air, 
and checking for air leaks, both of which could interfere 
with the quality of signals received. Hence a lot of time 
was spent in 'trouble -shooting'. Moreover, when faults 
occurred, their location was often by trial and error. 
This involved the disconnection and testing of a myriad of 
tubes and cables and then carefully reconnecting them 
after the fault had been located and rectified. The 
sequences and routines required to carry out this activity 
represented a form of skill, and so also did equipment 
down-time depend much on this experiential skill and the 
ability of the instrument man to carry out the 'faulting' 
process quickly. 
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Similarly, the range of tasks undertaken by mechanical 
maintenance technicians generally included welding, pipe 
fitting, lubrication, carrying out adjustments and 
realignments, and cleaning etc. These were, principally, 
dirty tasks, the performance of which was physically 
demanding, involving a lot of exertion and discomfort. 
Moreover, expertise in a variety of manual skills was 
required. 
Things were different in the new plant. Here, the 
replacement of pneumatic by electronic controls resulted 
in some changes in the tasks and the knowledge 
requirements of instrument men. Rather than being 
dependent on the flow of air under pressure, control 
signals became electronically generated. For the 
instrument men, knowledge in pneumatics was no longer a 
premium. Their tasks of checking for air blockages and 
leaks, as occurred in the old plant, became superfluous. 
In the new system, possession of electronic skills became 
more central in the performance of tasks. In addition, 
the new process instrumentation featured sections with 
self-diagnostic capabilities. Besides, more automatic 
testing tools and equipment were made available. This 
meant that the detection, diagnosis and repair of faults 
were made easier, took less time, and were more 
efficiently carried out. In other words, the trouble 
shooting aspect of the job was minimized and the skills 
for disconnecting /reconnecting cables etc; became less 
frequently used. 
A similar change emerged in mechanical maintenance jobs. 
For many workers in this section, work in the new plant 
was mediated by more sophisticated maintenance tools. 
Also, for the first time, it became possible to machine 
some spare parts in-house. It thus became necessary to 
learn how to use these new maintenance tools. Moreover, 
changes in the character of work were reported. There 
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were claims of tasks being made lighter, less strenuous 
and less filthy and that better results were achieved. 
Apparently, the new tools had not only reduced the pain of 
labour by minimizing physical exertion but had also 
improved the quality of performance. 
Paradoxically, the questionnaire data only very narrowly 
corresponded with these claims. As table 8.2 indicates, 
whilst only 45% of maintenance workers responded that 
their jobs did not require more physical effort, as many 
as 39% claimed that it did. As with the operators, these 
groups were probably eager to portray their jobs as 
difficult and highly skilled. Another important point, 
however, is that many of the workers had not worked in the 
old plant and so did not really have a base for the 
comparison. This may, possibly, also account for the 
generally high non-responses to the questionnaire items. 
In fact, a dramatic change in the content of maintenance 
jobs could not be safely assumed. As a manager in 
maintenance emphasized: 
[the] maintenance job has not really varied from 
what it was in the old refinery. The only thing is 
that the job is larger in scope ... Basically the 
same skills are required ... Generally, to repair a 
pump is carried out in the same way ... (Adah: 
August, 1991). 
Similarly another respondent noted that: 
the difference in maintenance work in the old and new 
plant derive only from the more specialized equipment 
now used. [Even so] ... the principles behind the functioning of both old and new equipment are the 
same ... The job itself still requires mainly manual 
skills (Amadi: July, 1991). 
Thus, it appears what had happened was a qualitative 
refinement in the skill requirements for maintenance job 
generally. The need for manual skills had persisted. 
Further, the claimed increase in the variety of tasks 
undertaken (79% of maintenance workers) or largeness in 
197 
the scope of maintenance jobs seemed to have little to do 
with the nature or character of the technology. It was 
seen as more directly a function of the size of the new 
plant. Hence a manager stressed: 
the equipment we have here are more in number. We 
have more pumps, more motors etc. In fact, this 
refinery is more than 4 times the size of the other 
one and so also is the workload (Edet: August, 1991). 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the extent to which the content and 
character of jobs underwent changes when a new refining 
plant was put into use at the Port Harcourt refinery. As 
is evident, there were alterations in the content of 
production and maintenance jobs. These changes were more 
dramatic in some jobs than others and so also were there 
differences in the aspects of the job content altered. 
For instance, changes in the skill content of jobs were 
more evident in production than in maintenance work. 4 On 
the other hand, maintenance workers seemed to have 
experienced more changes in the variety of the tasks they 
performed. Furthermore, amongst production workers, 
changes that occurred in the jobs of control operators and 
external operators differed. 
It is perfectly feasible to argue that the changes in the 
content of the different jobs derived from changes in the 
technology. With regard to the control operator, there 
does not seem to be any way to explain the new requirement 
for keyboard skills, for example, if technological 
influence is discountenanced; nor can the diminution in 
his physical movements be easily explained away without 
reference to the impact of the new system. The new 
technology took over some of the tasks previously 
undertaken by the control operator but, at the same time, 
provided new ones. 
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Similarly, the depletion in the skill requirements of the 
external operator and the point that he no longer needed 
to climb platforms frequently cannot be pinned onto human 
decision and choice alone. Presumably, the loss of skill 
could be better explained along the lines that the 
expertise for opening and closing valves which the 
external operator possessed previously had now been built 
into the technology. This in turn had reduced the need 
for climbing onto platforms. 
On the other hand, the instrument technician in the old 
plant required no knowledge of electronics to be able to 
perform his tasks. For him, knowledge of electronics 
became necessary only because he now had to maintain 
electronic equipment in the new plant. In a similar vein, 
the qualitative refinement in the manual skill 
requirements of the mechanical maintenance man, in the new 
refinery, had to do with the need to use more 
" sophisticated maintenance tools in the performance of the 
same or similar tasks. Besides, the recorded increases in 
the acquisition of new skills was likely to have resulted 
from the existence of novel sections in the new plant. It 
is doubtful that management would arrange and sponsor the 
acquisition of new skills for its own sake. That is, 
there is reason to believe that management would want to 
provide only skills which are purposive - relevant to the 
achievement of organisational objectives. 
Nevertheless, the above does not necessarily imply that 
the technology of the new plant unilaterally determined 
the content of jobs. For example, nothing about the 
technology demanded the separation of production from 
maintenance work nor could the technology be used to 
explain the boundaries that existed even within each of 
the two sections. With regard to maintenance job, there 
was nothing to suggest that the decision to make the 
instrument technician solely responsible for instruments 
199 
maintenance tasks, and mechanical technicians for 
mechanical equipment, was based on technological 
considerations alone. Furthermore, movements between jobs 
was claimed for mechanical maintenance staff. Here for 
instance, it was possible for workers to move on from the 
"maintenance of rotating equipment to work on diesel 
engines" (Amadi: July, 1991). Nothing in the technology 
would account for this. All these came under the ambit of 
social decision and choice. Besides, it is also notable 
that a faulty equipment would demand repairs but it does 
not dictate its down-time. The duration of equipment 
down-time is also human-influenced. 
Similarly, it is difficult to explain the distinction 
between the tasks of the control operator and the external 
operator solely on technological grounds. More plausibly, 
functional boundaries and specialisms are better seen as 
defined by social choice rather than by the demands of the 
technology at work. The new technology may have been 
instrumental or influenced the changes which occurred in 
the contents of jobs but it did not autonomously determine 
the job contents. Both the technology and humans were 
mutual 'allies' in this endeavour. Apparently, the 
technology makes certain demands on the social but, at the 
same time, acts as a facilitator of socially- originated 
initiatives. Similarly, whilst generating initiatives, 
the social takes cognizance of the potentials and the 
demands of the technological. In effect, the interactive 
thesis is satisfied. 
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NOTES (8) 
1. It needs to be remarked that the experience of the 
older' operator (who transferred from the old plant) 
in terms of changes in his skill differed from the 
experience of the control operator who was a new 
entrant. The former was reskilled rather than 
upskilled whilst the latter, who was essentially 
devoid of any relevant skill base, was enskilled. 
2. This view finds compatibility in Zuboff's claim of a 
bifurcation of skills in a computerised workplace 
such that "One group of operators... use the 
information system to learn.... about the process, 
while another group would make itself an appendage to 
the system, mechanically carrying out the computer's 
directives" (1988: 68). Presumably, the former and 
latter groups correspond to controlroom operators and 
external operators respectively. 
3. It was gathered that the instrument section was an 
offshoot of the electrical section. Electrical 
personnel became instrument men after exposure to 
specialised training. 
4. This statement relies more on the interview material 
than on the questionnaire data. For instance, the 
latter shows only a slight difference between the 
skill requirement of operators (80%) and those of 
maintenance workers (76%). 
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CHAPTER 9 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONTROL OF WORK 
Many organisations adopt various structures and strategies 
for tackling the problem of control (Edwards, 1979; Storey, 
1983; Thompson, 1983). According to Edwards, an 
organisation's "system of control" refers to: mechanisms 
for directing work tasks; procedures for supervising and 
evaluating worker's performance; and an apparatus for 
discipline and reward (1979: 18). As it appears, his 
%system of control' would apply in each of his three types 
of control namely simple, technical and bureaucratic 
control. Further, whilst Edwards periodizes his types of 
control, each corresponding "to a definite stage in the 
development of the ... firms"(1979: 21), Woodward's (1970) 
approach is some what different. For Woodward, 
organisations themselves can be distinguished according to 
the extent to which they adopt different "processes of 
control", ' and, variation in the control processes is a 
function of technology. She thus posits a relationship 
between control forms and the technology of production. 
From her research data, she concludes that "the hardware 
of the technology is the major determinant of the control 
system" (1970: 39) and also that the majority of firms with 
continuous process technology mainly adopt impersonal2 
administrative and mechanical controls. Woodward argues 
that in such plants the setting of objectives, the 
sequencing of activities and the mechanisms for taking 
corrective action, amongst others, are specified and 
incorporated into the technology during its design. Hence 
"line managers and supervisors increasingly cease to 
concern themselves with the day to day problems of 
production operations ... trouble-shooting role becomes 
superfluous as the control system becomes foolproof" 
(1970: 45). In essence, personal supervision of work gives 
way to impersonal administrative and mechanical controls. 
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Edwards (1979) similarly asserts that technical control is 
structurally embedded in the technology of production. As 
he further argues, technical control is manifest when work 
becomes paced and directed by machinery, and workers 
reduced to "attendants of pre-paced machinery" (1979: 20). 
More explicitly, the technology provides "unambiguous 
direction as to what operation each worker is to perform 
next and establish(es) the pace at which the worker ... 
work(s)" (Edwards, 1979: 118). However, it must be noted 
that although Edward bases this argument on assembly line 
technology, his position when discussing more modern 
technology is essentially the same. Thus, he contends 
that: 
The computer can send instructions ... as to what 
operations or activities workers are to perform, and 
upon successful completion of the task ... will 
receive feedback information that will permit it to 
send out instructions for the next operation. 
[Further] Just as foremen watch over particular 
shops, so microcomputers control the operations 
conducted on particular machines (1979: 123-4). 
This chapter seeks to examine whether what obtains in the 
Port Harcourt refinery corresponds with this scenario and 
the extent to which technology is implicated therein. 
9.1 THE TENABILITY OF TECHNICAL CONTROL 
Put succinctly, Edwards' (1979) thesis is that the 
technology of production is the precursor of technical 
control which may be indicated as machine-paced and/or 
machine-directed work. Similarly, Woodward's (1970) 
argument that the sequencing of activities etc; is built 
into the technology during its design ostensibly suggests 
that the technology would direct work when it is adopted. 
We need to look at this dimension of technical control in 
some detail. 
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9.1.1 Machine-pacing of work: 
Often implied in machine-paced work are greater speed of 
operation and restricted mobility of the workers while at 
work (Edwards, 1979). On the question regarding any 
changes in the speed with which they carried out their job 
tasks, 79% of the respondents said it had increased, 2% 
said it decreased and 3% indicated that it had remained 
the same (see Table 9.1). Of those who claimed that the 
speed of job tasks had increased, 54% felt the increase 
was as a result of management decision; and 25% and 11% 
saw promotion and pressure from work mates respectively as 
responsible for the increase. However, only 10% of this 
category of respondents perceived technology as 
responsible for the claimed increase in the speed of work 
(see Table 9.2). Hence, even if one accepts the increase 
in speed on its face value, attribution of such increases 
to a technological imperative is evidently fraught with 
difficulty. In the light of the above analysis, what 
seems more tenable, though still contestable, is a social 
determinist argument. 
Further, if restricted mobility is the yardstick for 
measuring technical control as Edwards suggest, then, the 
existence of such control in Port Harcourt is 
questionable. There was no evidence of restricted 
movement of staff or of staff confined to their equipment 
or work space. Admittedly, it could be argued that 
continuous-process technology differs markedly from the 
assembly line technology with which restriction of 
workers' mobility is more often associated. But, it is 
still possible to argue that continuous-process technology 
demands that certain procedures be carried out at definite 
times and to that extent would tend to restrict the 
movement of workers. However, this potential seems to 
have been effectively counteracted by management's 
tendency to overman facilities. Although management may 
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have held a different intention for adopting this 
strategy, a spill-over effect seems to be that of enabling 
freer movement of workers. Moreover, it was possible for 
individuals to negotiate with work mates for at least 
brief absences. Thus, the technology may have some 
potential to restrict movement but management's manning 
strategy inhibited the manifestation of such a potential. 
TABLE 9.1 : Changes in the speed of work 
Ques 5c: Has the speed with which you do your work 
increased, decreased or remained the same? 
% 
Increase 79 
Decrease 2 
Remained the same 3 
Others 16 
(n = 117) 
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Table 9.2 : Reasons for increase in the speed of work 
Ques 5d: In your opinion, which of the following is 
(are) responsible for the change? 
Management decision 54 
Pressure from work mate(s) 11 
Promotion 25 
The kind of technology in use 10 
(n = 81) 
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9.1.2 Machine-directed work 
As stated earlier, the notion of 
suggests that the sequence of 
technology-determined. This in tur 
elimination of human intervention 
is, the task relationship becomes 
which presumably controls the work 
machine-directed work 
work activities is 
n implies a decrease or 
(Gallie, 1978). That 
mediated by machinery 
process. 
In the refining process, this mediation by the technology 
renders the raw material' invisible and intangible during 
processing. For the process worker, buttons and digital 
symbols on control panels replace concrete 'reality'. In 
essence, operators are not directly responsible for making 
the products. They simply monitor the process via 
computer terminals in control rooms. That these workers 
are reduced to "controllers of control" (Woodward, 
1970: 46) suggests a reduction if not elimination of human 
intervention. 
But, how tenable is the argument that technology is 
directing and hence controlling work? Being in control 
implies an ability to initiate informed action. But there 
was nothing to suggest that the technological system even 
initiated action. As a supervisor points out: 
If the staff does not give a correct input to the 
computer, start from now till tomorrow, the result 
would be wrong unless he goes back to check and 
correct the error. It is still the human being that 
would correct the mistake (Akpan: August, 1991). 
This argument clearly blights any rhetoric which posits 
the elimination of human intervention. In fact, a case 
for the need for human presence was made by a process 
superintendent. As he argues: 
The computer can only take some actions, for example, 
shut some key control valves etc. But, there is also 
a possibility that some of the valves do not get 
closed. It might indicate they are closed on the 
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panel but you find that, 
So it requires somebody 
July, 1991). 
out there, they are open. 
to cross-check (Umanna: 
Futhermore, in the refinery, work actions were generally 
management-directed. For instance, many managers and 
supervisors stressed that they had instruction books in 
which they wrote out what had to be done daily and the 
subordinates were expected to follow the instructions 
strictly. In essence, subordinates were not exactly able 
to initiate work action. But more relevantly, that the 
content of these instructions, according to some managers, 
was largely guided by parameters like overall production 
planning requirements, shipping, product distribution and 
transfer requirements, suggests the influence of factors 
other than technology. 
In any event, it could be argued that technology was an 
important 'ally' since management's work-instructions took 
cognizance of what was permissible using the existing 
machinery. As a manager stressed: 
every equipment has its own performance output [and] 
the rate of movement of feed or product, for example, 
is determined by the output of the equipment 
(Akpu: July, 1991). 
Therefore, it seems, Forsyth and his colleagues (1982) 
were right in their thesis that technology does impose 
some technical rigidities. 
It is tempting to cite the existence of standard operating 
procedures as evidence for technology-directed work. On 
the necessity of standard operating procedures, a manager 
remarked: 
the risk involved in running a plant is enormous. 
What separates you from disaster is very minute and 
it requires experience and knowing what to do. When 
you have an upset you should know precisely what to 
do to avert danger (Nnamdi: June, 1991). 
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Nearly all workers (97%) agreed on the existence of 
standard operating procedure (see Table 9.3). As Table 
9.3 also shows, 91% of respondents believed that the 
operating procedures directed the sequence of work and 89% 
felt that the procedures were followed strictly. However, 
whilst only 11% of respondents thought that management was 
responsible for the content of operating procedures, as 
many as 79% reckoned that the technology was responsible 
(Table 9.4). 
Further illuminating responses emerged from respondents 
regarding why the procedures were followed strictly. 
Comments from many alluded to technological elements. For 
instance, an operator suggested that: 
non-adherence to the laid down procedures will 
automatically lead to damage of equipment and will 
eventually lead to loss of time and money 
(questionnaire respondent no. 114). 
Similarly, another felt: 
It will be mal-operation to do otherwise; and 
therefore would lead to damage of equipment or to 
producing off-spec products (questionnaire respondent 
no. 1). 
Yet another was certain that the operation procedures were 
"in keeping with the technology of ... the various 
vessels, machineries, and equipment in order to ensure 
successful operation and environmental safety" 
(questionnaire respondent no. 13). 
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Tables 9.3 : Perceptions on standard operations procedures 
Ques 12a : Do you have standard operating procedures for 
performing your work tasks? 
12bii Do the operating procedures actually direct 
the sequence of work, for example, direct 
what tasks must be performed before others? 
12i v Do you always follow the operating procedures 
provided? 
Existence 97 
Directs sequence of work 91 
Is followed strictly 89 
(n= 117) 
Table 9.4 : Determinants of the content of operation 
procedures 
Ques 12iii what in your opinion influence(s) the 
content of the operating procedures? 
The nature of technology 75 
Management's perferences 
and judgement 11 
Attitude of workers 4 
Others 6 
(n = 144) 
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These views, that technology more or less determined 
operating procedures, ostensibly suggests that work in the 
refinery was technologically directed. However, the 
preceding analysis does indicate the influence of both 
technical and social factors. Hence, a superintendent 
(Emeka: June, 1991) likened the technological system to a 
receptacle that would hold anything that was put in it. 
It was the human being that knew what reactions he wanted 
to take place; knew the reaction processes and set the 
parameters for the reaction to take place. The technology 
provided the environment or, more precisely, the site for 
carrying out the reaction. It exercised influence only in 
so far as it was a specialised type of receptacle whose 
component parts or sections would accept only certain 
parameters and certain reactions. Failure to recognize 
this specialised nature could result in malfunction, non- 
realisation of desired products/goals or even disasters 
etc. This argument also finds compatibility with that of 
another process worker who emphasised that: 
no matter how well designed the process plant is, if 
the human being who is to operate it does not know 
what he is doing, it will not work. So also, no 
matter how ingenious the guy is, he cannot pass in 
HF[Hydrofluoride] into area I [CDU- Crude 
Distillation Unit] and make it work; it is impossible 
(Ojo: July, 1991). 
That is, the technology is no more important than the 
human operator who operates it. The technology places 
some conditions which have to be satisfied but, to 
function, it has to depend on the operator who, on the 
other hand, has to possess certain essential knowledge and 
skills. In effect, both technology and human beings work 
hand in hand. The technology of the refinery does not 
exclusively pace or direct work nor does it unilaterally 
dictate the quantity and quality of what is produced. 
Hence, we need to turn elsewhere in further search of 
evidence for some exclusive technological influence on the 
control of work. 
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9.2 TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AT WORK 
Administrative controls are taken here to refer to other 
strategies of control which are presumably not machine- 
based. Specifically, the concern is on bureaucracy. As 
Storey suggests, the dimensions of bureaucratic control 
namely "hierarchy, specialization and division of labour, 
impersonality and formalised rules are expressive of its 
essential control function" (1983: 134). 3 The intention 
here is not to venture into an analysis of the dimensions 
of bureaucratic control. Rather the interest is to 
explore the extent of influence of technological and 
social factors in these strategies for control. 
9.2.1 The hierarchy: 
According to Blauner, "The technological requirements of 
continuous-process production encourage a finely 
elaborated status structure ... 
" (1964: 148). Any 
vindication of this assertion seemed to be only in the 
extent that levels of authority existed in the refinery. 
For example, the new process plant, headed by an OC 
(Officer in-charge), was split into 4 areas. Each area 
was headed by a superintendent directly below whom was the 
area supervisor. Under the supervisor were 4 chief 
operators corresponding to the 4 shift groups. Each chief 
operator was in charge of all operators in his shift. 
Directly under him were the control operators. These were 
followed by the senior operators and lastly the external 
operators. Similar levels of authority also existed in 
the power plant and oil movement sections which, together 
with the process section, made up the production 
department. 
However subtle variations were noticed. In the oil 
movement section, variation laid in the existence of 
two 
categories of supervisors - day and shift supervisors, 
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whose location in the hierarchy was a subject of 
conflicting reports. Whilst day supervisors claimed they 
directed and left instructions for their shift 
counterparts, the latter vigorously emphasized their 
direct responsibility to the OC. Furthermore, whilst in 
the process plant, control operators were higher in the 
hierarchy than senior operators, the reverse was the case 
in power plant and utilities. Here control operators were 
lower in status than some external operators. This seems 
paradoxical in view of the fact that control operators 
directed - or in the preferred word of a supervisor, 
"advised" - outside operators from the control rooms. 
Typically, in each section of the maintenance department 
the lowest in the hierarchy were the crew. Further 
gradation existed for crews in each section. However, the 
crew grades did not seem to represent distinct levels of 
authority since, apparently, all crewmen were directly 
answerable to the foreman who was next up in the 
hierarchy. The number of crew responsible to the foreman 
varied from 1 to 5. Above the foreman was the supervisor 
who in turn was responsible to the superintendent. The 
superintendents themselves came directly under the OC of 
the section. 
The preceding description may be a simplification of the 
%reality' but does suggest that the status structure was 
not as "finely elaborated" as Blauner had argued. Even 
so, what is remarkable for our concerns is that the status 
structure in the old and new plants were similar. As was 
apparent, the new, larger, and more sophisticated refining 
technology had created the need for certain new skills and 
hence, probably, the potential for an elaborate status 
structure. Nonetheless, that the status structure had 
remained more or less intact indicates a premium on 
managerial choice. 
213 
It could be argued, for instance, that the control 
operator in the new plant is a new category which was a 
%fall-out' from the new technology. However, the point 
that in sections like oil movement, operators were rotated 
such that control operators worked outside at times and 
vice versa eliminates the uniqueness of this category. In 
addition, it is difficult to identify anything in the 
technology that would explain variation in the status of 
control operators in the different sections as noted 
previously, given that they all performed similar 
functions. Furthermore, neither the overlap of the roles 
of day and shift supervisors in oil movement section nor 
the one-to-one reporting of supervisors to 
superintendents, as was found in the process section, 
could be reasonably explained in terms of the technology 
of the new plant. In any event, similar reporting system, 
and duplications in the supervisory function, existed in 
the old plant. 
Blauner had also argued that "the existence of achievable 
higher positions ... serves to motivate those of lower 
status to accept the goals of the organisation and to act 
in accordance with its norms" (1964: 148). In Port 
Harcourt however, higher positions existed but, for many, 
the chances of getting into such positions were slim. A 
multi-faceted explanation could be proffered. In the 
first place, many of the new entrants were similarly 
qualified educationally and this, coupled with 
overmanning, made competition into the comparatively fewer 
higher positions stiffer. For the less educationally 
qualified, their chances were that much slimmer. 
Furthermore, the possibility of inter-subsidiary transfers 
between NNPC subsidiary companies, particularly for the 
higher cadre staff, casts doubts on the functionality of 
the internal labour market (ILM). These transfers 
increased the possibility that many local staff would be 
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side-tracked or forgotten and ostensibly meant that 
aspirations to such positions were, to say the least, 
cautious. 4 
An ILM, in the extent that it existed, was basically 
rudimentary. There did not seem to be any sustainable 
seniority procedure. Many of the newer employees had 
higher educational attainment than their %older' 
counterparts and were more likely to be promoted faster 
into higher positions. Moreover, the highly subjective 
nature of appraisals in conjunction with socio-political 
influences5 seemed to undermine the chances of 
institutionalising seniority. This notwithstanding, most 
of the interview respondents answered that workers were 
committed and compliant, thus corroborating Blauner's 
assertion that such workers accept organisational goals 
and norms. In any event, this would not necessarily be 
attributed to the possibility of career advancement as 
Blauner suggests. Apparently more relevant was the desire 
of workers to retain their jobs. 
Nevertheless, advancement in the hierarchy was still 
possible in the refinery. According to a number of 
respondents, an essential ingredient for progression along 
the job ladder was experience on the job. Each vertical 
movement was often accompanied by higher pay and status 
and, to some extent, higher responsibilities. 6 Advancement 
was internal; that is, it was always along the job ladder 
mapped out for the section/unit to which the individual 
worker belonged. For example, it was not the practice for 
control operators to transfer between sections. Given 
that these operators possessed similar skills, it is hard 
to see how this transfer limitation can be interpreted 
along technological determinist lines rather than as the 
choice of management. Further, since the career ladders 
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had not changed with the installation of the new plant, it 
is presumable that the mapping of the career routes was 
not essentially technologically determined. 
It could be argued that experience on the job (as a 
prerequisite for advancement) suggest the acquisition of 
relevant skills for the next higher position. However, 
there was nothing to suggest that these skills were 
necessarily technical in nature. Interviewees indicated 
that subjective factors like relationship with workmates 
were also considered during staff appraisals. Hence, 
requisite' skills may well be related to those needed for 
effective workplace interaction. In fact, although the 
possession of technical skills for operating the machinery 
was said to be important, there was little evidence that 
it guaranteed attainment to higher positions as would be 
presumed from a technology determinist perspective. 
Besides, it needs to be mentioned that although some 
respondents earned career advancement at the end of 
training, this was apparently not the case for the 
majority for whom training was basically to "enable them 
perform their job better" (Edet: August, 1991). 
Furthermore, attention also needs to be drawn to the point 
that, as was evident, some subordinates possessed more 
technical skills than their superordinate. In essence, 
technical skills did not actually determine an 
individual's placement in the hierarchy. 
9.2.2 The Supervision of Work 
A number of analysts posit fundamental changes in the 
supervisory function as a result of technological 
influence (Blauner, 1964; Woodward, 1970; Edwards, 1979). 
For continuous-process technology, Blauner takes the view 
that its very nature makes supervision unnecessary, if not 
impossible. He argues that the technology decentralizes 
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operations and, with much of the work done outdoors, 
individuals often work out of the range of their immediate 
supervisors. As a consequence, "Many of the co-ordinating 
and administrative functions of supervision fall to ... 
the leader of each ... work crew" (1964: 147). 
On the other hand, for Woodward, the transformation of the 
supervisory function arises from the building of "a 
mechanical framework for discipline and control ... 
" into 
the technology. According to her, this means that the 
decision concerning the quantity and quality of what is 
produced are an integral part of the machine design. As 
a result, "little discretion is left to the line 
supervisors responsible for the day-to-day operation of 
the plant" (1970: XI). It seems Woodward has taken, as her 
point of reference, the role of the traditional factory 
supervisor who, as the man in charge, had "complete 
authority in the workplace, without undue interference 
from the employer" (Child and Partridge, 1982: 5). 
Presumably, the continuous process technology robs the 
supervisor of this free hand and also discretion. In a 
similar vein, Edwards (1979) takes the view that, by 
virtue of the feedback systems, more advanced technologies 
inevitably assume monitoring and evaluation functions.? 
That is, the technology takes over the supervisory roles 
of inspection of work and detection of errors. 
To an extent, some support for these propositions were 
found in the refinery. As the analysis so far attempts to 
show, operations were decentralised. Also as Blauner 
observed, the majority of workers worked in the field; and 
there was evidence of team work. Generally, the state of 
the supervisory function in Port Harcourt seemed to be at 
variance with the traditional picture of that function. 
It was found that majority of both production and 
maintenance workers worked in groups. 86% of 
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questionnaire respondents indicated this (see Table 9.5). 
However, for maintenance workers, groups were small, often 
in twos or threes and varied according to the tasks to be 
done. On the other hand, there was a greater tendency 
towards permanent work groups amongst production workers. 
It appears Gallie's conclusion that "automation is 
conducive to a certain degree of team autonomy" (1978: 221) 
is equally applicable to the Port Harcourt refinery. 
Hence, although 95% of operators and 92% of maintenance 
workers who responded to the questionnaire stated that 
their jobs were supervised, when asked whether they were 
left alone to do their job without frequent supervision, 
99% and 97% of production and maintenance workers 
respectively claimed that they were (Table 9.6). Further 
evidence of less-frequent supervision was also found 
during the interviews. For instance, a process 
superintendent remarked thus: 
They have a free hand to do whatever they think is 
right ... But you just have to be able to justify 
every move you make. [The unwritten rule was], If you 
are in doubt, do not touch (Emeka: June, 1991). 
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Table 9.5 : Group Working 
Ques 7: Do you work in groups? 
Work in groups 
Do not 
No response 
Table 9.6 : Supervision of work 
86 
9 
5 
(n = 117) 
Ques 13 : Do you have a supervisor to supervise your 
job? 
17a Are you most times left alone to do your 
work without interference from the 
supervisor or foreman? 
Operators (%) 
Supervised 95 
(n = 79) 
Maintenance 
Workers (%) 
92 
(n = 38) 
less frequent 
supervision 99 97 
(n = 75) (n = 35) 
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The above, in effect, suggests a devolution of 
responsibilities to the workers. In this regard, some 
maintenance managers stressed that foremen and their work 
teams were left to plan their work. The foreman assigned 
tasks and instructed crew members on how the tasks would 
be carried out. The supervisor or higher level managers 
stepped in only when the problem was beyond the crew. 
Similarly in production, the chief operator and his team 
were given a free hand. The chief operator was 
responsible for allocating tasks and ensuring that they 
were carried out. 
However, the devolution of responsibilities seemed to be 
more extensive in production than in maintenance. The 
reason for this disparity probably lies in the nature of 
technological change which was also mainly in the 
production process. Whilst, according to a maintenance 
manager, "maintenance work has not changed; it has been 
the same attending to pumps and compressors" (Adah: 
August, 1991), the same cannot actually be said of the 
production worker. For instance, with regard to 
operators, Zuboff apparently agrees that: 
the technology ... gives them ... responsibility because it gives ... [access to] data-trends, 
averages, ... (The operator now 
has] all the data in 
front of him, has got to be able to understand the 
data to find things in it, to make sense of it, to 
know what to look for (1988: 299). 
Similarly, Child notes that the advanced technology offers 
"the incorporation of quality responsibilities into the 
production operatives role" (1987: 119). As he also 
suggests: 
The introduction of computer process control with 
visual feedback to central display areas replaces the 
need for visual supervision and manual adjustment of 
plant (1987: 119). 
In essence, production supervisors had lost their role of 
providing 'technical' direction to their subordinates. In 
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fact many subordinates in the refinery were certain that 
they already knew all that their jobs entailed. Hence 
questionnaire respondents' reasons for preferring to work 
without supervision included remarks like: 
I have the confidence that I can discharge my duties 
properly (questionnaire respondent no. 12); 
and; 
I am confident that with the knowledge and experience 
I have in the job, the standard required can be 
achieved without his [that is, the supervisor] 
physically being with me (questionnaire respondent 
no. 90). 
In addition, Gallie points to the potential of the shift 
system to enhance workers' sense of autonomy. For Gallie 
the shift system meant that "for long stretches each 
month, there was no contact whatsoever between the main 
managerial hierarchy and its process workers" (1978: 222). 
The picture in Port Harcourt was very close to this, 
though not exactly. There, direct contacts between the 
shift and day staff were minimal. Contact was almost non- 
existent during night shifts except for emergencies. 
However, during the day, managers kept tab on things by 
regular visits to the control rooms and to the plant work 
locations. Also modern communication systems aided 
management in control of activities. For example, a 
manager in process stressed that with his radio, which was 
left on most of the time, he was always aware of what was 
going on in the plant and was thus able to intervene as 
the need arose. Besides, the refinery shift superintendent 
was a visible, senior management figurehead after hours. 
In any case, these notwithstanding, there is no gainsaying 
that many operational responsibilities were devolved to 
work groups who developed some capacity for self 
regulation. 
That there was less emphasis on direct personal control 
seemed clear enough. But, it was not entirely clear 
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whether devolution of responsibilities resulted from a 
conscious pursuit of what McLoughlin and Clark (1988) 
referred to as "team autonomy" or from Friedman's 
"responsible autonomy". According to McLoughlin and 
Clark, "The former is an outcome which is the result of 
management strategy while the latter may be an outcome of 
both the independent technical constraints on work 
organisation and the informal influence of work groups as 
well as management strategy" (1988: 144). In any event, the 
fact that, as was reported, management had managed not to 
increase the numbers of supervisors, for instance, in 
spite of the larger areas they now had to cover, tends to 
suggest the pursuit of team autonomy. On the other hand, 
the claim by many supervisors and superintendents that 
they certainly would have needed more supervisors to be 
able to cope, if it were the technology in the old plant, 
suggests that the technology served as an enabling tool, 
even if the pursuit of team autonomy is presumed. Thus in 
view of this and from the premise that 'team autonomy', 
following McLoughlin and Clark's definition, could be 
subsumed under "responsible autonomy", it is conceivable 
that the latter was the case with regard to the Port 
Harcourt refinery. 8 
Increasing autonomy notwithstanding, it is notable that 
autonomy was still very limited. It would be recalled 
that, as indicated in section 9.1.2, daily activities of 
work teams were based on instructions from superiors. 
Essentially, this meant that most important decisions were 
taken elsewhere. For the work team, autonomy was 
exercised only within the context of an assigned job. The 
fluidity of team autonomy is also laid bare by Gallie's 
precise observation thus: 
During the night shift and at weekends the refinery 
was set for purely routine running, while important 
changes in the operation of the units were only 
carried out when day management was present. If the 
night shift encountered difficulties in maintaining 
the quality of the product, then it would be a matter 
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of the operations holding on and doing their best 
until the experts arrived. In cases of crises -if for instance a unit had to be shut down in an 
emergency -then the alarm signal would be given and 
key members of day management would rush from their 
beds to the refinery (1978: 224). 
Therefore, for production workers, the presumed greater 
autonomy, or perhaps discretion, of work teams would 
appear to be located in the 'privilege' of tending preset 
production units and in the opportunity they had for 
"holding on and doing their best" while waiting for the 
experts. 
In effect, management had retained the core of control 
while delegating peripheral responsibilities to work 
teams. Any decentralization of control that had occurred 
was mainly in the extent that functions had been divided 
between sections and units. In fact, there were evidences 
to suggest a tendency towards centralisation of control. 
For instance, it was possible for a manager in production 
to have direct access to work teams, or to information 
about the field, without reference to the relevant 
supervisor or even the chief operator. In addition to 
this was the increased visibility of operations. As a 
manager stressed: 
In the old plant you had to be on their back all the 
time. But here, I can just walk to the DCS [Digital 
Control System]; press 2 or 3 buttons and then will 
know what is happening. There is no point in my 
moving out, pursuing them (Ijah: July, 1991). 
Similarly, another enthused on the new system thus: 
It makes the work easy. One can easily call up past 
trends and locate errors. So it makes them [that is, 
the workers] more attentive and not do certain things 
because you are not there (Ojo: June, 1991). 
These, and many similar remarks are in congruence with 
Edwards' (1979) proposition that technical control enable 
the inspection of work and the detection of work errors. 
More generally, they provide further credibility to the 
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technical control thesis. As it appears, while technology 
had not really shifted the control function away from 
management, it had significantly altered the mode of 
supervision in the refinery. As the various comments 
indicate, close personal supervision had given way to a 
more detached supervision. Hence a senior manager in 
process noted that: 
the more modern the process control instrumentations, 
the lesser the need for the supervisor to have 
frequent contact with the operators (Anah: 
June, 1991) . 
Additional support for the technical control thesis came 
from the questionnaire data. For instance, when 
respondents were asked why they thought supervision was 
not frequent, 33% reckoned that the nature of the 
technology was responsible. This percentage was much 
higher than those who indicated other factors (Table 9.7). 
Presumably, the supervisor had faith in the capacity of 
the technology to control9 work activities. That is, the 
existence of technical controls instilled the confidence 
that things would not go drastically wrong without 
detection. On the other hand, it could be seen along the 
lines that the technology enabled subordinates to do their 
jobs in such a way that, as a respondent enthused, "the 
supervisor has more confidence in what his subordinates 
are doing" (Sule: August, 1991). 
However, paradoxically, the question concerning what 
enabled the supervisor to direct work without being 
physically present provided a completely different 
picture. As Table 9.8 shows, rules and regulations, 
ostensibly management, took the upper hand (53%) in this 
case. This paradox could become more explicable if one 
assumes the interaction of technological and human factors 
instead of the primacy of any one factor. 
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Table 9.7: Reason for less-frequent supervision 
Ques 17c: What is responsible (for less frequent 
supervisor) ? 
The nature of the technology 33 
Management's preference 4 
Workers' preference 10 
Other reasons 16 
Non-response 37 
Table 9.8: Reason for Indirect Supervision 
(n = 117) 
Ques 14b: If Yes (that is, the supervisor is able to 
direct the job you do without actually being 
with you most of the time), what enables the 
supervisor to do so? 
% 
The technical control system 29 
Rules and regulations 53 
Influence of work mates 3 
Other 7 
Non-response 8 
(n = 117) 
225 
9.2.3 The discipline and reward systems: 
These are formalized aspects of an organisations's control 
processes. They are employed for the regulation of 
behaviour and performance of the workforce. Behaviour and 
performance standards, which are regarded as essential for 
the achievement of organisational objectives, are defined 
by rules, and are set either unilaterally by management or 
jointly by management and employees. Compliance to these 
standards are rewarded whilst the disciplinary system 
serves in penalizing deviance. 
In Port Harcourt, non-adherence to work rules was taken 
seriously. Sanctions for non-compliance included warning, 
either oral or written, demotion or dismissal. Whilst 
serious offences warranted demotion or dismissal10, minor 
misconduct attracted verbal warning for most first 
offenders. More persistent "minor' offences earned 
written queries and it was against the rules not to reply 
to a formal query. Often, a reply was followed by a 
warning. However, it was at the discretion of the 
departmental of sectional heads to retain the reply within 
the department/section or to send same to Central Admin 
and personnel department either for further action or for 
filing in the offender's personal file. 
It is noteworthy that management provided the environment 
which made coping with the rules easier. For instance, 
although sleeping on night duty was a very serious 
offence, it was permissible for individuals to bring in 
entertainment instruments (though playing cards was 
prohibited) so as to reduce boredom and to ward-off sleep. 
In addition, overmanning probably ensured that management 
was able to overlook instances where members of work 
groups made arrangement to rest in turns. In effect, the 
disciplinary system was exposed to considerable social 
influences. 
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Besides, assumed in the disciplinary system is the 
existence of a reality' to which all parties must be 
responsive. The rules that define behavioural and 
performance standards are social constructs employed 
against actions which detract from or obstruct the pursuit 
of the reality. To this extent therefore, the 
disciplinary system was socially determined. However, 
rules also served to ensure adherence of laid down work 
procedures like the operating instructions discussed 
earlier. The relevance of technology in the refinery's 
system of discipline could therefore be presumed, in so 
far as work procedures themselves served to protect the 
machinery. 
Alongside the disciplinary system was the reward system. 
Included here are the wages, salaries, allowances, welfare 
facilities, sickness provisions, pensions, etc. In the 
refinery, pay was not determined by any objective system 
which rated workers or the jobs they did. Broadly 
speaking, salaries were unrelated to skills possessed by 
the individual. At the point of entry into the 
organisation, individuals were assigned to salary bands 
that were determined mainly by their educational 
qualifications than by the skills they possessed. Thus, 
workers in maintenance, production and administration, for 
example, found themselves together in the same salary 
bands, irrespective of the differences in their skills. 
Also, many interview respondents indicated that exposure 
to training did not guarantee promotion or more pay. In 
other words, acquisition of new skills often made little 
difference to the salaries of many workers. Factors 
generally considered in the determination of pay included 
years of service, performance, and relationship with work 
mates. In the event, any assessment of performance in the 
refinery could only be subjective in view of the lack of 
job descriptions. For the individual worker, the lack of 
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a clear description of one's job hampered the formulation 
of a clear notion of what the job expectations were. This 
meant that there was no criteria against which the worker 
could inwardly assess his performance. As a consequence, 
the worker was neither able to personally perceive when he 
needed to improve his work performance nor did he have a 
coherent basis for making pay demands. This highlights 
the one-sidedness of pay bargaining in the organisation. 
In any event, for our concerns, what is more remarkable is 
that, as with the disciplinary system, the predominant 
influence on the reward system was essentially social. 
Determining who was rewarded, how the reward was to be 
made, and the content of the reward are complicated socio- 
political undertakings. In fact, one could deny any 
relevance of technology in the refinery's reward system 
particularly since, as it was discovered, the basic tenets 
of the payment system had not changed with the 
commissioning of the new plant. 
9.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the extent of the impact of 
technology on various dimensions of work control. It 
recognized the importance of technology in control 
matters. The new system had altered the nature of work 
supervision and control essentially by encouraging 
devolution of responsibilities to workers lower down the 
hierarchy and by being supportive of group working. On 
the other hand, for management, technical controls 
lessened the need for frequent contacts with operatives 
and increased the visibility of activities. 
However, it was suggested that any argument of 
technological dominance is not sustainable. For instance, 
administrative control strategies like the status 
structure, and the discipline and reward systems 
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experienced very little, if any, technological influence. 
Rather, social factors intervened. As was also suggested, 
placement in the hierarchy was essentially socially 
determined. Similarly, social considerations were 
significant in the discipline and reward systems. 
It is possible to argue that the nature of the process 
technology, in which processes were interdependent, 
necessitated group or team work amongst workers. In this 
regard, Blauner notes the "collective responsibility for 
the total operation ... 
" (1964: 179) since "the unique 
function of each operator in enmeshed in a network of 
interdependent relations with the function of others" 
(1964: 173). Similarly, Gallie observes that: 
no individual team member produces something that can 
be seen as deriving uniquely from him. He is 
responsible for one of several processes that must be 
carried out simultaneously if the work is to be 
successful (1978: 220). 
In other words, that an individual's contribution to the 
work process could not be easily isolated and that workers 
had to work in groups are attributable to the technology. 
However, there was no evidence to suggest that working in 
groups or teams was a new phenomenon that accompanied 
technical change. This mode of work organisation was 
carried over from the old plant. Besides, that some 
groups of workers worked in permanent work teams whilst 
grouping varied for others, suggests the dependence of 
such work arrangements, to a significant extent, on human 
decisions. 
Overall, a basic tenet of the interactive thesis seems to 
have been satisfied. As the preceding analysis attempted 
to show, both social and technological factors seem 
relevant, albeit in varying degrees, in the different 
dimensions of work control. On one hand, the influence of 
technology is manifest in the existence of technical 
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control systems which, most crucially, impacted on the 
mode of supervision. On the other hand, social relevance 
is evidenced, not only in its prominence in the discipline 
and reward systems, but also in the point that, in the 
final analysis, the extant control system owed much to 
choice -a very social endeavour. As was apparent, the 
technology made social choice possible by providing the 
opportunity for options to be chosen from. Similarly, the 
social enabled the existence and provided environment for 
the technological. 
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NOTES (9) 
1. Conflicting typologies are apparent. For instance, 
it is not very clear whether Woodward' s "processes of 
control" could be equated to Edward's "systems of 
control" or types of control. 
2. Impersonal administrative control presumably 
corresponds to bureaucratic control under which all 
the elements of Edward's 'system control' could also 
be subsumed. 
3. This list is not exhaustive. Storey (1983) has 
criticized the strategy in which work control is 
assumed to involve only the shop floor labour 
process. He advocates the treatment of work control 
as a ""totality' involving both internal and wider 
elements, external to the organisation. 
4. It is perhaps important to mention that Gallie had 
similarly noted a "consequent reduction of the 
ambitious operator's hope of moving into management" 
(1978: 217) in his study of refineries in more 
advanced economies. Gallie's conclusion is of 
particular interest here because it was also 
underpinned by his observation of an "increased 
tendency to recruit highly qualified engineers into 
lower management positions" (1978: 217). This is 
similar to what obtained in the Port Harcourt 
refinery. Thus, it seems advanced refining 
technology demands high calibre staff, and the demand 
is the same no matter the level of advancement of the 
economy of the country in which it is put in use. 
5. These influences derived mainly from the ownership. 
By virtue of its ownership of the company, the 
government is able to bring its weight to bear on 
certain appointments and postings. As was evident in 
respondents' comments, this situation was a source of 
considerable dis-satisfaction. Besides, attendant to 
this government interventions was the relatively 
instability of postings and positions. The negative 
effects therein could scarcely be over-emphasized. 
6. Responsibilities, particularly for lower level 
employees, were often not clearly defined. In fact, 
as at the period of research, jobs had not been 
clearly evaluated and no detailed description of jobs 
existed. However, whilst some respondents hinted on- 
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going plans to evaluate jobs, clearly defined jobs 
roles did not seem to be an attribute of work in the 
refinery. As Blauner hinted, the "crew of operators 
... have collective responsibility for the total 
operation ... 
" (1964: 179). Similarly, Gallie 
observes that "work roles in a continuous-process 
plant are difficult to define with any precision, and in practice what is needed is a willingness to 
lend a helping hand where it is required rather than 
any rigid adherence to a specific set of operations" (1978: 219). Gallie's observation corresponds 
perfectly with what obtained in Port Harcourt. 
7. A point of difference between Blauner's argument, on the one hand, and Woodward and Edwards', on the other 
hand, seems noteworthy. Whilst for Blauner, the 
technology apparently necessitates a social 
arrangement which inevitably causes the change in the 
supervisory function, both Woodward and Edwards see 
technology as taking-on some of the function 
directly. 
8. It is notable that in the Port Harcourt refinery, the 
view would hold in so far as "informal influence of 
work groups ... 
" is excluded in the definition of 
"responsible autonomy". In the refinery, there was 
little evidence to suggest the informal influence of 
workers on the work arrangements. Even the 
supervisors themselves, whose roles were depleted, 
did not seem to mind. Apparently, greater autonomy 
for the work groups was seen as a legitimate 
aftermate of adopting a sophisticated, and necessary, 
technology. Many supervisors generally busied 
themselves, and were content, with handling 
administrative tasks like securing job orders for 
maintenance technicians; procurement of materials for 
operators; and collecting workers' monthly dry 
rations -a welfare pack provided by management. 
9. In any case, many managers were quick to emphasize 
that the technical controls were used mainly to 
control the performance of the plant, not necessarily 
the workers themselves. This view was re-echoed by 
a superintendent thus: "Actually the idea is not to 
nose around what operators were doing. The idea [of 
calling up information from the system] is to correct 
lapses or errors" (Ugoh: August, 1991). 
10. The use of these sanctions was rare. During the 
study, only one case of demotion was mentioned. But, 
even this affected the individual concerned in terms 
of status alone. His salary was unaffected. The 
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rarity in the employment of this sanction is hard to 
explain. Perhaps, management saw no opportunity for 
taking such draconian action. As already indicated, 
workers, generally, seemed to comply with the 
rules. 
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CHAPTER 10 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGY 
According to Dunlop (1958), workplace industrial relations 
is concerned with the establishment and administration of 
rules by actors who include employers, employees and/or 
their representatives, and the state. In his systems 
approach, Dunlop recognizes technology as one of the 
external environments which play a decisive role in 
determining the industrial relations system. It is 
therefore presumable that a change in any of the 
%influencing' environments would impact on the rule-making 
and administration processes. This chapter examines the 
extent to which the industrial relations in the refinery 
was affected by the new technology. In an attempt to 
examine the roles and relative importance of the 'actors' 
in these rule-making and administration processes, the 
chapter first explores the path of industrial relations 
development in Nigeria. The aim is to highlight the trend 
and aspects of the state's influence. As the discussion 
seeks to show, the government wields enormous influence 
and, to a significant extent, dictates the current system 
which permeates both the public and private sectors of the 
economy. Following this is an account of the industrial 
relations system in the Nigerian oil industry generally 
and the refinery in particular. This leads us to the 
examination of the implications of the new technology on 
the refinery's system of industrial relations. This is 
against the background of propositions and suggestions in 
the developed economies. Essentially, the neutrality of 
technology in the refinery's industrial relations arena is 
suggested. 
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10.1 THE COLONIAL LEGACY 
Collectivisation amongst Nigerian workers was already 
discernable by the 1890s, but the earliest known formal 
trade unions were the civil service union formed in 1912 
and the Nigerian Railway Native Staff Union in 1919. 
There are conflicting views regarding the reason for 
unionisation. Whilst according to Yesufu, "the main 
reason ... was merely to match the existence of such 
institutions elsewhere" (1962: 32), some other analysts 
suggest the need of workers to improve their condition of 
work (Ubeku, 1983; Imaga, 1990). Whatever the reason for 
organising, it appears their relationship with the 
colonial employers was not exactly adversarial. For 
instance, the central aim of the Railway Union was: 
To promote official interests and welfare of the 
members of the staff and to inculcate in them the 
principles of devotion to duty and loyalty to 
government ... (ToKunboh, 1966 : quoted in Ubeku, 1983: 60). 
In any case, the employers were not necessarily 
sympathetic to the plight of workers nor were they more 
accommodating. Rather it seems workers recognized their 
no-win position in their relations with their employers. 
In fact, the word 'native' attached to the title of the 
Railway Union seems to suggest elements of friction and a 
search for a common identity. 
The legalisation of the trade union movement by the 
British colonial government was the watershed in the 
development of trade unions in Nigeria. The government's 
apparent interest in labour relations culminated in the 
passage of the Trade Union Ordinance, 1938. This 
Ordinance provided legal backing to Trade Unionism. 
Although it did not explicitly provide for union 
recognition, the Ordinance specified the rights and 
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obligations of unions in labour-management relations. 
Invariably, it contributed to the rapid growth of union 
organising which subsequently followed. 
However, this was a qualified growth. Growth was only to 
the extent that the Ordinance created greater awareness 
amongst workers about the advantages of collectivisation. 
There was no real growth in union strength in terms of 
effectiveness. The failure of the Ordinance to specify 
both the structuring of unions in terms of types and the 
modalities of their functioning led to the proliferation 
of unions whose membership were either too few or were 
variegated', and whose leadership were unskilled and 
inexperienced. In the circumstance, the unions were weak 
and unstable and were unable to make any significant 
contribution to labour-management relations apart from 
their pursuit of bread and butter issues (Akpala, 1982). 
As Ubeku also comments, many unions were formed mainly for 
the purpose of collectively making specific demands, most 
unions fizzling out soon after the end of the demand. In 
any event, the legalization of union activity also marked 
the beginning of more militant tendencies amongst unions. 
Another addition to the framework of industrial relations 
during the colonial was the passage of the Trade Disputes 
(Arbitration and Enquiry) Ordinance, 1941. This laid down 
the procedures for the settlement of disputes which 
collective bargaining failed to resolve. In any case, no 
government legislation provided a definitive framework for 
collective bargaining process or its resulting collective 
agreement. Apparently, it was assumed that the generation 
of collective bargaining from labour-management relations 
was automatic. Also, it seems the government presumed 
plant-level bargaining. This was in view of the fact that 
no Employers Association existed until 1957, when the 
Nigerian Employers Consultative Association, NECA, was 
formed. 
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In digression it needs to be stated that the late 
development of employers' association is not surprising 
and is quite explicable. Government in Nigeria was, and 
still is, the largest single employer and this enabled it 
to dictate the pace in industrial relations. Smaller 
employers were compelled to operate within the broad 
framework set out by government and therefore saw little 
need for collective action. Once the employer followed 
government guidelines, he was reluctant to enter into any 
bargaining with unions, preferring autonomy in the 
determination of terms and conditions of work in his 
enterprise. 
Following the 1941 Ordinance was the creation, in 1942, of 
the Department of Labour, charged with the responsibility 
of "enforcing labour legislation in the country and of 
reporting to, and advising the administration on trade- 
union development, the state of industrial relations ... 
" 
(Ubeku, 1983: 108). Whilst the department favoured joint 
consultation, it did not interfere with negotiations. It 
featured only as a conciliator or appointed arbitrators 
when the parties in labour relations were embroiled in 
disputes. This state apparatus could only persuade, not 
compel, the different parties. In cases where the state 
provided conciliation and arbitration services, the 
resulting awards were not legally binding and feuding 
parties were free to go back on settlements. 
Hence, the system of industrial relations in Colonial 
Nigeria was essentially voluntarist, fashioned after the 
British model but devoid of constructive collective 
bargaining. However, a major shift was to occur after 
independence in 1960 and beyond. 
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10.2 THE 'NEW' INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 
It is argued that the desire for rapid industrialisation 
against the background of scanty resources led the 
Nigerian government at independence to occupy the centre 
stage in the country's industrial relations (Yesufu, 1981; 
Akpala, 1982; Ubeku, 1983). The dominant reasoning was that 
the government had to "intervene in economic matters to 
protect and promote the public interest and for achieving 
a united, strong and self-reliant nation, a great and 
dynamic economy, a just and egalitarian society, a land of 
bright and full opportunities for all citizens and a free 
and democratic society" (Akpala, 1982: 65-66). In the 
country's industrial relations context, the fulfilment of 
these objectives was translated into the jettisoning of 
the pre-independence laisser-faire approach for a more 
interventionist stance. As Akpala also aptly puts it: 
Government would no longer remain a passive observer 
in the labour market, but would go beyond its 
traditional referee's function and discharge its 
leadership role both as a major employer and as the 
guardian of the nation's wealth (1982: 66). 
The first indications of a clear departure from the 
voluntarist ethic is provided the Trade Disputes 
(Emergency Provisions) Decree, 1968, and its amendment, 
Decree No. 51,1969. Probably in an effort to minimize 
industrial unrests which was then becoming commonplace2, 
the Decrees made the procedures for declaring trade 
disputes difficult and at the same time compulsory. That 
is, the procedures must be exhausted before disputes were 
declared. When this happened, the Decree also introduced 
deadlines for the settlement or, otherwise, referral of 
such disputes to arbitration. Hence, speed in the 
settlement of disputes was of the essence, understandably 
so in view of the emergency situation created by the 
Nigerian civil war then. Furthermore, the Decrees banned 
strikes and lockouts. It made arbitration compulsory and 
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removed the freedom of employers and employees or their 
representatives to back out of conciliation agreement. 
However, any award arising from arbitration was still not 
regarded as the final stage for the settlement of 
disputes. All collective agreements were to be 
implemented only with the prior approval by the 
government. In a way, these provisions tended towards 
curtailing the capabilities of the two parties to test 
their strengths during disputes. They also seemed to make 
the bargaining strength of the two parties, to an extent, 
irrelevant. 
Some encouragement for collective bargaining was to come 
with the enactment of the Trade Union Disputes Decree, 
1976. By the Decree, it became compulsory that copies of 
all collective agreements, reached between the parties, on 
labour-management relations must be deposited with the 
government. The Decree also provided for the 
establishment of a permanent Industrial Relations Panel. 
This represents a shift away from the previous ad hoc 
arrangements. The new institution was expected to be more 
perceptive and was mandated to be more aggressive with 
their arbitration services so as to salvage order before 
it actually broke down. Arbitration tribunals were to be 
appointed from the permanent panel whose membership 
included two representatives each of employers and 
workers. Presumably, this arrangement would give the two 
parties equal chances for participation in arbitration 
exercises. However, in the event of an award by an 
arbitration tribunal which was unacceptable to any of the 
parties, the objecting party could appeal to a new quasi- 
judicial body, the National Industrial Court (NIC). Any 
decision by the NIC was final. 
Evident in the foregoing is the Nigerian government's move 
from the pre-independence voluntarist approach through to 
a gradual but ultimately successful introduction of 
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compulsion in the settlement of disputes. As Oribabor 
argues, the implications of post-independence Nigerian 
government's labour policies are that: 
the right to strike action, one of the necessary 
conditions for effective collective bargaining, is 
virtually outlawed. Industrial peace and harmony 
must now be positively created by state regulation; 
cooperation becomes a legal duty and employers and 
labour both have an obligation to collaborate at 
work, enforceable by the state, when necessary 
(1987: 262). 
Another area where the government also manifested its 
intention to shape the country's industrial relations 
system was in the trade union organisation. A first step 
in this direction was the promulgation of the Trade Union 
Decrees, No. 31,1973. The Decree stipulated rigorous 
procedures for the formation and registration of unions as 
well as made provisions for their recognition. With the 
Decree, employers were expected to accord registered 
unions recognition or face this being done by compulsory 
order. Furthermore, by a different Decree, namely, the 
Trade Dispute (Essential Services) Decree No. 23,1976, 
employees in 'essential services' like electricity, water 
supply, medical, police, prison and fire services were 
banned from joining unions. However, certain employees 
who were grouped in this category, namely the petroleum 
and banking industries, were permitted to unionize but 
conditionally. Such unions faced proscription if they 
failed to give their employers at least 15 days notice 
before embarking on industrial action. More importantly, 
the failure of workers in the petroleum industry to comply 
with the statutory machinery for the settlement of 
disputes was seen as a calculated attempt to disrupt the 
country's economy. It therefore attracted a death penalty 
as provided by the Petroleum Production and Distribution 
(Anti-Sabotage) Decree No. 35,19753. 
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The Decrees notwithstanding, chaos still plagued the 
organisation of labour in Nigeria. This led the 
government to revoke all registrations and derecognized 
unions by its Trade Unions (Central Labour 
Organisations)(Special Provisions) Decree, 1976. 
Following this was the restructuring of the trade union 
organisation by Decrees Nos. 21 and 22 of 1978. The 
restructuring resulted in the grouping of about 1000 
previously existing trade unions into 42 industrial unions 
(among which were 15 Senior Staff Associations, 4 
Professional Unions, and 9 Employers' Associations), all 
with national outlook, Government also established one 
central labour organisation, the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC). Moreover, it appointed a Trade Unions Registrar 
with the responsibility for monitoring the functioning of 
the unions. This was to ensure that government's labour 
policies were complied with. Whilst some analysts frown 
at this apparent hoodwinking of the labour movement 
(Oribabor, 1987; Imaga, 1990), the government's 
involvement in trade unions restructuring and organisation 
along industry lines seems to have won some support. Thus 
Akpala vigorously argues that: 
Since trade unions are economic and social 
organisations and are part of the industrial system 
and important in the productivity quest, they equally 
need better, regulated, structured planning. Hence 
the problem of choice of trade union system is not 
just to choose industrial unionism. It is also one 
of bringing planning to bear on union development. 
And since the state represents both enterprise and 
workers and other social and economic institutions, 
it seems to have an on-going responsibility to 
facilitate trade union structural planning based on 
industrial unionism (1982: 177). 
Structuring of unions along industry lines is credited 
with a number of advantages. For instance, Yesufu reckons 
that by organising along industry lines, "the process of 
unionisation has been simplified for the workers and the 
problem of courting the displeasure of the employer 
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because of trade union activity has been greatly reduced" 
(1981: 217). Moreover, industrial unionism has been 
credited with facilitating the process of economic 
planning, strengthening unity in trade union membership, 
as well as simplifying collective bargaining (Salamon, 
1987). In other words, industrial unionism tends to 
create closer ties between a union and the industry it 
represents. Also, the incidence of rivalry, tension and 
competition between unions in the same organisation, which 
seems to be the case when union organisation is along 
craft or occupational lines, is eliminated; and the 
adverse effect of the dearth of trained and experienced 
union leaders is cushioned. With regard to collective 
bargaining, industrial unionism enables better integration 
between the two levels of bargaining - industry and plant 
or organisational levels - and makes negotiations simpler. 
Besides, productivity bargaining and agreement is made 
easier when only one Union acts as the workers' bargaining 
agent (Akpala, 1982). 
In any event the government's efforts to encourage 
collective bargaining has consistently been at a level 
beyond the workplace. No machinery for orthodox 
collective bargaining in the workplace itself has been 
provided. That this is so is probably because the 
government did not want to be seen as directly interfering 
with the day-to-day affairs of organisations. 
Nonetheless, the government had continued to enunciate the 
principle of free collective bargaining. Evidence of 
encouragement of the principle by the government is its 
legislative provision of collective bargaining machineries 
in The Wages Boards and Industrial Council Decree No. 1, 
1973. The Decree provided for the establishment of Joint 
Industrial Councils (JICs). The JICs are industry- 
specific, union-management bodies set up for purposes of 
negotiations and consultations on substantive issues like 
wages and conditions of service. In any case, government 
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is still able to influence this socio-economic process in 
that the Decree establishing the bodies also provided for 
the establishment of two Wages Boards, namely the 
Industrial Wages Board and the National Wages Board for 
the private and public sectors respectively. The 
principal function of the boards is the regulation of 
wages and other conditions of service where necessary. 
However, the overriding objective of the Wages Boards is 
to work out and recommend minimum wages payable. 
In addition, the government established the Prices, 
Productivity and Incomes Board (PPIB). This is a tri- 
partite board comprising the state, employers and the 
unions. The emphasis here is on productivity, which 
government sees as of utmost importance to economic 
growth. By their participation in the PPIB, employers and 
labour are obliged to ensure the implementation of 
negotiated agreements arising from the PPIB deliberations. 
In summary, the preceding suggests that the Nigerian 
government has sought to integrate the objectives of the 
state with those of industry and its members by means of 
a 'new' industrial relations framework. The realisation 
of the national objectives is deemed possible only if 
industrial peace and harmony prevail. Determined to 
ensure that this happens, the government have had to play 
a more pervasive role in the country's world of work. It 
has systematically rationalised labour-management 
relations by imposing a multitude of legislative and 
statutory limitations on labour relations. We now turn to 
briefly examine how this 'new' industrial relations system 
has filtered through to the Port Harcourt refinery. 
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10.3 THE CHARACTER OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE 
REFINERY 
The system of industrial relations in the refinery is much 
in line with the government's stipulates although it may 
not be claimed to be an exemplar of industrial relations 
practice in Nigeria. In what follows, an attempt is made 
at an overview of the system in terms of union structure 
and organisation, and the labour-management relations or, 
more specifically, the machinery for collective 
bargaining. 
10.3.1: Union Structure and Organisation: 
Workers in the refinery belong to industrial unions - 
National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas (NUPENG) for 
junior staff, and Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff 
Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) for senior staff. As 
is evident, union organisation was not along occupational 
lines. In other words, the unions were multi - 
occupational. Although workers were not obliged to join, 
the majority of workers were union members. There were 
three levels of union organisation, namely, the national; 
corporate; and plant levels. 
At the plant level, union leaders were elected, part-time 
officials. PENGASSAN official included the chairman, the 
secretary and six others, one of whom occupies a new 
office, the industrial relations officer. On the other 
hand, NUPENG had six union officials, the chairman, 
secretary and four others. Although union officials were 
not full - time officers, arrangement existed which 
enabled them to find time for their union duties. There 
were no designated shop stewards. This was probably 
because there were no distinct occupational groups that 
needed separate representation. Besides, as would be 
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seen, there was no need for "someone who has 
responsibility for the conduct of the initial stages of 
negotiations in the workplace... " (Goodman J., and 
Whittingham T., 1973: quoted in Salamon, 1987: 158). 
Officials of the two unions represented their respective 
members on industrial relations matters at the local 
level. Relations between the two unions appeared cordial 
as they saw themselves as "working in the same environment 
and pursuing the same course" (Nze: August, 1991). The 
local unions gave *situation reports' to branch officials 
at the corporate level as the need arose. The financial 
security of the unions was maintained via a check-off 
system approved by both management and government, the 
latter having made statutory provisions in this regard. 
In general terms, the unions at the Port Harcourt refinery 
represented sectional interests, possessed the means by 
which the different interests were reconciled, as well as 
enjoyed almost a 100% membership. These elements, 
according to Batstone and Gourlay (1986), are indicative 
of union sophistication. Another element of union 
sophistication in Batstone and Gourlay's scheme, which was 
also suggested by respondents in the refinery, was inter - 
union cooperation between the two existing unions. 
However, some other elements of union sophistication, a la 
Batstone and Gourlay, were still lacking. For instance, 
when different interest groups are lumped together into 
only two unions, as was the case in the refinery, it is 
highly improbable that all the different interests would 
be uniformly represented. Besides, in so far as the 
existence of shop stewards suggests a representation of 
different interests, inadequacy in such representation 
could be claimed. This is in view of the fact that, as 
stated above, shop stewards did not exist in Port 
Harcourt. Further, from the premise that the existence of 
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shop stewards is an essential component of union 
sophistication (Batstone and Gourlay, 1986) and that "an 
effective workplace union organisation may require a 
hierarchy of stewards and possibly one or two full- time 
stewards ... " (Batstone and Gourlay, 1986: 25), the unions 
in the refinery could be seen as less sophisticated and 
less effective. 
10.3.2 The Collective Bargaining Machinery: 
Collective bargaining has been defined as: 
all negotiations and consultations which take place 
between the employers and/or management on the one 
hand and the workers or their representatives on the 
other hand, for determining all aspects of working 
conditions including wages, job security, welfare and 
growth of enterprise, productivity and general staff 
welfare (The 214th ILO Bargaining Convention, 1981, 
No. 154: quoted in Imaga, 1990). 
This suggests that most forms of management-labour 
interactions could be subsumed under collective 
bargaining. In the refinery, interactions between 
management and workers or their representatives occurred 
both by formal consultation and by informal meetings and 
discussions. Consultation between management and labour 
took place on a monthly basis through the local Joint 
Consultative Committee (JCC). Joint consultation ensured 
regular communication between management and the unions 
and provided opportunity for both parties to submit and 
discuss issues which were of interest to them. As Akpala 
remarks, joint consultation enables "workers ... to 
participate in decision making over matters in which the 
two sides seek each others' co-operation and common 
understanding ... 
" (1982: 150). Similarly, a top 
management participant in JCC meetings took the view that 
it was a forum in which management discussed production 
targets (Eke: June, 1991). 
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On the other hand, a union official saw the JCC meetings 
as that in which: 
management makes suggestions to us on how to educate 
our members to be law-abiding and to make the best 
use of the facilities. In turn, we tell management 
the expectations of our members. At the end of the 
day, if both management and workers meet their 
obligations, the ultimate aim of high productivity 
would be achieved (Eno: August, 1991). 
It appears the opportunity for participation which has 
been provided by joint consultation had resulted in 
greater alignment of both union and management goals. For 
instance, the union leader enthused: 
We are not only asking for what management can do for 
us, we are also educating our members as to the 
responsibilities on them. In terms of their job, 
what is expected of them - issues such as 
punctuality, high productivity ... so [we are] not 
only asking for what the management can do, but also 
what we can contribute ... to make the company or the 
corporation ... a stable and progressive 
organisation. 
In a similar vein, another union official stressed that 
they were: 
committed to see that NNPC is developed ... competes 
with any industry within the oil sector; committed to 
see that our staff work hard, dedicate themselves to 
duty and have a sense of belonging ... (Nze: 
August, 1991). 
Such was the level of commitment of workers to 
organisational goals. Thus, government's objectives 
seemed to be on a success path. The problems of union 
leaders became, not just that of winning concessions for 
their members but also, according to one of them, that of 
being able "to communicate the different aspects of 
management decisions to members without undue industrial 
unrest" (Atta: July, 1991). Management seemed to have 
aided union leaders in the performance of this task by its 
strategy of sending union officials on industrial 
relations courses at its own expense. 
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During the JCC meetings, the issues that came under 
discussion were mainly local welfare matters like 
transportation, canteen and medical services, as well as 
other mundane matters that arose from the operations such 
as fire and safety (see Appendix 3). Generally, both 
management and the unions tended to abide by the consensus 
reached at the meetings. From management's point of view, 
employees' welfare was of particular importance. As a top 
manager explained: 
Apart from the fact that you get better productivity 
from any staff who is happy, you do not want to get 
staff all frustrated to the point where they could 
cause a lot of damage (Eke: June, 1991). 
In any case, although it is conceivable that more 
substantive issues bordering on pay and fringe benefits 
would probably have greater impact on the level of 
satisfaction (Goldthorpe et al, 1968), these issues were 
not discussed at the local plant level. Their 
determination was essentially a corporate affair and was 
left for negotiations which took place only at the 
corporate(branch) level. In essence, collective 
bargaining took place at the refinery only to the extent 
that formal consultations on local matters occurred. 
Substantive issues came under negotiation. The members of 
management's negotiation party were drawn from all the 
subsidiary companies under the NNPC corporate and were 
usually heads of personnel in these subsidiaries. 
Similarly, on each union's side, representatives were 
drawn from union officials in each of the subsidiaries and 
were led in the negotiations by their national secretary 
who was not a staff member of the corporation. As a 
member of the personnel staff emphasised, the secretary 
and the union's national president, who also attended the 
negotiation meetings, were "really not negotiating 
directly with the company as such, but are only helping 
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the branch union officials in their negotiation with 
management" (Dabo: July, 1991). This explanation seems 
confused but becomes more intelligible if it is seen from 
the premise that most of the union officials were 
relatively inexperienced and so needed the assistance of 
probably more skillful negotiators. 
Items for negotiation included salaries, overtime rates, 
fringe benefits and other allowances. The two unions 
negotiated with management separately although the 
framework for negotiation remained similar. In addition, 
salaries and fringe benefits were negotiated separately. 
In keeping with the government's regulations, all 
agreements reached were sent to the Ministry of Labour for 
approval before they could be implemented. Perhaps it 
needs to be added that the government's system of more or 
less unilateral wage fixing (Yesufu, 1981; Imaga, 1990) in 
the public sector had the effect of upsetting negotiation 
agreements. This was particularly so in NNPC which, on 
the one hand, practised wage bargaining as occurred in the 
private sector but, on the other hand, was regarded as a 
public organisation and so within the government's wage- 
setting umbrella. Thus, a top level manager (Uche: 
May, 1992) stressed that whilst other companies in the oil 
sector, like Shell, were more dynamic, reacting to 
international factors like exchange rates and hence making 
adjustments without prior negotiations, and were also in 
competition with each other, the NNPC was not responsive 
to such factors. Rather, it responded to "power dictates" 
and hence determination of workers remuneration was "very 
erratic, decided without reference to market fluctuations 
... [This] results in extreme 
distortions in pay ... which 
do not correspond with those of other [oil] companies". 
Hence, according to him, during negotiations, the unions 
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posture was often that of demanding that management should 
"catch up with the rest! ". On the other hand, management 
posture was: 
I am what I am. Please compare me with others in the 
public sector. 
The management could afford to take this stance because 
salaries and benefits in NNPC were said to be relatively 
higher, and conditions a lot better, than obtained in most 
public sector establishments. 
Aside from negotiations on substantive issues, a JCC also 
existed at the corporate level. In this also, membership 
on both sides was drawn from all the subsidiary companies. 
The committee at this level met quarterly and discussed 
issues not normally covered during negotiation. Like at 
the local level, issues discussed were mainly corporate 
welfare issues like estates, zonal clubs and staff 
housing. Besides, the corporate JCC adjudicated when 
difficulties in the interpretation of certain aspects of 
the conditions of service arose at the local level. 
However, it is noteworthy that the distinction between 
negotiation and consultation becomes less clear cut at the 
corporate level. The JCC at this level also discussed 
issues that would have normally been negotiated. 
In any event, a point needs to be made with regard to the 
multi - occupational nature of the unions and the scope of 
collective bargaining. As Batstone and Gourlay (1986) 
suggest, multi - occupation unions would be concerned with 
a broad range of strategic issues including interest in 
"the general strategies of the employer" (1986: 29). In 
Port Harcourt, there was no evidence to suggest that the 
unions showed any interest in probing management strategy. 
But, in the extent that the unions indicated commitment to 
the progress of the organisation, Batstone and Gourlay's 
suggestion could be seen as applicable to the Port 
Harcourt refinery. On the other hand, a multi - 
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occupation union seems unable to concentrate its efforts 
on the welfare of a particular occupation and, therefore, 
is less likely to "bargain more intensively and achieve 
greater control over factors relating most directly to the 
work situation" (Batstone and Gourlay, 1986: 29). This 
argument seems equally applicable to the refinery in so 
far as, aside from consultation over health and safety, 
there was little indication that issues bordering on the 
content of work, for instance, were bargained for. In 
essence, the mode of unionisation could have indirectly 
influenced the scope of bargaining. Relatedly, the 
structure of collective bargaining whereby only 
consultation, rather that 'hard' negotiation, occurred at 
the local level tended to deprive unions of a potential 
source of more influence. 
Overall, good pay and conditions and some degree of 
workers participation in, at least welfare, decisions had 
resulted in a significant level of cooperative 
relationship between management and workers. In fact, it 
does seem conceivable that the often assumed 'low trust' 
relationship between management and labour would be at an 
ebb and hence the existence of what could be regarded as 
a good industrial relations climate in the refinery. For 
our concerns, the question which arises is whether the 
application of new technology had affected this climate in 
any way. 
10.4 THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR IN THE REFINERY'S INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS SYSTEM 
In the advanced economies like Britain, various 
suggestions have been made regarding the effect of 
technological change on industrial relations. Some posit 
the erosion of traditional job boundaries which, it is 
claimed, tends to result in rivalry between competing 
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unions (McLoughlin and Clark, 1988; Sorge and 
Streeck, 1988). Also suggested are negative and/or 
positive implications for employment and manning levels 
which are thought to influence workers' reaction to 
technological change. In addition, effects and/or non- 
effects on collective bargaining are also suggested 
(Batstone et al., 1987; Willman, 1987). These suggestions 
together provide the background against which the 
implications of the acquired new technology is discussed. 
Following from the preceding section, the foci of analysis 
are the union organisation and the collective bargaining 
relationship of management and labour. 
Union organisation: 
The adoption of the new technology had not altered the 
structure of union organisation or the level of their 
influence. As was suggested in Chapter 7, the size and 
sophistication of the technology had led to increases in 
the employment of workers who were then equipped with a 
variety of skills through training. However, this did not 
lead to squabbles between rival unions seeking to win new 
members. This was because the new intakes simply fitted 
into the two existing unions according to their positions 
on the seniority scale and irrespective of their 
occupations or skills. Similarly, the erosion of job 
boundaries as occurred in instances when operators carried 
out mundane maintenance tasks or took over some 
supervisors responsibilities did not lead to union 
conflicts. In this case, there was no need for unions to 
bother about the defence of the job territories of their 
members. Apparently, any erosions of job boundaries, as 
a result of the technological change, were contained 
because the mode of union organisation ensured that inter- 
union conflict did not arise. 
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Collective bargaining relationship: 
The structure, pattern and scope of collective bargaining 
had remained essentially the same. With regard to the 
structure of bargaining, it was apparent that the 
government's prescribed guidelines were maintained. 
Further, the decision to acquire the new plant had 
occurred at a level beyond that in which collective 
bargaining normally took place. This, in effect, ruled 
out the possibility of any negotiations whatsoever with 
unions over the technological change. In addition, the 
bargaining structure meant that the issue was really not 
discussed at the local plant level. Even at the level in 
which negotiations occurred, terms and conditions were 
negotiated without reference to any inherent nature of the 
technology. 
it is presumable that because, as noted previously, both 
management and the unions saw the decision over technical 
change as within the sphere of managerial prerogative, 
there did not seem to be any point in bringing it in as an 
issue for bargaining. As Sorge and Streeck similarly 
argue, when technological change is seen as a managerial 
prerogative, "there is in principle nothing to negotiate" 
(1988: 32). In any case, Batstone and Gourlay make the 
point that "more sophisticated workplace organizations 
would negotiate more actively and over a wider range of 
issues concerning new technology than a less sophisticated 
organisation" (1986: 36). As already indicated, the unions 
in the refinery were not exactly very sophisticated. This 
limitation may, thus, also help account for the stability 
in the scope of collective bargaining since the unions 
were apparently unable "to intrude into areas which ... 
would be accepted as the sole preserve of management" 
(Batstone and Gourlay, 1986: 37). 
253 
As was apparent, the technological change did not raise 
new bargaining issues. The scope of bargaining was still 
confined to issues relating to pay and benefits. Even so, 
the majority of questionnaire respondents as well as many 
interviewees stated that the technology had no influence 
on their pay. This seems to point to the irrelevance of 
technological considerations during the negotiation rounds 
and appears to give credence to the view that the unions 
were unable or reluctant to use the new technology as a 
bargaining chip during their pay demands. 
In any event, whilst in some workplaces in Britain 
negotiation over technological change occur and often 
touch on the rationalisation of manning levels and the 
unions have anxiety over the training and/or retraining of 
their members (Davies, 1986), this was not the case in the 
Port Harcourt refinery. As indicated previously, 
management never intended to use technology to regulate 
labour. The issue concerning depletion of manning levels 
also did not arise. In fact, rather than destroy jobs, 
the acquisition of the new technology had created many 
more jobs. Besides, management's extensive training 
programmes for workers meant enskilling of the unskilled, 
and probably took care of any deskilling effects by 
reskilling those possibly deskilled. In essence, even 
though the unions were not sophisticated enough to impose 
control over technological change, management initiatives 
were quite favourable to the unions. The latter were 
saved from worries over preservation of skills, job losses 
and training provisions, all of which would have been 
important bargaining issues (Davies, 1986; Batstone et 
al, 1987; Willman, 1987). As a union leader emphasized: 
We do not see computerisation as a threat to our 
employment. There would not be any reason for 
management to lay off some staff especially because 
they require skilled staff if they are to be able to 
completely take over operations from the expatriate 
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contractors. Unless it is time for us to retire, we 
do not fear that management will lay off staff 
(Mgbeke: August, 1991). 
Hence, the security of jobs, coupled with training 
provisions meant a net gain for workers and may have 
contributed to the overwhelming acceptance of technical 
change even though change was not negotiated. Also, as a 
top manager argued: 
Most of these people are really products of our 
training programmes in preparation for the 
commissioning of the plant. It is unlikely that they 
would oppose the change (Onye: July, 1991). 
Besides, in a society where many are unskilled, 
technologically-related skills are held in high esteem, 
and individuals who possess such skills are regarded as 
bright and intelligent and have relatively high status, it 
is inconceivable that an opportunity which provides access 
to skills would be resisted. Relatedly, Bamber makes a 
relevant point that the acceptance of technical change as 
well as the right of employers to manage "may be found 
with unskilled workers and in new establishments ... 
" 
(1988: 209). 
It is notable that the unions, particularly the senior 
staff association, did not really feel left out in 
management decision making. This is evident in the 
following comment by a senior staff association official: 
Our members rank from fresh graduates to deputy chief 
officers. There is no way management can sit and 
work out ... a change in technology without 
involving 
our members. Our members are involved in the 
decisions, laying the plans, working out ... how the 
system will operate (Eno: August, 1991). 
Similarly, a top manager made the point that members of 
the management cadre are themselves workers and to that 
extent, "the differences between management and the unions 
[concern] differences in responsibilities and not 
differences in beliefs and feelings" (Uche: May, 1992). 
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These notwithstanding, none of the unions could be said to 
bargain from a position of increased strength because of 
technological change. Members of the senior staff 
association who were in the position to participate in the 
decisions leading to technical change seemed more 
committed to their responsibilities as organisation 
decision makers rather than to the trade union to which 
they were members. For this category of workers, it is 
feasible to argue that their membership of a union had 
more to do with social rather than economic 
considerations. That is, they joined the union because of 
social and perhaps psychological desire to belong to an 
organized community rather than a desire to be part of a 
collective protest group (Akpala, 1982). In effect, the 
association's influence on organisational decisions 
generally was very limited, indeed, far less than some 
union officials preferred to presume. 
The one area in which the intrinsic quality of the 
technology was apparently implicated was during 
%productivity' discussions at local JCC meetings. Even 
so, the presence of the new technology merely served to 
accentuate the productivity discourse which, in any event, 
had always been on the agenda long before the application 
of the new technology. During such meeting, management 
often made the point that the technology had taken over 
most of the manual and tedious jobs and hence, it expected 
that production targets should be reached with ease. On 
the other hand, unions agreed that they "could even beat 
that target" because of the new system but that this could 
occur: 
provided all the necessary equipment are in perfect 
working condition and basic welfare needs of staff 
are catered for by management ... The staff are not 
responsible for say a sudden mechanical failure of a 
machine which probably would require parts to be 
imported (Mgbeke: August, 1991). 
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In essence, both technology and social needs were 
considered relevant in the achievement of productivity 
targets. Evidently, the new technology was not treated in 
isolation of other work relations issues. In Bamber's 
words, "Technological change [was] not ... a discrete 
issue which can be dealt with seperately from most other 
issues associated with the employment relationship" 
(1988: 216). In Port Harcourt, the goals and interests of 
both management and workers were important, if not the 
most important, components of the productivity/technology 
discourse. 
CONCLUSION 
In the light of the foregoing, it is feasible to suggest 
the dominance of social-political factors in the shaping 
of the refinery's system of industrial relations and a 
general lack of effect of technology on the system. A 
review of the development of industrial relations in 
Nigeria revealed that the government more or less dictated 
the prevailing system. In the Port Harcourt refinery, the 
system of industrial relations was essentially an 
imposition by the government. Here, the mode of 
unionisation and the framework for collective bargaining 
were in line with government's stipulations. Also, the 
virtual "vetting' of collective bargaining agreements by 
the government probably served to instill a lot of caution 
in both management and the workers. 
Union organisation in the refinery was along seniority 
lines. In the circumstance, tension and rivalry, 
associated with occupational or craft unions co-existing 
in the same workplace, were avoided. However, the two 
resulting unions were each multi-occupational. It was 
suggested that this meant the unions had rather broad 
based concerns and interests. This, coupled with the 
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absence of shop stewards, made the unions less likely to 
uniformly protect the interests of all the different 
occupational groups under their fold. In essence, the 
mode of unionisation constrained the possibility of 
distinct occupational groups, possibly affected by 
technical change, to pursue their specific interests. 
Nevertheless, the mode of unionisation also meant that any 
violation, by the new technology, of boundaries between 
occupations within the same union mattered little. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the collective 
bargaining structure in which negotiation took place only 
at corporate level may have served to prevent 
technological change from becoming an issue for bargaining 
at the local plant level. Also notable is the tendency of 
negotiations at the corporate level to focus on issues of 
relevance to all the subsidiary companies. Technological 
change could not have been a relevant issue at this level 
of bargaining because not all the companies were exposed 
to it. In any event, it was also noted that 
organisational changes, including technological change, 
were regarded as management prerogatives and would 
therefore not even be brought up for bargaining. 
On the other hand, only consultation took place at the 
local level. Since management at this level was not even 
involved in the technological change decisions in the 
first place, the technology did not arise as an issue for 
consultation. Even after the technology became 
operational, "'management's right to manage' probably may 
have again prevented technology from being a consultation 
issue. In effect, even though the unions probably lacked 
the capacity, they also did not really have the 
opportunity to exert any influence on the technical 
change. However, in a similar vein, the technology could 
not influence the content of bargaining. 
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The inability of the technology to influence the content 
of bargaining could also be explained in terms of both the 
potentials of the technology itself and the management's 
initiatives. The technology created more jobs and 
provided the opportunities for acquiring new skills. It 
could therefore be argued that if the technological change 
had resulted in job losses, deskilling etc, then 
technology - linked issues probably would have been 
prominent in the refinery's industrial relations scene. 
Implicit here is some relevance of the technology. This 
is in the extent that the opportunities it provided 
prevented potential upsets in the industrial relations 
climate. Nonetheless, the relevance of the social 
dimension is even more significant and is evidenced in, 
for instance, the point that management's training 
programmes made reskilling and enskilling possible and 
hence constrained any deskilling effects of the new 
technology. In other words, it is feasible to suggest 
that technology - linked issues were avoided because the 
management's training programmes prevented skill demands 
from becoming a worry to the unions and hence a potential 
issue to be raised during bargaining rounds. Futhermore, 
it could also be argued that if management's intention for 
acquiring the technology had been for labour regulation, 
then technology would have possibly come up as, at least, 
a consultation, if not a negotiation, issue. That labour 
regulations was not part of management's intention for 
acquiring the new technology may have therefore also 
contributed in preventing technology from impacting on 
collective bargaining. 
Overall, other than the opportunities which technology 
enables, its effect on the system of industrial relations 
in the refinery was very limited. Inspite of the high 
premium placed upon modern imported technology, neither 
the mode of union organisation nor the structure or scope 
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of collective bargaining had been affected by the 
applications of the new refining plant at Port Harcourt. 
Nevertheless, it could still be suggested that technology 
is relevant even if it is only in the extent that it 
enabled the existence of conditions like the creation of 
many new jobs and skills and rendering tasks less 
strenuous, all of which aided the sustenance of the good 
industrial relations climate. Similarly, the profound 
influence of social factors in the shaping of the 
refinery's system of industrial relations was very 
evident. In essence, it is perfectly feasible to suggest 
that both the technological and the social are relevant in 
the refinery's industrial relations system. That is, even 
though social factors undoubtedly appeared to have an 
upper hand in the system of industrial relations which 
existed at the Port Harcourt refinery, it is still 
possible to make a case for an interactive approach in the 
analysis of the system. 
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NOTES (10) 
1. The Ordinance provided that 5 persons could form and 
register a trade union and it was permissible to 
organise across occupations, industry, etc. 
2. Trade union leaders were turning politicians and 
those in Opposition were tending to use the trade 
unions as an instrument for sustaining their 
opposition. 
3. Although this Decree had never been repealed, it had 
never really been enforced. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION: THE INTERACTIVE APPROACH REVISITED 
The case study examined the extent of relevance of 
technology in the organisation of work at the Port 
Harcourt refinery. From the premise that sophisticated 
foreign technologies are desired for modernisation in the 
country, a high probability of technologies being 
determinate in the workplace was anticipated. Against 
this background, the study explored the reasons and 
strategies involved in deciding, choosing, implementing 
and operating the new refining technology in the Port 
Harcourt refinery. Specifically, the influence of the 
technology on the content of jobs, the control of work 
activities and on management-labour relations were 
investigated. The study found that although the 
technology in Port Harcourt is 'alien', the nature of its 
influence generally did not deviate significantly from the 
literature impression of what happens in its 'home' 
environment. Very importantly, although the source of 
technology tended to conjour images of perfection which 
were seen as deserving emulation, this still did not make 
the imported technology overly determinate. However, some 
influence of technology on certain dimensions of work 
organisation were discernable, even though at nearly every 
turn, a 'marriage' between the social and the technical 
was also evident. These give credibility to the 
interactive model, a tenet of which employed in the 
research posits, that both the technological and the 
social are relevant in workplace relationships. None is 
determinate, to the exclusion of the other nor is any a 
truly independent force. This chapter summarises the 
research findings, the arguments and the conclusions. 
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The technology factor in national and/or organisational 
development. 
As was pointed out in chapter 4, technology was seen in 
Nigeria as an imperative for modernisation. Hence, the 
emphasis was on the need for it to be "adequately 
harnessed for accelerated industrial development in the 
country" (Osifo, 1992: 3). Also, Osifo rightly notes that 
technology is "one of the composite input items used for 
the production of goods ... 
" (1982: 7). Thus, if 
technology is just 'one', then, there are likely to be 
others. It therefore does not seem safe to regard 
technology as all - determining. Certainly, the other 
input items' are also of some importance. Crucially, the 
human beings to operate the technology are as important as 
the technology to be put into use. 
Further, the expressed desire of the Nigerian government 
to adapt imported technology to the local environment is 
indicative of social relevance. Not only is it the case 
that the technology would not undertake the adaptation 
process on its own. Also remarkable is the point that the 
direction of adaptation is subject to human decision and 
choice. Infact, in the first place, choosing the 
technology is itself a social act and so also is the 
choice of technology mediated by social considerations. 
In other words, social conditions structure technological 
development. Besides, that the adaptation of the foreign 
technology to suit the local environment was suggested 
also tends to points to the non determinacy of technology. 
It thus appears feasible to argue that if the environment 
is not made conducive by social actors, then quite simply, 
the technology would not function effectively. Also, 
since the %environment' is multifaceted, including 
political, economic, social, cultural, and technological 
dimensions, it follows that technology cannot safely be 
seen as the exclusive mover of technological development. 
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Further, the principal reason for adopting the new 
technology at the Port Harcourt refinery was the desire to 
match the supply with the growing national demand for 
refined petroleum products. That is, a social need took 
recourse in a technological means for its satisfaction. 
Put differently, the new technology did not simply find 
its way into the refinery. The need for it had to be 
socially constructed first. Moreover, although the 
technology was chosen for its potential to enhance 
production, it did not by itself determine the achievement 
of this potential. Its achievement depended upon the 
decision of human ""actants' (Latour, 1991) 
The Choice And Strategies for the application of new 
technology. 
The acquisition of the new refining technology in Port 
Harcourt was stimulated by the desire to increase output 
of refined petroleum products. This led to the selection 
of a technology which was expected to enable the increase. 
As was apparent, what was needed was not just a properly 
assembled refining system. The capabilities of the 
technological system also mattered and, as was emphasized, 
featured prominently in the considerations. It may be 
worthwhile to remark that this strategy is very similar to 
what obtains in more developed economies from where the 
oil refining system was imported. Writing against the 
background of such economies, Constant II emphasizes: 
[the] purchase or use of almost any modern technology 
is mediated by the complex organizations that are 
required to integrate the knowledge and resources 
necessary to produce and distribute the artifact or 
service (1987: 231). 
In Port Harcourt, the project team and their activities 
equate to Constant II's 'complex organisations' and there 
can be little doubt that these are socially - oriented 
endeavours. Furthermore, every decision taken, which 
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concerned the technical change, was not necessarily 
technological. For example, there were decisions 
concerning the source of finance for the project as well 
as regarding the manpower needs- the skill requirements; 
the types of training needed; and when, how and where the 
training would take place. Presumably, these decisions 
aimed to make both the technology and the human resources 
productive so as to optimize the returns on investment. 
In essence, both the 'human' and the 'non-human' were 
regarded as important. 
The relevance of the human and the non-human was also 
evident in the implementation and operation of the 
technology. For example, the potential of the technology, 
which included automatic start-ups and shut-downs, 
admittedly influenced its choice. However, the 'top-down' 
approach of the implementation arrangements was not a 
technological demand but, was more, a social preference. 
Moreover, modifications on sections of the plant which 
allegedly occurred after its commissioning is of 
significance. Respondents referred to adjustments that 
had to be carried out on some pumps, cables, 
instrumentations etc. As a respondent explained: 
If we have problems with running an equipment or in 
achieving our desired results from the column, the 
man in charge of the area may come up with some 
modification ideas which he thinks would help to 
achieve the desired objective. This proposal for 
modification is sent ... to our technical services 
section that reviews modifications, that is, the 
merits and demerits-If the suggestions are found to 
be appropriate, ... the modification is carried out (Effiong: July, 1991). 
That is, on one hand, the technology 
extent that it presented constraints 
modification of some of its parts. 
hand, social relevance is highlightec 
grappling with the modifications is 
guided by human decision and choice. 
is relevant in the 
which necessitated 
But, on the other 
3 by the point that 
a social activity, 
Indeed, the 
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perception of a technical constraint which requires 
modification is itself a human, not a technological, 
phenomenon. 
In addition, the social impact' on technological change 
could be located in the whole hearted acceptance of change 
by all organisational participants. Perhaps, resistance 
by workers would have led to greater or lesser use of the 
technical control system. A pertinent point here is that 
the technology opened up possibilities which, in turn, 
suggested the existence of options as well as choice 
between options. Conversely, the existence of 
possibilities and options, albeit enabled by the 
technology, also highlighted the fact that the 
manifestation of the potentials of technology was 
dependent on social choice. 
In any event, there were indications of what Meissner 
(1969) had described as the 'teleology of production', and 
Forsyth et al., (1982) took as 'technical rigidities'. 
Regarding this, one could point to "spatial constraints' 
(Meissner, 1969) arising from the technical design which 
meant that a control operator, for example, had to perform 
his job tasks only in the controlroom itself. Moreover, 
technical rigidity would explain the point that the jobs 
of operators in the HF (Hydrofluoride) unit of the plant 
were dependent on those of their colleagues in the CDU 
(Crude distillation unit) which supplied, the 'raw 
material', namely 'atmospheric residue', for the HF unit. 
A breakdown in the CDU did inevitably mean inactivity in 
the HF unit. 
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Other examples reflecting the 'teleology of production' 
were found in the way pumps and compressors were operated. 
With regard to pumps, a respondent explained that the 
nature of the technology required that certain procedures 
were followed before a pump could be taken out. As he 
elaborated: 
Suppose you want to take out a pump for maintenance, 
the first thing to do is to stop the pump. The next 
thing is that you isolate it, i. e. shut off the 
sunction and discharge lines. Then you depressurize 
it [after which] the pump is ready. If you bypass 
any of these steps, there'll be a problem. Like, if 
you stop the pump, isolate it but do not depressurize 
it, if somebody goes to do anything there, the 
content may splash on the person or could even cause 
fire. So you can't afford to jump any of the steps. 
They have to be followed sequentially (Umanna: July, 
1991). 
Similarly, handling a compressor required a series of 
technically-influenced procedures. However, here, social 
impact was also implicated. This is in the extent that, 
by the company's policy, the status of the worker to start 
a compressor must not be less than a senior operator; 
trainee operators were prohibited from this activity. 
Furthermore, the technology demanded continuous operation 
and adherence to certain "start up' and 'shut down' 
procedures. Nonetheless, the technology did not actually 
determine precisely when it should be started or stopped. 
This was largely socially determined. Infact, it is 
notable that in Port Harcourt, complete shut down of 
operations in the refinery was permissible only with prior 
approval by the Federal government, not just the corporate 
management. 
It was noted that job specificity and/or rotation, as 
occurred in different units in the refinery, was not 
entirely due to the demands of the technology. 
Differences in the preferences of the different 
sections/units, with regard to the pursuit of job 
267 
specificity or job rotation, is indicative of social 
factors at work. The new technology would neither easily 
explain the persistence of these practices in the new 
plant nor explain the non-uniformity in the practices of 
the different departments. Also, it would not 
satisfactorily explain why in the new plant, the oil 
movement section reverted back to its old practice of job 
rotation after initially having a go with job specificity 
for its workers. More probably, a perception of failure 
of job specificity to meet the section's work objectives 
led to the reversion to the old, and apparently better 
trusted, job rotation. In essence, these work practices 
were essentially managerial arrangements presumably 
intended for more efficient running of the technology. 
In addition, the technology offered opportunity for 
reductions in the manning levels. But whether or not this 
opportunity is exploited appeared to be a social decision. 
As the study showed, manning levels in the refinery were 
more socially - than technologically - determined. For 
instance, according to a manager in process, "may be about 
5 people would be enough to man the FCC [Fuel Catalytic 
Cracking Unit]" but this was not the case principally 
because of "so much unemployment in the country" (Anah: 
June, 1991). That is, the need to provide jobs coupled 
with that to develop technical skills meant that the 
technology's potential to reduce manning was deliberately 
not exploited. At this juncture, it is perhaps necessary 
to remark in passing that these observations negate 
propositions such as that, once the design of a 
technological system is complete, "then social choices 
become frozen in [the] technology" (Clark et al., 
1988: 32). As was evident, although the refining system 
was imported as a completed design, there was still room 
for local choice in its deployment. 
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The interactive phenomenon could also be discerned in the 
shift work system. The shift system could be seen as a 
technological demand in so far, as according to a 
respondent, 
the technology demands continuous operation [and so] 
we have to run the plant on a round-the-clock 
basis ... turning the system on and off daily would 
certainly cause damage and could be a disaster 
(Nnamdi: June, 1991). 
He also noted that "nobody can work for 24 hours". Hence, 
on one hand, the shift system was to ensure that the 
technological system was kept working as technologically 
demanded in order to optimise its utility. On the other 
hand, the shift system served to ensure that the human 
users of the technology were not overworked. In other 
words, both the technological and social demands were 
satisfied. Moreover, that the shift system generally 
results from considerable social influence is further 
evidenced by the fact that it varies from one place to 
another. For example, whilst Gallie recorded that for 
French refinery workers, "the morning shift started at 
5am, the afternoon shift at 1pm and the night shift at 
9. pm" (1978: 90), the Port Harcourt workers were under a 
different arrangement. In Port Harcourt, morning shift 
started at 7.00am, afternoon at 2.00pm and the night shift 
at 10.00pm. In essence, whilst the nature of the 
technology necessitates the shift system, the form which 
shift system takes is socially determined. 
Technology and the content and character of Jobs. 
In Port Harcourt, mediation of work by the technology was 
evident. Many workers had to perform their task by means 
of the new system which rendered many jobs less physically 
strenuous. For certain workers, like control operators 
and instrument technicians, the new technology created 
opportunities for acquiring new skills and knowledge. The 
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new monitoring and control devices as well as the new 
self-diagnostic equipment had meant new skill 
requirements. As was suggested in chapter 8, the new 
technology enabled the reskilling of the controlmen who 
transfered from the old plant, whilst the relatively newly 
employed controlmen who, as it were had no identifiable 
production skill base, were enskilled. On the other hand, 
external operators saw reduction in the requirement for 
both their effort and skill as a result of the adoption of 
the new technology refining system. Also, for some 
mechanical maintenance workers, work became less 
synonymous with physical exertion. Generally, the 
application of the new technology resulted in changes in 
the character of some jobs. 
Nevertheless, whilst the technology redefined the skills 
of many jobs, it did not correspondingly affect the 
%ordering' and specification of the tasks. Social 
elements seemed more influential in these latter 
dimensions of the content of jobs. Admittedly, the 
technology demanded the possession of certain specialised 
skills for its operation, and also demanded that its 
operation commands be inputted in a particular way. 
However, decisions concerning when and who inputted the 
command, in order to get the system working, remained 
within human territory. Furthermore, the varieties of 
tasks individual workers carried out depended much on the 
work instructions provided by superordinates. It seemed 
to have little to do with the technology. 
Technological Change And The Control Of Work 
The new refining technology was able to take on direct 
control of some production processes. Once programmed, 
the system was able to respond with a precision that was 
unmatched by humans. As it appeared, the new technology 
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actually resulted in a considerable decrease in human 
intervention in the production processes. Also, it became 
possible for supervisors to know what subordinates were 
doing without being on their backs most of the time. 
Hence, a supervisor (Ngo: July, 1991) noted how it was 
possible to sit back and instruct a subordinate to start 
a pump and run it for a certain time. The new system, in 
his words, 
would tell me when the pump was started; when it was 
stopped ... if the pump ran [for] more than was instructed, I will find out ... 
Furthermore, the high degree of precision and accuracy of 
the technology in monitoring and controlling operations 
meant that, generally, it could be relied upon to get 
things' right. In addition, its fault detection 
capabilities meant that errors would not go undetected for 
long periods. In this regard, the supervisor (Ngo: 
July, 1991), in reference to an incident in which an 
operator kept recirculating water in a section of the 
system instead of running it off as was instructed, 
emphasised that 
the present technology has now made it possible for 
us to ... sit down in the control room and watch and know what is happening outside. If the incident had 
happened in the old plant, we couldn't have been able 
to notice it, unless one went outside. 
That is, the new technology enabled supervision to be more 
indirect. 
In any event, that the technology still required human 
intervention cannot be over-emphasized. The computerised 
system carried out actions and in certain cases, concluded 
and stopped actions. But it still required human input 
before it could commence action. Also, whilst the 
technology detected and, by itself, corrected some errors, 
correction of some other errors were left firmly in human 
hands. It is also noteworthy that, on the one hand, the 
technology influenced the control of work via its demands 
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for compliance with standard operating procedures. 
Nonetheless, on the other hand, human influence could 
equally be discerned in the provision of work 
instructions, and hence some form of human control, by 
superordinates. 
Further evidence of social influence in the control of 
work in the new technology environment was found in the 
stability of other control strategies like the status 
structure and the discipline and reward systems. These 
remained basically unyielding to any technological 
influence. Although the new system affected the mode of 
supervision, contrary to Zuboff's supposition, it had not 
made authority to "depend more upon an appropriate fit 
between knowledge and responsibility" (1988: 6). Instead, 
the traditional ranking system had endured. As was 
apparent, whilst, for instance, many subordinates were 
more versed in the relevant technical knowledge than their 
supervisors, this did not alter their positions in the 
hierarchy. That is, although the technology had created 
possibilities for more 'organic' organisational structure, 
humans, or more precisely, management's apparent 
preference for the more hierarchical structure ensured its 
endurance. Generally, management maintained their 
prerogative to manage and favoured strategies which tended 
to maintain the status quo. 
The Industrial Relations Context Of The Technological 
Change. 
In Port Harcourt, technological change was not an 
industrial relations issue. In fact, relations between 
management and labour appeared to be unperturbed by 
technical change. This, in a way, tends to suggest that 
technology is capable of carving a path for itself and 
apparently gives some credence to Ellul's argument that 
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technology is "autonomous ... self determinative 
independently of ... human intervention" (1981: 205). But, 
this view remains flawed when technology is seen merely as 
a chosen means. In other words, the relationship between 
technology and industrial relations is a function of 
social choice. Essentially, social actors determine 
whether or not, and how, technology would feature in 
industrial relations matters. For example, with regard to 
Port Harcourt, corporate management was in a position to 
decide what the content of collective bargaining would be. 
It would have been a perfectly feasible strategy for 
management to use the potentials of the new technology as 
a chip for bargaining. But, there was little evidence 
that it did. As was evident, management chose not to. In 
any event, the social organisation of collective 
bargaining which was such that bargaining occurred only 
at the corporate level, and involved all the NNPC 
subsidiary companies bargaining together, probably 
prevented the use of such a strategy. Since the 
technology in question concerned only one of the 
subsidiary companies, it seemed out of place to play up 
its potentials in the circumstances. 
In fact, it could be argued that whilst remaining 
relatively impervious to technological influence, the 
refinery's industrial relations system actually had a 
significant influence on the mode, and the outcomes, of 
technological change. For instance, the relative 
strengths of the industrial relations parties possibly 
ensured that the comparatively weaker partner, the 
workers, played no part in the decisions regarding the 
change. Also, the nature of unionisation, whereby 
organisation was along seniority lines, ensured that union 
rivalry and quarrels concerning encroachment on 
occupational boundaries were non - existent. In addition, 
the general acceptance of technical change could be 
explained in terms of the non - adversarial pattern of 
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industrial relation which had resulted largely from the 
government's statutory laws and regulations. All these 
social 'shapings' seem to have contributed significantly 
to technological change outcomes. 
In any case, as was suggested in chapter 10, an equally 
feasible argument is that the creation of many new jobs by 
the technology and its provision of opportunities for the 
acquisition of technical skills meant that change was not 
resisted. In other words, the technology aided the 
sustenance of non-adversarial industrial relations by 
enabling the creation of new jobs and desired skills. 
Perhaps, the reverse would have been the case if the 
adoption of the new technology had resulted in job losses. 
In any event, the prevalent social conditions meant that 
the potential of the technology to generate job losses was 
ignored. Evidently, the non - exploitation of this 
potential of the technology was more a social, than a 
technological, decision. 
The Mode Of Technology Influence 
From the study, the 'interactiveness' of the human and the 
non - human could be suggested. Against the background of 
the foregoing, technological change outcomes at the Port 
Harcourt refinery could be seen as a function of the 
"forces of the collective and the synthetic capacity of 
the individual" (Callon, 1991: 148) actors in the network. 
As was evident, what seemed to be straightforward 
technological' effects also turned out to have 'social' 
undertones. Similarly, some purely social decisions also 
took the technological into consideration. That is, to a 
considerable degree, both the social' and the 
'technological' were relevant and were in an 
interdependent, not a mutually independent, relationship. 
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Further, although technology "lacks whatever it is that 
currently distinguishes us as paradigm human beings" (Law, 
1991: 17), this has not robbed it of the capacity to 
influence. As was shown, it was able to exert influence 
on the technical aspects of the control system as well as 
influenced the skill content of jobs. Nonetheless, as the 
research has shown, technology's ability to influence was 
ft. woven' into the social which was itself transformed by 
the technological. This was the order of things even 
though a member of the coalition was alien - imported from 
the outside. 
Admittedly, in Nigeria generally, foreign technology is 
revered and conjours a desirable image of perfection. 
But, this has not confered it determinacy. Evidently, 
technology is neither irrelevant nor is it overarchingly 
dominant. Certainly in Port Harcourt, the new refining 
technology is relevant in the organisation of work. But, 
explanation for its relevance does not reside in the 
%technological' alone. It is also located in the social. 
In other words, a crucial point here is not that the new 
refining technology did not have discernable influence but 
that on no account was the technological influence exactly 
independent, contrary to what Clark and his colleagues 
(1988) tend to suggest. In Port Harcourt, technology's 
influence was always dependent on its alliance with 
humans. 
Moreover, neither the technological determinist nor the 
social determinist approach would exclusively provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the extant model of work 
organisation at the Port Harcourt refinery, following the 
application of new technology. In Port Harcourt, the 
technology was not able to influence all dimensions of 
work organisation. For example, it was unable to 
influence some aspects of the control system. This is 
inconsistent with the technological determinist thesis. 
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Similarly, that the technology evidently influenced the 
skill content of jobs cannot be explicated under a social 
determinist framework. 
By contrast, the interactive model provides a more 
acceptable framework in so far as it recognizes the 
relevance of both the social and the technological. 
However, whilst emphasizing the importance of all 
ýactants', mainstream interactive model theorists (for 
example, Latour) fail to make a statement concerning the 
extent of relevance of each of the %actants' in a given 
phenomenon. In fact, they seek to dissuade such pursuits. 
Here lies the point of dissonance between the study and 
the model. As is evident from the study, interactivity 
between the actants is not equilibratory such that each 
contributes equally in every given phenomenon. By 
focusing on "routine operation - where the system has been 
brought into service and a stable pattern of working with 
the technology has been [more or less] established" 
(Mcloughlin, 1992: 6), the study attempted to show that 
although the social and the technological were 
"recursively woven" (Law, 1988), each was more influential 
in certain dimensions of work organisation than in some 
others. For instance, the technological evidently had 
more influence in relation to the skill requirements of 
jobs and in the mode of supervision than it did on the 
status structure, the discipline and reward systems, and 
in industrial relations matters. 
Overall, it is possible to propose that technology is 
relevant and has a discernable influence on aspects of 
work relations, even though its interdependent 
relationship with other organisation actants deprives its 
influence of any independence. However, in so far as 
actants do not contribute equally in all organisational 
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phenomena, more precise measurement of the exact extent of 
technological influence remains problematic and begs for 
further investigation. 
Nonetheless, as a final note, this study is considered 
significant for a number of reasons. It is an attempt to 
extend contemporary debates on technology at work to 
include a Third World workplace. Very importantly, it 
demonstrates that technological determinism remains flawed 
even in an environment where premium is placed on the 
technological. Moreover, it shows an example of where a 
cultural value has not been of "critical importance" in 
determining outcomes as Gallie(1978) would suggest. Here, 
the cultural belief in foreign technology as important and 
as the cornerstone for development has not made the 
technology determinate or dominant, contrary to a 
plausible expectation in the circumstance. Furthermore, 
also implicit from the study is an affirmation of the 
point that the acquisition of sophisticated foreign 
technology would not necessarily optimize productivity. 
Productivity seems more likely to be optimised if, along 
with such acquisitions, more attention is given to social 
elements like more carefully planned development and use 
of human actants. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questions below relate to your work in the refinery and are purely for research 
purposes. Please kindly spare some of your time to answer them. Some of the questions 
have a list of response options from which you are requested to tick an option. Where 
more than one option are agreeable to you, please assign positions to your chosen 
options, giving the Ist position to the most preferred option. 
N/B: Management, as used here, could be the supervisor or those in higher level 
management cadres. 
i How old are you? ..................................... 
ii Sex: (Male/Female) ..................................... 
iii Marital Status: (Single, Married, Widowed, Divorced) .................................. 
1. When did you start working for the refinery? ............................................................. 
2. What was your post when you started? ......................................................................... 
3. What did you actually do on that job? That is, what were your main duties? 
4. Do you still carry out the same job tasks as you did when you first took up the 
employment? Yes/No 
5. If your job tasks have changed: ........................................................................................ 
a. Since when did you start doing your new job tasks? ...................................... 
b. Are your tasks increased or decreased? 
c. Has the speed with which you do your work increased, decreased or 
remain the same? (Please underline as appropriate) 
d. In your opinion, which of the following is(are) responsible for the change? 
Response Options: 
Management decision 
Pressure from work mate(s) F-I 
Promotion 
The kind of technology in use 1ý 
None of the above F1 
6. 
7. 
s. 
Other reasons (please specify) .................................................................... 
Do not know 1ý 
a. Does your current job tasks require you to exert more physical power than 
previously? Yes/No 
If No, has the need for physical power decreased or remained the 
same? (Please underline the preferred option). 
b. Are your tasks technically more complex than before? Yes/No 
c. Did you require new knowledge to be able to perform your current job 
tasks? Yes/No 
d. Are you able to impose limits on the pace with which you work? Yes/No 
If yes, how? ................................................................................................... 
e. Please state what you think is(are) the reason(s) for the present state of 
your work tasks. 
Do you work in groups? Yes/No 
If you work in a group; 
a. 
b. 
C. 
Is the work group a permanent one or varies according to the assignment 
to be done? 
(Please underline the preferred option) 
Who selects the members of the group? ............................................................. 
Why, in your opinion, do you work in groups? ............................................... 
d. Do you have a group leader? Yes/No 
If yes, what does the group leader do? ..................................................... 
........................................................................................................................... 
e. Do you think the group leader knows more about the job than you do? 
Yes/No 
f. Is the group under constant observation by a higher officer? Yes/No 
Now, I would like to ask some questions on training. 
9. Do you think you needed more training to be able to work in the refinery? Yes/No 
10. Have you undergone any training since you were employed? Yes/No 
11. If you have undergone some training, 
a. What kind(s) of training? ...................................................................................... 
b. When did you undergo training? ........................................................................ 
c. Who selected you for training? ..................................................... ............ 
d. In your opinion, what was the reason for the training? 
e. Did you acquire any new skill(s), from the training, which is(are) useful 
in performing your job tasks? Yes/No 
If Yes, what skill(s) ........................................................................................ 
f. What other benefit(s), if any, did you derive from the training? 
Back to your daily work tasks 
12. a. Do you have standard operating procedures for performing your work 
tasks? Yes/No 
b. It Yes: 
i. Who Provides it? ..................................................................................................... 
ii. Do the operating procedures actually direct the sequence (_)f wo-11 k, for 
example, direct what tasks must be performed before others? Ycs/N-o 
iii What in your opinion influence(s) the content of the operati ng proceci u res? 
Response Options: 
The nature of the technological system in operation IJ 
Attitude of workers/work groups 
Management's preferences and judgement 
None of the above options F1 
other reason(s) (please specify) ................................................................. 
Do not know 
F-I 
iv) Do you always follow the operating procedures provided? Yes/. No 
Why? ................................................................................................................ 
13. 
14 
Do you have a supervisor to supervise your job? Yes/No 
If your work is supervised: 
a. 
b. 
Is the supervision able to direct the job you do without actually being with 
you most of the time? Yes/No- 
If Yes, what enables the supervisor to do so? 
Response Options: 
The technical control systems F1 
The rules and regulations which guide the jobb L_ýJ 
The influence of work mates/group 
i 
None above 
P 
Other reason(s) (please specify) ................................................................. 
Do not know 
1ý 
15. Do you like it if the supervisor is able to supervise your job without physically 
being with you? Yes/No 
Why? ...................................................................................................................................... 
16. If the supervisor is always on hand, is it because: 
i. You are not very familiar with the equipment and their operation? Yes/No 
ii. You like him to be there? Yes/No 
iii He chooses to be there always? Yes/No 
17. a. Are you most times left alone to do your work without frequent 
interference from the supervisor or foreman? Yes/No 
b. Has it always been so? Yes/No 
If No, since when did the change occur in the supervisor/ foreman's 
approach? ........................................................................................................ 
c. What is responsible? 
Response Options: 
Workers preference and insistence 
The nature of the technology in operation 
11 
Management's preference F1 
None above 
11 
Other reasons (please specify) .................................................................... 
r 
Do not know 1ý 
18. 
19. 
20. 
In your opinion, is your work: 
i. Sufficiently challenging? Yes/No 
ii. Interesting? Yes/No 
iii More of a routine? Yes/No 
iv Boring? Yes/No 
a What interests you about your job? .................................................................... 
..................................................................................................................................... 
b How do you maintain the interest? ..................................................................... 
a What aspect(s) of your job, if any, do you not like 
b. Why do you not like the aspect(s)? ..................................................................... 
c. In what ways do you try to contain the dislike? 
Is your salary influenced by: 
i. the skills you have? Yes/No 
ii. the kind of equipment you operate or use? Yes/No 
iii laid down conditions of employment? Yes/No 
22. a Do you belong to the staff association? Yes/No 
b. If Yes, is membership optional or obligatory? .................................................. 
(underline as appropriate) 
c. Does the association: 
i. enable you to perform your job better? Yes/No 
ii. help to ensure that you retain your job? Yes/No 
iii help to improve the conditions of your employment? Yes/No 
Thank you very much for your help. 
C. Nwuche (Mrs) 
July, 1991 
r 
Appendix 2 
QUESTIONS ASKED AT MOST OF THE INTERVIEW 
SESSIONS 
- What is the function of the department/unit? 
- What categories of workers are in the 
department/unit? 
Why the new refinery? 
At which level was the decision on the adoption of 
the new technology taken? 
What factors were considered before the decision was 
taken? 
- Did the technological change concern product or 
process innovation or both? 
- Has there been any modifications to the technological 
design? Why? 
- Are the pace of work; number and variety of tasks; 
skill requirements; efforts level; and the level of 
discretion/ autonomy of the workers whilst performing 
their job tasks different from what they were in the 
old plant? 
- Do the workers like the conditions of works? Are 
they committed and compliant? 
- What is the role of the supervisors? Did they 
experience any change in their role since the new 
refinery was commissioned? How? 
- What relationship exists between effort and reward? 
- Is the current reward system different from what it 
was in the old plant? 
* Questions were not necessarily asked in the same 
order and in exactly the same words during each 
interview session. 
__- 
URT REFINING COMPANY LIMITED 
(Internal Memorandum) 
v ýAr 1 DATE 22/4/92 
FROM INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER YOUR REF. 
SUBJECT PENGASSAN/MANAGEMENT JCC MEETING OUR REF. 162.1 
"i 
The Joint Consultative-Commit-fee meeting has been scheduled 
for Thursday, 23rd of, April, 1992 in the Conference Room, New 
Administration Block at. 1000 hours. 
,.. . 
T/1 t. ý f1 ! 
AGENDA 
teFb) ) Matters arising from the minutes of the meeting of 10/1/92. 
Matters arising from the last minutes of 24/3/92. 
c) Medical ' 
1 
d) Transport/MD's memo on lateness 
e) Canteen II 
f) Kiosks within the Company's premises 
- g) A. O. B. _- 
D. M. BARASIN 
I 
DIST. 
0/C PERSONNEL 
0/C ADMINISTRATION 
0/C SECURITY 
0/C MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT 
a 
cc: HAP/SECRETARY. PENGASSAN 
s 
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